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\",\"path\":null,\"side\":null,\"line\":null}{\"type\":\"pull_request_comment\",\"body\":\"Good catch — fixed in 95ef998: the archival bullet now names the actual hazard (GetProvenanceAsync reads CreatedBy*/MadeOfficialAtUtc straight from the original *.Create/promotion events for as long as the record stays visible) and says any archival design must keep those source events queryable, not just drop/roll up by age.\",\"path\":\"docs/decisions/505-audit-events-no-time-partition.md\",\"side\":\"RIGHT\",\"line\":null}","text_elements",[],{"_391":563,"_370":371,"_393":377},{"_394":564,"_396":-5,"_45":-5,"_398":565,"_400":-5,"_99":328,"_95":402},[566],{"_403":377},{"_49":559,"_95":426},{"_391":568,"_370":371,"_393":377},{"_394":569,"_396":-5,"_45":-5,"_398":570,"_400":-5,"_99":328,"_95":402},[571,572],{"_403":377},{"_49":574,"_95":426},{"_49":573,"_95":426},"\n /workspace/cluckwork\n bash\n 2026-08-13\n Etc/UTC\n /workspace/cluckwork\n","# AGENTS.md instructions for /workspace/cluckwork\n\n\n# AGENTS.md — Cluckwork\n\nPoultry egg-farm management system. Backend: **.NET 10** (C#), layered DDD. Frontend: **React 19 + Vite** SPA in `web/`. Postgres via EF Core.\n\nThis file is the shared brief for any coding agent (Claude Code, Codex, etc.).\n\n## Communicating\n\nKeep explanations clear and human-sounding. Provide concise, focused responses. Skip preambles and recaps — lead with the action or answer.\n\n## Layout\n\n```\nsrc/\n Cluckwork.Domain aggregates, value objects, domain events (no deps)\n Cluckwork.Application feature handlers, repository interfaces, validators\n Cluckwork.Infrastructure EF Core, Identity/JWT, repositories, seeding, jobs\n Cluckwork.Api minimal-API endpoints, middleware, Program.cs\nweb/ React/Vite SPA (see web/README.md)\ndeploy/ docker-compose (.yml prod, .dev.yml dev DB), .env.example\nspecs/ product + technical specs, wireframes\ntests/ Domain.Tests, Application.Tests, Api.IntegrationTests\n```\n\nDependencies point inward: Api → Application/Infrastructure → Domain. Domain depends on nothing.\n\n## Build / test / run\n\n```bash\ndotnet build Cluckwork.sln # warnings are errors — keep it clean\ndotnet test Cluckwork.sln # 688 tests as of 2026-07; integration needs Docker\n```\n\n- **Integration tests** spin up a real Postgres via Testcontainers (`docker` required). No SQLite — EF SQL semantics differ.\n- **Run full stack (prod-like):** `docker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.yml up --build` → SPA + API on http://localhost:8080 (single container; API serves the built SPA from `wwwroot`).\n- **Run frontend dev:** `cd web && npm run dev` → http://localhost:5173 (proxies `/api` → :8080).\n- **Debug API (no docker stack):** `docker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.dev.yml up -d` (Postgres on :5432), then run/debug `Cluckwork.Api` (Development env). Dev secrets live in **user-secrets**, not files.\n\n## Conventions (follow these)\n\n- **Result pattern:** domain/handlers return `Result` / `Result` (see `Domain/Common`). Don't throw for expected failures; throw only for invariant violations (e.g. `Flock.Create` guards).\n- **Every aggregate mutation must bump `Version`.** `Version` is an EF concurrency token (`IsConcurrencyToken`) — EF puts the *original* value in the UPDATE's WHERE but never auto-increments it. A mutation without `Version++` silently loses concurrent races (both writers match `WHERE Version = N`) instead of 409ing. This bug shipped three times (`RecordProduction` was correct; `Submit`/`Lock` and `SalesOrder.AddItem` weren't) — each now has a parallel-race integration test; add one for any new mutation.\n- **Handler per feature**, invoked directly from endpoints — **no MediatR**. Register handlers/validators/repos in `Program.cs`.\n- **Validation:** FluentValidation validators (`*Validator`), one per command; endpoints call `ValidateAsync` and return `ValidationProblem`.\n- **Endpoints:** minimal APIs grouped under `/api/v1/...` via `MapEndpoints`; writes require auth + an `Idempotency-Key` (middleware).\n- **Multi-tenancy:** every tenant-owned entity has `AccountId`; enforced by an EF **global query filter** + a **`TenantStampInterceptor`** (stamps on insert). `TenantContext` is resolved per-request from the JWT `account_id` claim. At startup it's unresolved → use `IgnoreQueryFilters()` in seeders.\n- **Auth:** asymmetric JWT + rotating refresh tokens. PEM keys come from config with escaped `\\n`; normalize via `PemKey.Normalize` before `ImportFromPem`. Integration tests generate an ephemeral RSA pair at test-process startup (`TestJwtKeys` in `CluckworkWebApplicationFactory.cs`) — no real key material is ever committed to source (`deploy/.env.example` carries PEM armor with a `replace-me` body, not a usable key).\n- **Both JWT keys are checked at boot, and the check is serving-only (#510/#347).** `AddCluckworkIdentity` requires `Jwt:PublicKeyPem` **and** `Jwt:PrivateKeyPem` to be non-blank **and to actually import**; a `Serving` process refuses to start otherwise. Two traps this closes, both of which shipped: `configuration[...] ?? throw` catches **only null** while the shipped `appsettings.json` carries `\"\"` — use **`IsNullOrWhiteSpace`**, never `??`, or the guard is decorative for every real deployment; and importing inside the `AddJwtBearer` delegate makes a corrupt key a **per-request** failure, so the farm boots green, `/health/ready` passes, the container `HEALTHCHECK` passes, and every authenticated request 500s — an orchestrator sees a healthy instance that rejects every login. The check takes a `ProcessRole` and is skipped for one-shot verbs, which neither issue nor validate a token; **making it eager without that scope is a fresh #331** in the most security-sensitive file of the set. Pinned from both sides: four rows in `ProcessRoleGuardTests` (each key × missing/unusable) plus `OneShotVerbMinimalConfigTests`, whose environment carries no `Jwt:*` at all.\n- **Credential epoch revocation (#364).** Every access/refresh token is bound to the user's `CredentialEpoch`; every password-reset path bumps it so issued credentials fail on next use. Epoch **`0` is permanently retired** (users start at `1`, legacy refresh rows at `0`), and a missing/malformed `credential_epoch` claim is **always a mismatch** — never default it to the DB epoch. `CredentialEpochMiddleware` does a **fresh DB read per authenticated request** (the round trip *is* the fail-closed guarantee — do not cache), sits **after `TenantResolutionMiddleware`, before `MustChangePasswordMiddleware`**, and exempts `auth/logout`. Login/step-up snapshot the verified epoch+stamp before clearing failed-access and refuse issuance on a concurrency-loss reload. Distinct from #283/#265/#308 — none substitutes for another. **Break it and a revoked credential keeps working.** → [`docs/decisions/364-credential-epoch-revocation.md`](docs/decisions/364-credential-epoch-revocation.md)\n- **Base reference data via guarded raw-SQL migrations (#283).** The default account, four assignable roles, default egg grades, and packed-unit conversions are **static reference data baked into the migrations** as hand-written `migrationBuilder.Sql` with `WHERE NOT EXISTS` guards — **never `HasData`/`InsertData`** (which key on the PK and would either collide or emit `UpdateData`/`DeleteData` that silently reverts the farm's own edits). No runtime seeder, no `Seed:*`. The **grades** guard is whole-set (empty catalog, because grades are user-renamable); roles/conversions/account are **per-key** (keys aren't user-mutable). Pinned by `MigrationSecurityReviewTests` + `BaseReferenceDataMigrationTests`. **Regenerate these into `HasData` and a later model-diff reverts a renamed grade.** → [`docs/decisions/283-migrations-base-provisioning.md`](docs/decisions/283-migrations-base-provisioning.md)\n- **Migrations: `InitialCreate` frozen, one migration per change (#407).** `Persistence/Migrations/` is one squashed `InitialCreate` (recorded id `20260801190854_InitialCreate`); it is **frozen and never regenerated**, and **every schema change gets its own `dotnet ef migrations add`**. EF never re-runs an applied migration, so a column **hand-folded into `InitialCreate` silently does not exist** on any booted DB — it surfaces as broken behaviour (a failed login, #399), not a migration error. `InitialCreate` also carries four un-regenerable `lower(\"Name\")` expression indexes + the base-reference SQL; regenerating mints a new timestamp that desynchronises `__EFMigrationsHistory` everywhere. Pre-squash or pre-#407 dev DBs can't migrate forward — drop and recreate. `MigrationSecurityReviewTests` freezes the id + a portable operation digest. → [`docs/decisions/407-migration-freeze.md`](docs/decisions/407-migration-freeze.md)\n- **Schema docs are generated, committed, and regenerated with every migration (#417).** `docs/schema/` (mermaid ERD + full catalog: every column, constraint, and index — including the raw-SQL expression indexes and partial predicates EF reflection can't see) is produced by `tools/schema-docs/generate.sh` from an ephemeral migrated Postgres via digest-pinned tbls. **Every PR that adds a migration runs the generator and commits the result in the same PR** — CI's `build-and-test` runs `generate.sh --check` (byte-diff against a fresh generation) and fails a stale PR. Generated files under `docs/schema/` are **never hand-edited**, and a conflict there after a rebase is resolved by regenerating, never by hand-merging. Pinned from three sides by `SchemaDocsTests` (postgres-pin uniformity across every tracked file, no environment leakage, completeness against the live catalog). → [`docs/decisions/417-schema-docs.md`](docs/decisions/417-schema-docs.md)\n- **`AuditEvents` is not time-partitioned, on purpose (#505).** The dominant read (`GetProvenanceAsync`, run on every Flocks/Egg grades/Daily entries/Sales/Expenses page load) filters on `AccountId`+`EntityType`+`EntityId` with **no date predicate**, so partitioning by month would convert one index lookup into one per partition — added per-partition overhead that only grows as months pass, for no pruning benefit — plus a PK change, a new INSERT-fails-without-next-month's-partition failure mode inside the same transaction as the audited mutation (#93), and no partition-maintenance job to prevent it. At current growth (~20 MB/year at 100 flocks) this is not close to needed; if it ever is, partition by `AccountId` (the column the query actually filters on) once genuinely multi-tenant, not by time. → [`docs/decisions/505-audit-events-no-time-partition.md`](docs/decisions/505-audit-events-no-time-partition.md)\n- **Seed / simulation data is never boot-seeded (#280, #284, #279).** Run it explicitly against an **already-base-seeded, non-Production** database: `ASPNETCORE_ENVIRONMENT=Development dotnet Cluckwork.Api.dll seed --profile demo|simulation` (an unset env → Production → blocked). The verb migrates, seeds, then exits — **authoritative** (ignores config) and **fail-loud** (a real exit code, never a silent no-op). `simulation` additionally records a durable date anchor + completion marker, so a clean re-run — even across a UTC-midnight rollover — converges to `AlreadySeeded`; a polluted account fails the exact-count validation **closed**. → [`docs/decisions/280-seed-and-simulation.md`](docs/decisions/280-seed-and-simulation.md)\n- **Break-glass recovery (#265):** `recover-admin` is a second one-off CLI verb on the same binary, same run-then-exit shape as `seed` — but deliberately **NOT** environment-gated (it must work against a real Production database): `dotnet Cluckwork.Api.dll recover-admin --email [--account ] [--reason ]`. For a locked-out account (the sole-Owner-lost-password case, no email/SMTP reset path) it, in one transaction, resets to a **freshly generated** temporary password (never one passed on the command line), rotates the security stamp, revokes every refresh token, and writes a conspicuous `User.BreakGlassReset` audit row carrying `--reason`. The temp password is printed to **stdout only** (never the logger/OTLP) and exit `0`; failures go to stderr with exit `1` and change nothing. `AdminRecoveryService` orchestrates; `IdentityProvider.BreakGlassResetAsync` shares the reset/revoke core with `SetUserPasswordAsync`. Full procedure + verification drill: `docs/runbooks/break-glass-account-recovery.md`.\n- **First-run admin provisioning: `bootstrap-admin` (#283).** `dotnet Cluckwork.Api.dll bootstrap-admin --email ` (run-then-exit, always available in Production) migrates, then — **only if the default account has no Owner** — creates one with a **freshly generated password (stdout only, never the logger/OTLP)** and `MustChangePassword=true`; a re-run is a **silent no-op**. While the flag is set the JWT carries `must_change_password`, `MustChangePasswordMiddleware` 403s every endpoint except `auth/change-password`+`auth/logout` (before `UseAuthorization` and before idempotency), and the SPA renders **Set your password**. Any successful reset clears the flag (one invariant in `IdentityProvider`). **Deliberately a separate credential type from #265/#308** — never conflated. → [`docs/decisions/283-first-run-admin-provisioning.md`](docs/decisions/283-first-run-admin-provisioning.md)\n- **Farm timezone + tzdata/ICU image constraint (#264):** the default account (a fixed `\"UTC\"` migration literal since #283) is provisioned once; a real farm sets its actual IANA zone via **Settings → timezone** after first login (`Account.UpdateSettings`), not at provisioning time (the `Seed:TimeZoneId` config lever from before #283 is retired along with the runtime seeder it fed). The farm clock resolves IANA zones via `TimeZoneInfo.FindSystemTimeZoneById` for every safety-sensitive local-day decision and **fails closed**, so the runtime **image MUST carry tzdata + ICU** (the Ubuntu 24.04 (Noble) `aspnet:10.0` base does; **never** an Alpine/chiseled base without tzdata, and **never** `InvariantGlobalization=true`). `AddCluckworkPersistence` still asserts a representative IANA canary resolves at boot (`TimeZoneAvailability.EnsureResolvable`), for **both** process roles — a bad image fails the boot loudly instead of surfacing later as a per-request `FarmTimeZoneException`.\n- **Migrate command + prod migration split (#263).** `dotnet Cluckwork.Api.dll migrate` applies EF migrations then exits — the **pre-deploy-job entrypoint**. In Production `Database:MigrateOnStartup=false`, so the serving process never runs DDL; the **guarantee is ordering** — compose runs a one-shot `migrate` service before `app` waits on `service_completed_successfully`. `DatabaseReadyHealthCheck` is the backstop: `/health/ready` **503s while any migration is pending**. The remaining host step (deploy repo) is a least-privilege runtime role with no DDL, plus `ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES` for the migrator. → [`docs/decisions/263-migrate-command.md`](docs/decisions/263-migrate-command.md)\n- **Proxy-trust boot guard (#260):** behind a reverse proxy/edge, HSTS (#144) and the per-IP login limiter (#143) only work if the app trusts the proxy's `X-Forwarded-*`, which it does **only** for networks in `RateLimiting:TrustedProxies`. An **empty list in Production fails the boot** (a `ProcessRole.Serving`-only guard, so `migrate`/`seed`/`recover-admin` are unaffected — see the process-role bullet below) rather than silently running with inert HSTS + a one-bucket limiter. Opt out with `RateLimiting:AllowNoTrustedProxies=true` only for a rare direct-TLS deploy with no fronting proxy. The concrete edge CIDR is deploy config (in the separate deployment/ops repo).\n- **Process role, not statement order (#347).** A boot guard's scope is declared, never positional. `ProcessRoles.From(args)` (`Hosting/ProcessRole.cs`) computes `ProcessRole.Serving | OneShot` **once**, before the host is built, and every role-scoped guard takes it: `ServingBootGuards.EnsureServingConfiguration` (#260, #319) is called **before** the CLI dispatch on purpose and still leaves the verbs alone, and `AddCluckworkTelemetry` (#316) and `AddCluckworkRateLimiting` (all of `RateLimitingOptions.Validate`) degrade with a stderr warning for `OneShot`. The one-shot verb list is derived from `CliDispatcher.Commands` so a new verb classifies itself; **`healthcheck` is the one that must be named explicitly** (it isn't an `ICliCommand` — it needs no host) and omitting it silently classifies the container's own probe as `Serving`. **Never gate a guard on where its statement sits**: that is what #331 was — the #316 validation ran at service registration, ahead of the dispatcher, and killed `recover-admin` (the break-glass verb) with SIGABRT 134. **Scope the whole subsystem, not the one setting that bit you**: #316's *endpoint* check was role-scoped while `ParseProtocol` two lines above it was not, so `Otlp:Protocol=bogus` still killed `recover-admin`; and `RateLimiting:TrustedProxies` **empty** was correctly serving-only while the **same key malformed** aborted every verb. **Every serving-only guard needs a row in `ProcessRoleGuardTests.ServingOnlyGuards`, one per VIOLATION rather than per subsystem** — `ServingGuardCoverageTests` reflects over `ServingBootGuards`, `RateLimitingOptions` and every `.ValidateOnStart()` registration and fails when a row is missing. Note that `.ValidateOnStart()` is serving-only *by mechanism* (it runs from `Host.StartAsync`, which the CLI dispatcher never reaches), so converting one to an eager registration-time check aborts every verb. The #261/#262 TLS floor and the #264 tzdata canary take no role: they apply to **both**, and unconditional code says so better than a parameter nobody branches on. → [`docs/decisions/347-process-role.md`](docs/decisions/347-process-role.md)\n- **Production Postgres TLS floor (#261/#262).** `ConnectionStrings:Default` accepts libpq URI or key-value form. In Production the effective `sslmode` is a **fail-closed allow-list**: `VerifyCA`/`VerifyFull` silent, `Require` warns, **everything else — `Disable`/`Allow`/`Prefer`, unset, or undefined — fails the boot**. `Database:AllowInsecureConnection=true` is the explicit opt-out for the co-located plaintext compose stack. When mapping a libpq param, **`ContainsKey(\"\")==false` does NOT mean Npgsql lacks the setting** — usually the keyword is spelled differently (`keepalives`→`Tcp Keepalive`, `client_encoding`→`Client Encoding`); search the keyword list before concluding it's unmappable (that exact false negative shipped #332). Integration tests opt out of this **and** the #260 guard. → [`docs/decisions/261-postgres-tls-floor.md`](docs/decisions/261-postgres-tls-floor.md)\n- **GSS/Kerberos negotiation off by default (#332).** `PostgresConnectionString` appends `GSS Encryption Mode=Disable` **unless the operator set it** (detected by **presence, not value**), **textually** after the TLS floor runs (a round-trip through the Npgsql builder would reorder/requote the operator's string and throw on any keyword this version doesn't know). Without it, Npgsql's `Prefer` default makes every connector dlopen the absent `libgssapi_krb5.so.2` and print two pre-Serilog stderr lines per process. Orthogonal to `sslmode` and to GSS *authentication*. → [`docs/decisions/332-gss-kerberos.md`](docs/decisions/332-gss-kerberos.md)\n- **Design-time migration connection fail-closed (#318):** `AppDbContextDesignTimeFactory` (used by `dotnet ef migrations add`/`database update`, never by the `migrate` verb, which uses the built host's own config) has **no default connection** — an unset/blank `CLUCKWORK_MIGRATIONS_CONNECTION` throws immediately, naming the variable, rather than falling back to a predictable `Host=localhost;...;Username=postgres;Password=postgres`. Every target is held to the **same allow-list TLS floor as a Production boot** (#261/#262, reused via `PostgresConnectionString.NormalizeAndValidate` — no second validator), except an explicitly acknowledged **loopback** development target: `CLUCKWORK_MIGRATIONS_ALLOW_INSECURE_LOOPBACK=true` permits plaintext, but only when the connection's host is `localhost`/`127.0.0.1`/`::1` (checked via `IPAddress.IsLoopback`) — set against any other host, it fails rather than silently widening scope.\n- **Container image hardening (#267):** the runtime stage runs **non-root** (`USER $APP_UID`, uid 1654 — the base image's built-in `app` account); all three base images are **digest-pinned** (`@sha256:…`, kept current by Dependabot's `docker` ecosystem); a CI job builds the image and **Trivy** fails the build on a *fixable* HIGH/CRITICAL. `aquasecurity/trivy-action` is **SHA-pinned** — the action was compromised in the 2026-03 supply-chain incident, so pin the immutable commit, not the re-pointable tag (this is the standing rule for third-party actions). Keep the full glibc base (tzdata + ICU per #264); never chiseled/Alpine.\n- **Container health probe: the `healthcheck` verb (#266).** The runtime image and the compose `app` service run `dotnet Cluckwork.Api.dll healthcheck` — a run-then-exit verb **dispatched before host build** (it needs no host/DI/DB/config, so a 30s probe doesn't re-run startup or re-log boot warnings). The hardened image ships no curl/wget, so the probe is **in-process**: it GETs `/health/ready` over loopback and exits `0` on a 2xx, `1` on any other status or an unreachable server — **never a false green**. CI boots the built image and asserts `/health/ready` goes green. → [`docs/decisions/266-container-health-probe.md`](docs/decisions/266-container-health-probe.md)\n- **Transient-DB retry, and where it stops (#269).** `EnableRetryOnFailure` retries only **self-contained EF units** (every read, every `SaveChanges` outside a user transaction); it must **not** wrap unreplayable work. The general hazard is **an automatic replay sitting above a stateful detector** (a monotonic counter, a CAS stamp, a single-use claim) that can't tell \"this request racing itself\" from the signal it exists to detect. Two cures, and picking wrong ships the bug: **`SingleAttemptExecution`** when the replay is itself observable (e.g. `AccessFailedAsync`'s second durable increment — otherwise one wrong password locks at ~half the #128 threshold); a **durability probe keyed on a self-minted token** when the replay writes nothing and the defect is a mis-read `catch` (refresh-token rotation, login/reset `INSERT`s). All fail closed; pinned from both sides in `RetryBoundaryTests`. → [`docs/decisions/269-transient-db-retry-boundary.md`](docs/decisions/269-transient-db-retry-boundary.md)\n- **A new Production boot guard must be taught to the sim harness (#370).** Every guard that fails the boot on missing/invalid config (#260, #261/#262, #316, #319, …) and every config-key add/rename/retire must **also update `tools/simulation/bootstrap.sh` + `docker-compose.sim.yml` + `verify-harness.sh` in the same PR** — that harness runs **Production config on purpose**, is **deliberately not in CI**, and every path into it is human-started, so nothing tells you when you break it (four guards once landed unnoticed until it couldn't boot `main`). Satisfy guards **properly** (a concrete `AllowedHosts`, the documented opt-outs), never by disabling one. **Treat a boot-guard PR that leaves the harness behind like a missing test.** → [`docs/decisions/370-sim-harness-boot-guards.md`](docs/decisions/370-sim-harness-boot-guards.md)\n- **SPA E2E lives in `tools/simulation/ui/` (#277/#385).** Playwright drives the real built SPA over the **same** `seed --profile simulation` fixture k6 uses; `web/` stays Vitest + Testing Library. Three enforced rules, each of which has caught something: **never hardcode a credential** (personas from the git-ignored `.sim-cast.json`), **never hardcode English** (selectors resolve through the SPA's own en/es/tl catalogs — a missing key throws), and **respect the farm clock** (`America/Chicago` is behind UTC). Mutation-checked (`npm run mutation`; a red baseline aborts). **Anything reasoning about `inert` or the accessibility tree must go through CDP** (`src/ax.ts`) — Playwright's `ariaSnapshot`/`getByRole`/`isVisible` do **not** model `inert`, so such a spec written with them passes whether or not the app inerts anything (#501). **The quick suite runs on PRs** (path-filtered, ~3 min; owner call 2026-08-08 after #433 broke it silently); the `slow`/`canary` modes and the k6 sibling stay `workflow_dispatch`-only, so the #370 warning still applies to those. → [`docs/decisions/277-spa-e2e.md`](docs/decisions/277-spa-e2e.md)\n- **A write-contract change must update its non-CI callers (#394).** Adding a required field, tightening a validator, or changing an aggregate's state machine breaks automated callers no test references. **Coverage is not uniform:** the seeders are covered only to the handler/domain layer, so a **validator-only** tightening is invisible to all five seeder tests (they call `HandleAsync` directly, skipping `ValidateAsync`); `tools/simulation/k6/` and the Playwright specs are **uncovered**, and a green baseline hides it (`authedPost` counts a tolerated `[403,409,422]` as a pass, and `reset.sh` never runs k6). **So verify the request/status contract by reading the callers, not by running.** Grep callers of the endpoint, re-check each payload, and narrow a tolerated-status list when a status flips from \"constrained write\" to \"broken write\". → [`docs/decisions/394-write-contract-callers.md`](docs/decisions/394-write-contract-callers.md)\n- **Production logs: compact JSON on stdout; base layer argument-free (#404).** stdout is the only sink (no file/vendor sink). Production selects `CompactJsonFormatter`; Development the human `outputTemplate`; the base `appsettings.json` Console entry carries **`Name` only, no `Args`** — a template left in the base file merges *beside* the formatter and Serilog **silently binds the template and ignores the formatter**. Trace fields differ by format: compact JSON writes **`@tr`/`@sp`**, the Dev template `{TraceId}`/`{SpanId}` — a collector query against the wrong name matches nothing. **Compact JSON serializes EVERY property**, so anything pushed via `BeginScope`/`LogContext`/`ForContext` now reaches the collector (see #273 for the redaction answer). Pinned by `ProductionLogFormatTests`. → [`docs/decisions/404-production-logs.md`](docs/decisions/404-production-logs.md)\n- **Nullable enabled**, no unused usings (both are build-breaking).\n\n## Secrets — never commit\n\n- `deploy/.env` is gitignored (real values). `deploy/.env.example` holds placeholders only.\n- Local API debug config uses `dotnet user-secrets` (keyed by `UserSecretsId` in `Cluckwork.Api.csproj`).\n- No hardcoded passwords/keys in source — GitGuardian scans PRs. Generate test credentials at runtime.\n\n## Host-agnostic repo (deployment boundary)\n\nThis repo is **host-portable** — it must build and run against any host without\ncarrying provider-specific config. The app reads every environment specific from\nconfig/env (connection string, `RateLimiting:TrustedProxies`, `Seed:TimeZoneId`,\nPostgres `sslmode`, …) and **never names or branches on a hosting provider**.\n\n- **Stays here** (portable operational contract): the Dockerfile (incl. its\n `HEALTHCHECK`), `deploy/` compose as a local/reference stack, health probes\n (`/health/live`, `/health/ready`), the `migrate` / `seed` / `recover-admin` /\n `healthcheck` verbs, `.env.example`, and docs that state *requirements* (\"needs tzdata + ICU\",\n \"needs a trusted-proxy list\", \"needs TLS to Postgres\", \"a fronting CDN must\n respect origin cache headers\").\n- **Does NOT belong here** (goes to a **separate deployment/ops repo**):\n provider deploy manifests (`railway.json`, `fly.toml`), IaC (Terraform/Pulumi),\n CDN / DNS / edge config, secret-store wiring, provider-named runbooks, and the\n concrete environment *values* (proxy CIDRs, CA bundles, connection URLs).\n\nReviewers: treat a hardcoded provider name in code, config, or a committed doc\nlike a missing test — flag it. Naming a provider as a passing *example* in prose\nis tolerable only when no portable phrasing works; prefer the neutral term.\n\n### Deploy invariant: exactly ONE serving API instance (#271, #338)\n\n**Run one serving instance.** More than one breaks four separate things, and\nnone of them announces itself as \"you are running two replicas\". This is a\n*requirement* the app imposes on its host, so it lives here; the concrete\nreplica count and how it is pinned are deploy-side.\n\n`AddHostedService()`\n(`Hosting/CluckworkJobServiceCollectionExtensions.cs`) means **every** instance\nruns the worker loop, and the poll claims nothing — no `FOR UPDATE SKIP\nLOCKED`, no lease, no advisory lock. What that exposes today is **the three\nrecurring sweeps**, which ride the same poll and run unconditionally per\ninstance: `DailyEntryLockSweep`, `RefreshTokenPurgeSweep`,\n`IdempotencyRecordPurgeSweep`. The durable-job half is still a scaffold that\nselects pending rows and logs them — no handlers are registered — so job\ndouble-execution is latent, not live. **Registering the first handler makes it\nlive**, which is the moment this invariant stops being about sweeps only.\n\nNot every double-run is equally bad, and the difference decides what an operator\nwould actually see. The two purge sweeps are idempotent deletes, so a second\nrunner wastes work and reports nothing — genuinely silent.\n`DailyEntryLockSweep` is not silent: it reads-then-writes behind an optimistic\n`Version` token, so the losing replica's `SaveChangesAsync` throws a concurrency\nexception, which its per-account `catch` logs as `Lock sweep failed for account\n{AccountId}` (`Jobs/DailyEntryLockSweep.cs`). That is observable — but it reads\nas a database fault, not as \"two replicas are sweeping\", which is the sense in\nwhich the duplicate stays invisible.\n\n**Four independent blockers, all of which must close before scaling** — and\nthey are not all in #271:\n\n- **#271 — background work has no single-runner guarantee** (this section's\n subject). Needs an advisory-lock lease or `FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED` with crash\n recovery, **plus** a two-instance test proving each job and each sweep runs\n exactly once.\n- **#338 — `IStepUpGrantRegistry` is process-local.** `InMemoryStepUpGrantRegistry`\n is a per-process singleton holding step-up replay tracking and logout epochs,\n and its own header says a multi-instance deployment must move it to a shared\n store. Both #308 guarantees degrade per replica: a single-use grant becomes\n usable **once per replica**, and a logout honoured by one replica is invisible\n to the others. These grants gate privileged account-control operations, so\n this is the blocker with teeth — closing #271 alone does not license scaling.\n- **The IP-keyed auth limiters (#143) are in-process.** `AddRateLimiter`'s\n partitions live in each process — login, refresh, and client-error reports\n alike — so N replicas allow roughly N times the intended attempts per IP\n before lockout.\n- **The per-account report concurrency cap (#311) is in-process.**\n `ReportConcurrencyLimiter` is a singleton owning a `PartitionedRateLimiter`\n (`Api/RateLimiting/ReportConcurrencyLimiter.cs`, registered at\n `Hosting/CluckworkRateLimitingServiceCollectionExtensions.cs`), so one account\n can hold up to N × `ReportsConcurrency.PermitLimit` heavyweight report queries\n in flight — the DB/CPU ceiling that cap exists to bound, multiplied by the\n replica count.\n\nThe last two have no open issue; they are recorded here rather than left to be\nrediscovered.\n\n**How this list was derived, because it was twice derived wrongly.** Both misses\nwere the same shape — a process-local limiter — and the second one lived in a\nfile the first sweep had already opened. So do not extend this list from memory.\nRe-derive it: enumerate **every** `AddSingleton`/`AddHostedService` under `src/`\nplus every in-memory state primitive (`ConcurrentDictionary`, `IMemoryCache`,\n`PartitionedRateLimiter`, `Channel`, `SemaphoreSlim`, mutable statics), then\nclassify each one as safe or not. That walk currently finds 12 `AddSingleton`\nregistrations and 1 `AddHostedService` (13 total, the hosted service is not one\nof the 12); the four above are what survives it. Excluded deliberately, so\nthe next walk need not re-litigate them: `TimeProvider.System`, the Serilog\ndiagnostic contexts, `IValidateOptions`/`IAuthorizationMiddlewareResultHandler`\n(all stateless), and `FirstRunProvisioningLatch` — a monotonic one-way cache of\n\"the default account has an Owner\", where a per-replica copy costs at most a few\nextra reads and cannot go stale in the unsafe direction.\n\n**#307 (multi-replica HTTP write idempotency) is CLOSED**, so the request-path\nhalf is genuinely done — do not read that closure, or #271's, as permission to\nscale. Documenting the invariant, as this section does, is the interim\nmitigation, not the close for any of the four.\n\nThe run-then-exit verbs (`migrate`, `seed`, `recover-admin`, `bootstrap-admin`,\n`healthcheck`) are unaffected: they do not start the host's hosted services.\n\n## Writing a guard (a test that asserts an invariant)\n\nA guard is a test whose job is to *fail* when someone later does the wrong thing — the migration freeze (`MigrationSecurityReviewTests`), the body-reading endpoint check, the simulation manifest's exact counts. **A wrong guard is worse than no guard, because it reads as safety.** #407 spent five review rounds on one. The full rules with\n",{"_391":576,"_370":371,"_393":377},{"_394":577,"_396":-5,"_45":-5,"_398":578,"_400":-5,"_99":579,"_95":402},[580],{"_403":377},"developer",{"_49":581,"_95":426},"Do not spawn sub-agents unless the user or applicable AGENTS.md/skill instructions explicitly ask for sub-agents, delegation, or parallel agent work.",{"_391":583,"_370":371,"_393":377},{"_394":584,"_396":-5,"_45":-5,"_398":585,"_400":-5,"_99":579,"_95":402},[586],{"_403":377},{"_49":587,"_95":426},"You are `/root`, the primary agent in a team of agents collaborating to fulfill the user's goals.\n\nAt the start of your turn, you are the active agent.\nYou can spawn sub-agents to handle subtasks, and those sub-agents can spawn their own sub-agents.\nAll agents in the team, including the agents that you can assign tasks to, are equally intelligent and capable, and have access to the same set of tools.\n\nYou can use `spawn_agent` to create a new agent, `followup_task` to give an existing agent a new task and trigger a turn, and `send_message` to pass a message to a running agent without triggering a turn.\nChild agents can also spawn their own sub-agents.\nYou can decide how much context you want to propagate to your sub-agents with the `fork_turns` parameter.\n\nYou will receive messages in the analysis channel in the form:\n```\nMessage Type: MESSAGE | FINAL_ANSWER\nTask name: \nSender: \nPayload:\n\n```\nThey may be addressed as to=/root\n\nNote that collaboration tools cannot be called from inside `functions.exec`. Call `spawn_agent`, `send_message`, `followup_task`, `wait_agent`, `interrupt_agent`, and `list_agents` only as direct tool calls using the recipient shown in their tool definitions, such as `to=functions.collaboration.spawn_agent`, since they are intentionally absent from the `functions.exec` `tools.*` namespace. Available tools in `functions.exec` are explicitly described with a `tools` namespace in the developer message.\n\nAll agents share the same directory. In detail:\n- All agents have access to the same container and filesystem as you.\n- All agents use the same current working directory.\n- As a result, edits made by one agent are immediately visible to all other agents.\n\nThere are 4 available concurrency slots, meaning that up to 4 agents can be active at once, including you.",{"_391":589,"_370":371,"_393":377},{"_394":590,"_396":-5,"_45":-5,"_398":591,"_400":-5,"_99":579,"_95":402},[592,593],{"_403":377},{"_49":595,"_95":426},{"_49":594,"_95":426},"\n## Skills\nA skill is a set of instructions provided through a `SKILL.md` source. Below is the list of skills that can be used. Each entry includes a name, description, and source locator. `file` locators are on the host filesystem, `environment resource` locators are owned by an execution environment, `orchestrator resource` locators are opaque non-filesystem resources, and `custom resource` locators use their provider's access mechanism.\n### Available skills\n- imagegen: Generate or edit raster images when the task benefits from AI-created bitmap visuals such as photos, illustrations, textures, sprites, mockups, or transparent-background cutouts. Use when Codex should create a brand-new image, transform an existing image, or derive visual variants from references, and the output should be a bitmap asset rather than repo-native code or vector. Do not use when the task is better handled by editing existing SVG/vector/code-native assets, extending an established icon or logo system, or building the visual directly in HTML/CSS/canvas. (file: /opt/codex/skills/.system/imagegen/SKILL.md)\n- openai-docs: Use when the user asks how to build with OpenAI products or APIs, asks about Codex itself or choosing Codex surfaces, needs up-to-date official documentation with citations, help choosing the latest model for a use case, or model upgrade and prompt-upgrade guidance; use OpenAI docs MCP tools for non-Codex docs questions, use the Codex manual helper first for broad Codex self-knowledge, and restrict fallback browsing to official OpenAI domains. (file: /opt/codex/skills/.system/openai-docs/SKILL.md)\n- plugin-creator: Create and scaffold plugin directories for Codex with a required `.codex-plugin/plugin.json`, optional plugin folders/files, valid manifest defaults, and personal-marketplace entries by default. Use when Codex needs to create a new personal plugin, add optional plugin structure, generate or update marketplace entries for plugin ordering and availability metadata, or update an existing local plugin during development with the CLI-driven cachebuster and reinstall flow. (file: /opt/codex/skills/.system/plugin-creator/SKILL.md)\n- skill-creator: Guide for creating effective skills. This skill should be used when users want to create a new skill (or update an existing skill) that extends Codex's capabilities with specialized knowledge, workflows, or tool integrations. (file: /opt/codex/skills/.system/skill-creator/SKILL.md)\n- skill-installer: Install Codex skills into $CODEX_HOME/skills from a curated list or a GitHub repo path. Use when a user asks to list installable skills, install a curated skill, or install a skill from another repo (including private repos). (file: /opt/codex/skills/.system/skill-installer/SKILL.md)\n","\nFilesystem sandboxing defines which files can be read or written. `sandbox_mode` is `danger-full-access`: No filesystem sandboxing - all commands are permitted. Network access is enabled.\nApproval policy is currently never. Do not provide the `sandbox_permissions` for any reason, commands will be rejected.\n","turn/started",{"_370":371,"_90":598},{"_106":-5,"_45":377,"_378":599,"_380":381,"_382":383,"_384":600},[],"inProgress",{"_384":602,"_370":371},{"_603":604,"_95":605},"activeFlags",[],"active","thread/started",{"_608":609},"thread",{"_610":-5,"_611":-5,"_612":613,"_614":615,"_436":437,"_616":18,"_617":-5,"_618":-5,"_619":-5,"_620":621,"_45":371,"_622":623,"_184":-5,"_624":-5,"_164":625,"_626":202,"_627":615,"_628":371,"_442":629,"_384":630,"_631":-5,"_80":632,"_633":615},"agentNickname","agentRole","cliVersion","0.144.0-alpha.4","createdAt",1786587895,"ephemeral","extra","forkedFromId","gitInfo","historyMode","legacy","modelProvider","openai","parentThreadId","/opt/codex/sessions/2026/08/13/rollout-2026-08-13T02-24-55-019ff8ef-d7a9-7500-9094-09a4ab976418.jsonl","preview","recencyAt","sessionId","vscode",{"_95":388},"threadSource",[],"updatedAt",[],"messages",[637],{"_45":638,"_639":640,"_641":642,"_643":642,"_394":644,"_384":645,"_396":-5,"_646":35,"_647":648,"_649":650,"_651":-5},"e37d192e-3606-4200-a01c-4528498ebaef","author",{"_99":328,"_184":-5,"_647":660},"create_time",1786587894.602512,"update_time",{"_656":49,"_657":658},"finished_successfully","weight","metadata",{"_652":653},"recipient","all","channel","l1239dk1",{"_654":655},"inline_comments",[],"content_type","parts",[659],"@codex addressed in 95ef998 — see thread reply above.\nchore(infra): record why AuditEvents is not time-partitioned\n\n## Summary\n- Parks the #494 review's \"should we partition AuditEvents by month\" question as a permanent decision record instead of leaving it to be re-litigated.\n- Answer: no — the dominant read (`GetProvenanceAsync`) has no date predicate, so monthly partitioning strictly worsens that query, forces a PK change, and adds a new INSERT-fails failure mode inside the same transaction as the audited mutation (#93). Table is ~20 MB/year at 100 flocks — nowhere near needing it.\n- If it ever does: partition by `AccountId` (the column the query actually filters on), not by time.\n- Docs-only: `docs/decisions/505-audit-events-no-time-partition.md` (full reasoning) + a compressed `AGENTS.md` bullet + index row in `docs/decisions/README.md`, per this repo's established rule-vs-rationale split (#413).\n\nCloses #505.\n\n## Test plan\n- Documentation-only change, no behavioral impact — no tests applicable (per this repo's TDD skill: pure doc changes are out of scope for the RED/GREEN cycle).\n- Local pi (deepseek-v4-flash) review pass for internal consistency + factual accuracy of the Postgres partitioning claims.\n**_{_{![P2 Badge](https://img.shields.io/badge/P2-yellow?style=flat)}} Preserve provenance when archiving audit rows**\n\nThis recommendation is unsafe as written because `GetProvenanceAsync` derives `CreatedBy*` exclusively from the original `*.Create` event and derives `MadeOfficialAtUtc` from the promotion event. If a retention job archives or rolls up those old rows while the corresponding flock, grade, expense, or order remains visible, its page will silently lose provenance even if newer audit rows remain. Specify that archival must keep these events queryable (or persist equivalent provenance) rather than simply removing or aggregating rows from `AuditEvents`.\n\nAGENTS.md reference: [AGENTS.md:L53-L53](https://github.com/mforce/cluckwork/blob/fa19cb0306e373d194844722afd1209b4947f54d/AGENTS.md#L53-L53)\n\nUseful? React with 👍 / 👎.\n\n### 💡 Codex Review\n\nHere are some automated review suggestions for this pull request.\n\n**Reviewed commit:** `fa19cb0306`\n \n\n

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\n
\n\n[Your team has set up Codex to review pull requests in this repo](https://chatgpt.com/codex/cloud/settings/general). Reviews are triggered when you\n- Open a pull request for review\n- Mark a draft as ready\n- Comment \"@codex review\".\n\nIf Codex has suggestions, it will comment; otherwise it will react with 👍.\n\n\n\n\nCodex can also answer questions or update the PR. Try commenting \"@codex address that feedback\".\n \n

\nGood catch — fixed in 95ef998: the archival bullet now names the actual hazard (GetProvenanceAsync reads CreatedBy*/MadeOfficialAtUtc straight from the original *.Create/promotion events for as long as the record stays visible) and says any archival design must keep those source events queryable, not just drop/roll up by age.",{},"created",1786587948.4332297,"Completing the task","event_type","info",{"_95":402,"_99":96,"_394":732},{"_95":668,"_669":670},"partial_repo_snapshot","files",[671],{"_164":672,"_673":-5,"_674":675,"_676":-5},"docs/decisions/505-audit-events-no-time-partition.md","contents","line_range_contents",[677],"missing_reason",{"_678":679,"_680":681,"_394":682,"_683":62},"line_range_start",1,"line_range_end",61,[684,202,685,202,686,202,687,688,689,690,202,691,202,692,693,694,695,696,697,698,699,202,700,202,701,702,703,704,705,706,707,708,709,202,710,202,711,712,202,713,202,714,715,716,717,718,719,720,721,722,723,724,725,726,202,727,202,728,729,730,731],"contains_end_of_file","# `AuditEvents` is not time-partitioned (#505)","Parked from the #494 review, so the reasoning is not rediscovered.","## Question","`AuditEvents` is append-only with no purge sweep, so it only grows. #494","added ~1 row per daily entry per day (`DailyEntry.Create` + `DailyEntry.Submit`),","on top of every other audited mutation. Should we get ahead of it by","range-partitioning the table by month?","## Answer: no, and not merely \"not yet\"","Time partitioning is the wrong axis for this table. Partition pruning only","helps a query that filters on the partition key. The dominant read —","`AuditEventRepository.GetProvenanceAsync`, run on every Flocks / Egg grades /","Daily entries / Sales / Expenses page load — filters on `AccountId` +","`EntityType` + `EntityId` and carries **no date predicate at all**.","Partitioning by month converts one index lookup on","`IX_AuditEvents_AccountId_EntityId` into one lookup *per partition*, getting","worse every month. It would degrade the exact query #494 introduced.","Three further costs, none of them the deciding one:","1. Postgres requires the partition key in every unique constraint, so the PK"," moves from `Id` to `(Id, OccurredAtUtc)`. Converting an existing table"," means create-new + copy + rename, not an `ALTER`.","2. Partition maintenance becomes a new failure mode with teeth. If next"," month's partition does not exist, `INSERT` fails; audit writes share the"," transaction with the change they record (#93), so *every audited"," mutation* fails with it. No partition-maintenance job runs today.","3. It drags in a migration (#407), a `docs/schema/` regeneration (#417), and"," a sim-harness pass (#370) — for a table that does not need any of them yet.","## Current size, for the record","~2 rows per flock per day. 10 flocks → ~7.3k rows/year; 100 flocks → ~73k","rows/year, roughly 20 MB/year. Not a problem at any plausible farm size.","## If it ever does bite, in order","1. **Archive or roll up** rows older than the retention the farm actually"," needs — but not naively. `GetProvenanceAsync` derives `CreatedBy*` from"," the record's original `*.Create` event and `MadeOfficialAtUtc` from its"," promotion event (submit/confirm), for as long as the record itself stays"," visible — which for a flock or a sales order can be indefinitely. Moving"," or aggregating those specific rows out of `AuditEvents` while the record"," they describe is still shown would silently blank its History column."," Any archival design must keep provenance-source events queryable (or"," copy their fields forward) for every record still visible, not just"," drop/roll up by age.","2. **Partition by `AccountId`** — the column the provenance query *does*"," filter on, so pruning would apply. Only meaningful once the deployment is"," genuinely multi-tenant.","## Separate, and real","The Audit page pages with `OFFSET`, which degrades on deep pages as the","table grows. Independent of partitioning and of #494; worth keyset","pagination on its own merits if it ever shows up in practice — no issue","filed for it yet.",[733,734,735,736,737,738,739],{"_656":49,"_49":749},{"_656":741,"_164":672,"_678":748,"_680":745},{"_656":49,"_49":747},{"_656":741,"_164":672,"_678":745,"_680":746},{"_656":49,"_49":744},{"_656":741,"_164":672,"_678":742,"_680":743},{"_656":49,"_49":740},"\n\nNo additional changes were necessary, so I did not create another commit or pull request.\n\n**Checks**\n- ✅ `git show --format=fuller --no-ext-diff HEAD -- docs/decisions/505-audit-events-no-time-partition.md`\n- ✅ `git diff --check HEAD^..HEAD`\n- ✅ `git status --porcelain` (working tree clean)\n- ⚠️ `git diff --check 851033b2e986b95aed8bfeb580c9446130b639e6..HEAD` (the PR base commit is unavailable in the local checkout)","repo_file_citation",49,51,"\n- Requires future archival designs either to retain those events as queryable or copy their provenance fields forward. ",46,48,"\n- Warns that archiving those events while the associated record remains visible would silently remove its provenance. ",42,"The reviewer’s concern is already fully addressed in commit `95ef998`. The decision record now:\n\n- Explains that `GetProvenanceAsync` depends on the original create and promotion events. ",{"_95":328,"_45":87,"_99":328,"_752":753,"_754":755,"_756":757,"_135":-5,"_122":758},[86],"input_items",[777,778,779,780,781],"external_post_config",{"_759":760,"_266":199,"_761":308,"_277":-5,"_762":260,"_763":-5,"_764":-5,"_765":766,"_767":768,"_769":-5,"_770":-5,"_771":772,"_773":18,"_774":62,"_775":57,"_776":18},"user_model_slug","slug",1786587888.530054,"installation_id",150444056,"pr_number","repo_id","gitlab_service_account_project_id","review_trigger","comment_id",5275200620,"comment_type","issue","pr_write_guard_token","pending_pr_reaction_id","pending_comment_reaction_id",397191094,"comment_if_no_findings","comment_on_error","share_url","is_parallel_review",{"_95":402,"_99":328,"_394":792},{"_315":316,"_317":318,"_789":322,"_790":132,"_324":-5,"_95":791},{"_95":782,"_317":788,"_164":672,"_784":785,"_786":-5},{"_95":782,"_317":787,"_164":-5,"_784":-5,"_786":-5},{"_95":782,"_317":783,"_164":672,"_784":785,"_786":-5},"pull_request_comment","Good catch — fixed in 95ef998: the archival bullet now names the actual hazard (GetProvenanceAsync reads CreatedBy*/MadeOfficialAtUtc straight from the original *.Create/promotion events for as long as the record stays visible) and says any archival design must keep those source events queryable, not just drop/roll up by age.","side","RIGHT","line","\n### 💡 Codex Review\n\nHere are some automated review suggestions for this pull request.\n\n**Reviewed commit:** `fa19cb0306`\n \n\n

ℹ️ About Codex in GitHub

","**_{_{![P2 Badge](https://img.shields.io/badge/P2-yellow?style=flat)}} Preserve provenance when archiving audit rows**\n\nThis recommendation is unsafe as written because `GetProvenanceAsync` derives `CreatedBy*` exclusively from the original `*.Create` event and derives `MadeOfficialAtUtc` from the promotion event. If a retention job archives or rolls up those old rows while the corresponding flock, grade, expense, or order remains visible, its page will silently lose provenance even if newer audit rows remain. Specify that archival must keep these events queryable (or persist equivalent provenance) rather than simply removing or aggregating rows from `AuditEvents`.\n\nAGENTS.md reference: [AGENTS.md:L53-L53](https://github.com/mforce/cluckwork/blob/fa19cb0306e373d194844722afd1209b4947f54d/AGENTS.md#L53-L53)\n\nUseful? React with 👍 / 👎.","base_ref","head_ref","pull_request_info",[793],{"_656":49,"_49":794},"@codex addressed in 95ef998 — see thread reply 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